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Abstract 
 
 
Why do states transfer arms to one another, and what are the effects of these weapons 
transfers? Conventional weapons are the weapons most commonly used in war, and states 
devote significant resources to acquiring them, spending an estimated $401 billion in 2014. 
Despite this link to conflict and economic resources, we know very little about why states 
seek certain weapons and not others, or the outcomes of these transfers. In contrast to 
arguments that conflict or economic profit guide weapons transfers, I argue that states use 
weapons transfers to send political signals. These signals, based on the symbolic value of 
the weapon, clarify—to friend and foe alike—the extent and depth of the states’ political 
relationship. My dissertation offers a typology of weapons and their expected effect on the 
receiving state’s foreign policy behavior; theorizes the circumstances under which these 
outcomes should be observed; and assesses this theory using case studies of US arms 
transfers to India and Pakistan (1954-1967), Egypt and Israel (1962-1968), and China and 
Taiwan (1972-1979), as well as large-n statistical and network analyses, in turn offering a 
novel explanation of key foreign policy dynamics.
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Introduction 
 
In 2013, Turkey unexpectedly announced it would purchase a theater missile defense 
system from China, leading to a diplomatic crisis in the NATO alliance. Turkey was 
expected to purchase arms from one of its fellow NATO members, since the alliance 
includes top-tier missile producers, such as the US, France, Italy, Germany, and the UK.1 
The NATO allies were puzzled by Turkey’s choice of China, as well as the weapon itself. 
China’s FT-2000 missile defense system had never been exported, and would not be 
compatible with NATO’s existing arsenal, including the Patriot missiles that were then 
deployed along Turkey’s border with Syria. Though the FT-2000 had not been used outside 
of China, it was believed to be highly capable, and would not have negatively affected 
Turkey’s relative capabilities.2 Nonetheless, Turkey’s willingness to consider a non-NATO 
missile supplier was immediately condemned by the NATO allies. Even before Turkey 
paid for the missile system, this deal affected foreign policy within NATO. One analyst 
observed that “the whole alliance [was] in conversation with Turkey” at a NATO summit.3 
Turkey continued to be the topic of discussion at a subsequent G20 summit.4 That is, the 
                                                 
1
 Jacob Resneck, “Turkey riles NATO with Chinese Whispers,” Deutsche Welle, 19 February 2015, 
http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-riles-nato-with-chinese-whispers/a-18269483 
2
 Brooks Tigner, “Turkey’s Missile Buy Overshadows NATO Meeting,” The Atlantic Council 22 October 
2013, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/turkey-s-chinese-missile-buy-overshadows-nato-
meeting. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
  Mustafa Kibarogly and Selim Sazak, “Why Turkey Chose, and Then Rejects, a Chinese Air-Defense 
Missile,” Defense One, 3 February 2016, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/02/turkey-china-air-
defense-missile/125648/ 
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mere announcement of this unexpected weapons transfer was enough to trigger a 
condensed period of high-level dialogue between Turkey and its NATO allies.  
Turkey ultimately delayed finalizing the deal with China, though it was happy to raise 
the prospect of buying Chinese weapons from whenever it was dissatisfied with its 
treatment by NATO. The specter of the Chinese deal was raised, notably, in 2015, on the 
100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, and again when Turkey disagreed with US 
and European approaches to the war in Syria.5 Finally, in September 2017, Turkey signed 
a deal, and deposited an initial payment, on the Russian-produced S-400 missile defense 
system. The Turkish president said, “Nobody has the right to discuss the Turkish republic’s 
independence principles or independent decisions about its defense industry,” patently 
dismissing geopolitical concerns over the deal with Russia.  
The NATO backlash directed at Turkey highlights that weapons’ origin is a salient 
point of information for states. It was significant to both Turkey and the NATO states that 
Turkey was pursuing specifically Chinese and Russian missiles. For Turkey, the transfer 
was a way to express its discontent with its allies, and in particular with efforts by France 
and the US to recognize the Armenian genocide.6 China saw an opportunity to widen the 
gap between Turkey and its Western European allies, and would have benefited from 
                                                 
5
 Aaron Stein, “Missile Confusion: Turkey’s Dance with the Chinese,” Arms Control Wonk Blog, 19 
February 2015, http://guests.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4889/missile-confusion-turkeys-dance-with-
the-chinese.  
6
 Ibid.; Bulent Aliriza and Samuel Brannen, “Turkey Looks to China on Air and Missile Defense?” Center 
for International & Strategic Studies, 8 October 2013, https://csis.org/publication/turkey-looks-china-
missile-defense; Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey to Keep Missile System Outside NATO as China Deal Looms,” 
Bloomberg, 19 February 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-19/turkey-to-keep-
missile-system-outside-nato-as-china-deal-looms.  
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securing a contract to export its missiles to the “West.”7 By announcing China – rather than 
a NATO state – as its new missile supplier, Turkey signaled a rift between it and the NATO 
allies, which led the allies to engage in dialogue with Turkey about its role in NATO. 
Similarly, Russia saw the Turkey deal as an opportunity to sow dissent within NATO. 
This example shows that weapons serve dual functions in international politics. They 
affect military capabilities but also send signals about political relationships. I argue that 
weapons transfers are credible signals of political relationships, and that these signals 
matter because they affect the foreign policy behavior of states. Weapons transfers are an 
essential tool for producing, sustaining, and severing political ties, even when the weapon 
does not affect the relative balance of power. These signals sent through weapons transfers 
help explain why war does or does not occur, why states pursue cooperative or belligerent 
foreign policies at various times, and are tools for establishing hierarchies within alliances. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 
To show the link between weapons transfers and foreign policy, I proceed in three steps: 
(1) provide a way to distinguish between types of conventional weapons; (2) identify the 
different signals sent by different types of transfers; (3) connect signals to foreign policy 
outcomes. 
Even intuitively, we know that a tank is very different than a supersonic jet. Yet most 
analyses of weapons lump these into the same umbrella “conventional weapons” category. 
                                                 
7
 See Emre Peker, “Turkey Breaks from West on Defense,” Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-shifts-away-from-west-on-defense-1429608604. 
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I argue that this is not a particularly useful analytic category and provide a way to 
systematically talk about differences between conventional weapons. I take an inductive 
approach to classify weapons based on the prestige of the type of weapon, and the military 
utility it has for the state receiving it. This categorization is highly contextual, and means 
that weapons can be in different categories for different states. Take, for example, 
Singapore’s recent purchase of nearly 300 Cold War-era tanks from Germany. Singapore 
is an island, and tanks are usually unforgiving on civilian roads, so it is not immediately 
clear what, if any, military use these tanks will have for Singapore. Egypt, on the other 
hand, would see much higher military utility from tanks.  
Similarly, not all weapons are prestigious, and some weapons can be prestigious even 
if they aren’t militarily useful. In one notable – and recurring – example, US diplomat 
George Ball called the F-104 fighter jet a “glamour object.”8 Glamour weapons contrast 
with weapons like jeeps or tanker planes: weapons that are important militarily, but don’t 
have any of the prestige or wow-factor associated with them. Comparing military utility to 
weapon prestige produces four ideal types of weapons.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Telegram State (Ball) to New Delhi, 20 August 1963, p. 3, RG 59, Box 3761, Folder DEF Defense Affairs 
US-Pak 1/1/63, US National Archives (USNA). 
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This typology provides a framework for talking about differences between 
conventional weapons that does not rely on often tenuous classifications of weapons as 
offensive, defensive, or “tail.” It thus avoids debates about whether weapons should be 
analyzed from a tactical, operational, or strategic level, and does not have to labor over 
what to do with weapons that are both offensive and defensive.9 While this typology is 
useful for talking about differences between conventional weapons, on its own it says 
nothing about the range of signals sent by different types of weapons transfers. To 
determine signal type, I consider states’ broader political context to determine which types 
of weapons transfers are expected or unexpected. This is important because, for example, 
we’d expect the NATO allies to have different transfer relationships than a NATO ally 
would have with China or Brazil. As explained in further detail in Chapter 2, I argue that 
we can determine which transfers are expected or unexpected for a given relationship based 
on the degree of common or conflictual interests between those states.10 Crucially, the 
signal that is sent by an arms transfer depends on whether the transfer was expected or 
unexpected. Expected arms transfers send a reinforcement signal: this type of transfer 
confirms or cements existing relations. Unexpected transfers, by contrast, constitute new 
relationships or mark a change in existing relations. When the transfer is unexpectedly 
positive – such as receiving a higher quantity or better type of weapon than anticipated – 
the transfer sends an upgrade signal. When the transfer is unexpectedly negative – such as 
                                                 
9
 Biddle 2001; Glaser and Kaufmann 1998; Lynn-Jones 1995; Van Evera 1998. On the “tail” in tooth-to-
tail ratio, see Van Creveld 2004. Fortifications, for example, are defensive because they protect your own 
territory and forces, but this protection can enable an offensive strategy since you know your own land is 
secured. 
10
 Snyder 1984a. 
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the denial of a request or receiving a lower type of weapon – the transfer sends a downgrade 
signal.  
Finally, I connect each of these signals to distinct foreign policy behaviors. 
Reinforcement signals, coming from expected weapons transfers, should lead to continuity 
in foreign policy. After receiving a signal that everything remains the same, the receiver of 
the weapon should not change its foreign policy. Oftentimes weapons transfers become so 
ingrained and part of standard operating procedure that they have no effect on the receiver’s 
foreign policy, as in the NATO alliance; they simply reinforce the current state of affairs. 
The foreign policy effects of upgrade and downgrade signals depend on whether the 
receiver is status quo or revisionist.11 Although weapons transfers effect foreign policy, 
they do not fundamentally alter a state’s strategic orientation. Upgrade signals facilitate 
bolstering behavior in status quo states. The upgrade signal indicates that there is the 
possibility for a closer relationship between the sender and receiver. I expect the receiver 
to accordingly take actions to strengthen this budding relationship.12 In revisionist states, 
upgrade signals can lead to aggression, as these states seek to translate their new political 
alignment into more forceful pursuit of their goals. Downgrade signals should lead status 
quo states to pursue compromise with their adversaries. Sensing winds of change, these 
states will seek to do whatever it takes to guarantee as much of the status quo as possible. 
Revisionist states, on the other hand, will want to take action before their downgraded 
political alignment becomes reality, and thus should pursue prevention. Both status quo 
                                                 
11
 On the importance of status quo vs. revisionist, see George and Smoke 1974, 526; Jervis 1976, Ch.3; 
Slantchev 2005. 
12
 Bell 2015, 97-98. 
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and revisionist states should, after receiving a downgrade signal, seek re-alignment with 
an alternate partner. Figure 1, below, summarizes the signals and receiver’s foreign policy 
behaviors that result from weapons transfers.  
Relationships, of course, are dynamic and change over time. Therefore, the weapons 
that send each type of signal can change over time as relationships persist or change. While 
a squadron of fighter jets might have sent an upgrade signal early in a relationship, a similar 
transfer five or ten years down the line might be construed as a downgrade signal. States’ 
expectations change, which is why the type of weapon – the content of the tie between 
states – is so integral to explaining the link between arms transfers and foreign policy 
outcomes. 
Understanding the effects of conventional weapons transfers matters deeply for 
policymakers and for scholars. Weapons transfers most obviously have stakes for states’ 
abilities to fight wars or deter conflict, yet policymakers looking for answers about the 
Figure 1: Arms transfers, Signals, and Foreign Policy Outcomes 
Is the  
transfer  
expected? 
Reinforcement 
Signal 
Continuity 
Is the transfer 
negative or 
positive? 
Is there a 
feasible alternate 
alignment? 
Prevention 
Bolstering 
Realignment 
Aggression 
Downgrade  
Signal 
Upgrade 
Signal 
Compromise 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Negative 
No 
Status Quo  
State 
Status Quo  
State 
Revisionist 
State 
Revisionist 
State 
Positive 
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relationship between arms and conflict will find themselves disappointed. Because 
scholarship treats “conventional weapons” as a monolithic category – ignoring the different 
war-fighting capabilities of a tank as compared to a jet – scholarship lacks a coherent 
understanding of the relationship between weapons and war. The theory developed in this 
project provides better leverage on this question by differentiating between types of 
weapons and states’ strategic orientation. The case studies that follow help explain the 
outbreak of war between India and Pakistan in 1965; offer an amended explanation of the 
June 1967 war; and address the lack of armed conflict between China and Taiwan. 
This project also has stakes for scholars and policymakers interested in credible signals 
in international politics. Whether discussions of “red lines” or cheap talk, the different ways 
that states can credibly commit themselves to a course of action has long occupied the 
thoughts of leaders and scholars. The central insight of this dissertation is that conventional 
weapons are widely recognized symbols, that transfers of these symbols constitute credible 
international signals, and that these signals matter because they affect political 
relationships. Though there can be costs associated with transferring weapons, the signal 
itself comes from symbols and shared understandings. This project is a first step toward 
developing a theory of communication that does not rely on either extreme of costly signals 
or of cheap talk, and shows the deep social context and contingency of signaling in 
international politics. My analysis of conventional weapons transfers thus extends work by 
Robert Jervis concerning international communication based on symbols and 
perceptions.13  
                                                 
13
 Jervis 1970.  
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Analyzing conventional weapons as both tool and symbol sheds light on questions of 
international order and polarity. Though the structure of the international system matters, 
structure does not place the same constraints on every actor. As the following chapters 
show, even in the relatively rigid bipolar structure of the Cold War, weapons transfers 
crossed blocs: the West traded with the Soviet bloc and vice-versa. My argument about 
foreign policy behaviors examines the feasibility of alternate alignment partners, and uses 
the strength and depth of ties between states to make this assessment. Though, for example, 
it would seem that the Cold War structure would preclude China from being a feasible 
alignment partner for a Western ally, this was often not the case. Polarity at the level of the 
system can often bear only a passing resemblance to polarity at the regional level.  
With respect to international order, the signals sent by weapons transfers are implicated 
in the production and communication of status hierarchies. Withholding particular planes 
from, for example, all but the closest allies is a way of drawing an intra-group clique. 
Similarly, that clique can expand if other states are given that same plane. Alternately, a 
receiving state can draw boundaries between it and potential peer states (or structural 
equivalents) by refusing to accept certain weapons. Establishing or clarifying these status 
hierarchies if often a deliberate motivation behind weapons transfers. 
Finally, treating arms as both military tool and symbol shows the promise of linking 
materialist and constructivist approaches to international security. Addressing both 
dimensions of weapons shows that perceptions of relative power are a function of both 
military capabilities and relationships with other states. Weapons transfers serve the vital 
role of signaling and clarifying these political relationships. Combined with the focus on 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power     
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relationships, this work shows how international actors use symbols and signal to make 
and unmake relations that constitute world politics. 
 
ROADMAP 
 
 
The body of the dissertation lays out the argument in more detail. In Chapter 1, I review 
existing scholarship on conventional weapons transfers, highlighting oversights and issues 
with data usage and models. The second half of this chapter includes a description of the 
global arms trade, drawing on fieldwork and quantitative network analysis to show changes 
over time. Chapter 2 develops my theory of conventional weapons transfers. I argue that 
weapons transfers are a credible form of signaling that clarifies the extent and depth of 
states’ political relationships. I develop a typology of conventional weapons based on 
fieldwork, and show how different types of weapons lead to different foreign policy 
expectations. The next three chapters demonstrate the theory through case studies. Chapter 
3 explains why Pakistan turned away from its chief ally, the United States, in the mid-
1960s, and why war occurred between India and Pakistan in 1965. Chapter 4, on US, 
French, and Soviet transfers to the Middle East, offers an amended explanation for the June 
1967 war by showing how signals sent by arms transfers fueled ambiguities about political 
relationships. Finally, Chapter 5 examines how the US used weapons transfers to develop 
its policy of strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait in the 1970s. Chapter 6 flips the 
analysis to explain what happens when the receivers in the previous case studies develop 
their own domestic defense industry. I focus on the cases of Israel and India to address 
how, if at all, states’ interest in arms transfers as signals changes once they can make their 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power     
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own weapons. I conclude the dissertation by discussing how weapons transfers have, and 
continue to, make and unmake the relations that constitute world politics, and draw out 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 1. Conventional Weapons: Known Unknowns 
 
States spent a combined US$1.69 trillion on their militaries in 2016, much of which was 
devoted to acquiring arms. The top importers were India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 
China while the top exporters included the United States, Russia, China, and France.14 
Despite the political power of states on this list, and the significant amount of resources 
states devoted to acquiring weapons, scholarship on the effects of conventional arms 
transfers remains limited, described by one scholar as “sparse and spotty.”15 When scholars 
have analyzed conventional arms, they generally do so with a narrow focus on immediate 
conflict outcomes, such as the duration or onset of war, or human rights violations. Others 
treat the arms trade as a trade and provide primarily economic explanations for the flows 
of weapons around the world. However, both conflict and economic models of the arms 
trade ignore – or assume away – the broader political relationships created, sustained, or 
severed, through arms transfers.  
Drawing on new information about the logistics of the arms trade, this chapter shows 
that assumptions scholars make about how the arms trade works do not reflect the reality 
of the process. Existing scholarship paints the arms trade as a simple, straightforward, and 
unsurprising domain of international politics. To the contrary, I show that arms transfers 
are not easily explained as economic or conflict-related processes, and argue for a broader 
view of the political relationships affected by the arms trade. I proceed as follows. First, I 
                                                 
14
 See the SIPRI Arms Transfer database, https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-
disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending. 
15
 Thurner, Schmidt, Cranmer, and Kauermann, 2015, 3. 
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provide an overview of existing literature, highlighting its divergent conclusions. Second, 
I explain the logistics of the arms trade, and point out where existing literature overlooks 
these important logistical factors, leading to problematic inferences. Third, I build a new 
dataset to try to correct for many of the inaccurate assumptions. I then turn to descriptive 
network analysis to highlight the relationships created by arms transfers, paying particular 
attention to the different patterns of relationships created by different types of weapons 
transfers. I conclude by suggesting a new approach to studying the arms trade, grounded 
in deep knowledge of the arms trade and the politics that are deeply infused in and affected 
by arms transfers. 
 
EXPLAINING THE ARMS TRADE 
Most existing literature on conventional weapons transfers is focused on the relationship 
between arms and conflict or takes an economics approach and suggests that states perform 
a bang-for-their-buck calculation. This literature is generally quantitative in nature, relying 
on data collected by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and 
models either state decisions to export weapons or decisions to import them.  
Where arms and conflict are concerned, some scholars suggests that conflict increases 
desire for arms, while others suggest there is no correlation between arms and conflict. 
Brzoska and Pearson find that arms transfers affected decisions to initiate war,16 Blanton 
finds that increased arms imports correlate with higher incidence of human rights 
                                                 
16
 Brzoska and Pearson 1994. 
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violations,17 and Sislin and Pearson find that higher levels of weapons accumulated by 
ethnic groups are a good predictor of subsequent ethnopolitical violence.18 Others have 
added caveats to these findings. Kinsella shows that arms transfers allow the recipient to 
engage in diplomatic or military conflict, but that this behavior is tempered if the recipient 
is dependent on a single supplier for arms.19 Diehl and Kingston, on the other hand, do not 
observe any change in overall military spending based on conflict in the previous year.20 
Craft similarly found no relationship between weapons transfers and the duration of war,21 
and Durch took it a step further to say that conflict itself can’t explain the arms trade, and 
the arms trade can’t explain conflict.22 
To a certain extent, scholars’ focus on arms and conflict dynamics makes sense: 
conventional weapons are the most commonly used tools of war, and cause the majority of 
conflict-related deaths.23 The contradictory findings about arms transfers and conflict 
might initially seem puzzling. However, even a simplistic understanding of general trade 
suggests why this literature has not yet reached consensus. The transfer or sale of anything 
involves two parties, but most models of the arms trade focus on the sender of the weapon 
or the receiver. Pearson’s research, for example, looks only at the characteristics of the 
receiving state, not the policies or characteristics of the sending state. A dyadic process 
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 Blanton 1999. 
18
 Sislin and Pearson 2001. 
19
 Kinsella 1998. 
20
 Diehl and Kingston 1987, 810. The authors analyze military spending – a figure that includes both 
foreign and domestic arms purchases – but do not break out arms purchases separately. 
21
 Craft 1999. 
22
 Durch 2000. 
23
 Erickson 2015, 8; Biddle 2010, 9.  
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cannot possibly be explained by focusing on the actions of one party. Kinsella draws his 
conclusions by studying arms transfers to nine countries, all in the Middle East or North 
Africa. Weapons transfers and conflict are so intimately tied to politics that is seems highly 
improbable that explanations based on one region could easily generalize to others.  
A second problem concerns the artificial separation between the causes of arms 
transfers and their consequences. This separation might be because, as Jennifer Erickson 
notes, arms transfers are “a complex issue followed only by a small set of specialists, 
NGOs, and the defense industry.”24 With the exception of Erickson, most scholars overlook 
the fact that the reasons states seek arms, and thus our explanations of arms transfers, are 
inherently tied to the effects of arms transfers.25 As related work in the nuclear domain has 
shown, there is no single explanation for all states: motivations for seeking weapons are 
multi-causal, and can change over time.26 Disentangling cause from effect in the 
relationship between arms and conflict is particularly difficult because the desire to engage 
in conflict is often a motivation for seeking arms; the anticipated effects of arms transfers 
are the cause. But most models of the arms trade are not equipped to capture this 
complexity and endogeneity. 
While critical for existing literature, these two critiques don’t require knowledge 
particular to the arms trade. The dyadic and endogenous nature of the arms trade means it 
                                                 
24
 Erickson 2015, 31.  
25
 A related body of literature on the defense industry more explicitly incorporates a dyadic vision. See, for 
example, Gutterman and Lane 2017; Vucetic and Tago 2015; Kapstein 1992; Caverley and Kapstein 2012. 
Many of the critiques levied here do not apply to this work, since most of the scholars working on this topic 
have detailed knowledge about the defense industry. 
26
 In the nuclear realm, see Bell 2015. 
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is particularly difficult to model quantitatively. Modeling difficulties increase 
exponentially with more accurate knowledge of the logistics of the arms trade. As the next 
section shows, the arms trade is far from a simple and straightforward process, and the 
assumptions scholars make about it – whether explicit assumptions or assumptions implicit 
by model choice – do not reflect the reality of the global arms trade. 
 
NOT SO SIMPLE, AFTER ALL: OVERVIEW OF THE ARMS TRADE 
 
Though scholars tend to assume that the arms trade is a rather straightforward process in 
international politics, the actual logistics of the arms trade are quite complex. As a result, 
scholars continue to make inferences based on wildly unrepresentative assumptions. 
Contrary to popular belief, the arms trade has only a tenuous relationship to conflict and to 
economic-based decision-making. I first present general trends in the arms trade over time, 
before explaining the long time-horizons, multiplicity of actors, and economic 
complications that affect the arms trade. 
 
General Trends over Time 
Between 1950 and 2016, the value of arms transfers has varied significantly. Data collected 
by SIPRI shows a spike in arms transfers in the early 1980s, after which the quantity of 
arms transfers decreased until the end of the Cold War. Though the arms trade has since 
increased, it has not hit the yearly high achieved during the Cold War. Figure 1, below, 
graphs arms transfers over time using a measure called the Trend Indicator Value (TIV).  
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As defined by SIPRI, this is a numerical value “based on the known unit production costs 
of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather 
than the financial value of the transfer.”27 The TIV represents characteristics and 
performance of the weapon, types of electronics, engine, and the year in which the weapon 
was produced. For example, SIPRI discounts the TIV if the transferred weapon has been 
in service in another country. Most scholarship relies on the TIV data, and while useful for 
comparison of all conventional arms transfers over time, the TIV is like a blunt knife, 
providing a crude and rather unnuanced look at the arms trade: it captures general trends, 
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 SIPRI background information for Arms Transfer Database, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background 
Figure 2: Arms Transfers Over Time  
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but does not differentiate between types of weapons.28 It is more similar to an analysis of 
military spending than an analysis of weapons and their effects. 
Even using the crude TIV measure, it’s possible to differentiate between types of 
weapons. Such differentiation makes intuitive sense, since a tank can enable a very 
different type of fighting than can a supersonic aircraft. And yet, most scholarship uses 
undifferentiated data, continuing to treat “conventional weapons” as a monolithic category. 
As Figure 2, below, shows, the assumption that all conventional weapons are the same is 
problematic. Figure 3 represents transfers of aircraft, air defense systems (such as surface-
to-air missile and tracking systems), armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and ships over 
time.29 If scholars were genuinely interested in studying the relationship between arms 
transfers and conflict, they should use the differentiated TIV data. As Figure 3 clearly 
shows, there are differences in the types of weapons transferred over time.  For example, 
from 1990 to 1998, air defense systems shrunk to well under half their Cold War totals, 
and yet the aggregate level of arms transfers increased. As this example illustrates, scholars 
would obtain different conclusions regarding arms transfers depending on the level of 
aggregation and arms type examined. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 See, among others, Kinsella 1998, 2002; Brzoska and Pearson 1994; Akerman and Seim 2014; Sanjian 
1999. 
29
 The gap between these categories and “total” is made up of engines, sensors, “other,” satellites, and 
naval weapons. 
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Because different amounts of each type of weapon are transferred at different rates over 
time, inferences drawn about arms and outcomes of interest depend on the level of data 
aggregation. Further complicating the use of undifferentiated data, there are varying 
patterns of relationships created by different types of weapons transfers. Even though many 
states produce all types of arms (the US, for example, produces and exports missiles, 
armored vehicles, and aircraft), the network configuration for each type of weapon is very 
different, suggesting that something effects which weapons are available to which states.30 
Figure 4, below, shows missile, armored vehicles, and aircraft transfers for the period 1950-
1961. The left panel (missiles) makes sense: it shows the expected Cold War clustering 
                                                 
30
 The network graphs included in this chapter were created using SIPRI’s importer/exporter tables. I 
assessed the characteristics of the weapons using information from the weapon manufacturer or from 
defense industry staples like Jane’s Defense. The nodes (red circles) are states, and the ties are directional, 
showing the transfer from sender to receiver. The ties are weighted based on the number of weapons 
transferred in the given period.  
Figure 3: Arms Transfers by Type 
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around the United States (top) and Soviet Union (bottom). Given the superpower rivalry, 
it seems appropriate that the US and Soviet Union each have their own distinct groups of 
states they transfer weapons to.31 Armored vehicle transfers, the middle panel, begin to 
question some of the assumptions about how the structure of the international system 
should be reflected in arms transfers. Though there are still distinct US and USSR clusters, 
there are states in the middle suggesting that bipolarity did not affect armored vehicle 
transfers as rigidly as it did missile transfers.   
Aircraft transfers, the rightmost panel, refute such assumptions about the relationship 
between international structure and arms transfers. Perhaps states were too interested in 
making profits from high ticket items like aircraft to be constrained by Cold War politics. 
But why, then, were they not similarly unconstrained for missiles and armored vehicles? 
These differences cannot be explained by existing literature. The network graphs indicate 
that there is something about the type of weapon that matters – and though different types 
of weapons affect conflict differently, this remains undertheorized in exiting literature. One 
immediate explanation might be the offense-defense balance; that states receiving 
offensive weapons are more conflict-prone than states receiving defensive weapons. Yet 
all three weapons have offensive or defensive variants, and, more importantly, can be 
incorporated into offensive or defensive tactics.32 
                                                 
31
 The sole tie connecting the distinct clusters is a transfer from the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia. 
32
 On the futility of classifying weapons as offensive or defensive, see Lynn-Jones 1995; Glaser and 
Kaufmann 1998. 
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Figure 4: Missile, Armored Vehicle, and Aircraft Transfers, 1950-1961 
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The lack of a conflict-based explanation for the differences between weapons becomes even 
more clear when the type of weapon is further disaggregated. Figure 4 shows the different 
transfer patterns for surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Both 
figures are transfers between 1991 and 2015.33   
 
The SAM network has 35% of the ties of the SSM network, and 44% of the number of 
receivers. It’s not immediately obvious that SAMs are more offensive than SSMs, since they can 
be used tactically and strategically in both ways. And yet a difference in transfer patterns exists. 
Nor are there such significant cost differences between the types of missiles that an economic 
explanation would fit. Despite their differences, both missile networks show a degree of political 
clustering. In the SAM network, there are distinct clusters around the United States at the top and 
Russia at the bottom. In the SSM network, Russia has a cluster of states at the top, whereas the 
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 If anything, weapons transfers in the post-Cold War period should have similar structures, because of the end of 
the bipolar system structure and an increase in the number of suppliers.  
Figure 5: SSM vs. SAM transfers 
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US, UK, and Israel anchor the more central cluster. There is clear differentiation between the US 
and Russian clusters. However, this differentiation is less obvious in the armored vehicle networks.  
I classified armored vehicles into a support or offensive category as a final test of the offense-
defense balance/conflict explanation for differences in transfer patterns. Armored vehicles (AVs) 
are easier to classify than missiles, since some AVs have firepower, whereas others are transport 
or support vehicles. The differentiation is more properly characterized as the difference between 
tooth (fighting vehicles) and tail (support vehicles).34 Offensive armored vehicles, the right panel 
in Figure 6, have some clustering, though the network overall is denser and has more receivers 
than either of the missile networks. In the offensive AV network Russia, China, and the 
US/Western Europe each have their set of receivers, but there are a number of states in the middle 
that receive from all three groups, such as Iran and Pakistan. The network of support AVs (left 
panel), is much denser, with a group of interconnected central states that cut across traditional 
security blocs seen in the other networks.  
The network graphs raise more questions than they answer. Why are there differences in 
transfer patterns? Why do these patterns change over time? Why are some states central in one 
network but peripheral in another? These questions are compounded by the actual logistics of the 
arms trade, particularly the time horizons, actors involved, and economic dynamics.   
                                                 
34
 Scholars strangely ignore the tooth-to-tail ratio, even though conflict will be short lived unless the state has the 
necessary support structures. A notable exception is Van Creveld 2004. 
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Figure 6: Support vs. Offensive Armored Vehicle transfers 
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Logistics, Part I: Time Horizons 
Scholarship on the relationship between arms and conflict assumes that states seek, and obtain, 
weapons they need in a short period of time. While second-hand arms are usually available on a 
faster timeline than new weapons (or weapons still under production), there is often a multi-year 
gap between when weapons were ordered and when they were delivered. Just examining the SIPRI 
data, there was, on average, a 2.7-year gap between when artillery was ordered and when it was 
delivered, with a maximum gap of 27 years. For aircraft the average difference was 1.9 years, with 
a maximum period of 41 years. When aircraft are new, particularly supersonic and/or 
technologically sophisticated aircraft, the delay is significant. The F-35, Lockheed Martin’s brand-
new fighter jet, has been in development for 25 years. This means that states could technically 
have ordered the jet 25 years ago, and are still waiting on delivery. It would be rather prophetic if 
a state ordered the F-35 intending to use it for a specific conflict. 
For cases where the gap between order and delivery is small, it might be plausible that states 
ordered the weapon in anticipation of future conflict. However, weapons purchases require long-
term investments of resources and personnel, so various levels of state bureaucracy are involved 
in the decision-making process. Budgets have to be allocated, and purchasing weapons often 
requires decisions about strategic priorities, increasing the stakes for each purchase and the number 
of veto-players and stakeholders involved. Weapons purchases are therefore planned many years 
in advance of actually placing an order. The Indian government, for example, has a fifteen-year 
cycle for acquisitions, which government representatives noted was a short time period compared 
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to other states.35 It would indeed require some sort of crystal ball for states to be able to predict 
conflict fifteen or more years in advance.36  
The issue of timing becomes even more complicated from the perspective of the state that 
receives the weapon. Just because a weapon has been delivered does not mean it is available for 
use. First, service members need to be trained to use the weapon, which can include flight school, 
mock battles, or combined arms training. Second, weapons cannot be used for any sustained period 
without spare parts and support equipment. Tank tracks often need to be replaced; aircraft need 
engine and wing maintenance; and artillery requires a large supply of shells. This can further 
lengthen the time between when a weapon is delivered and when it is operational. A 1984 RAND 
report, for example, stated that while the US could deliver an F-16 fighter jet within about two 
years of it being ordered, the initial set of spares and support equipment required three to four 
years for delivery.37 Without spares and support equipment, the weapon has little operational use, 
and therefore should have a limited effect on conflict.  
These logistical insights complicate the usual stories about the arms trade. States rarely get 
what they want when they want it. The necessity of spare parts, maintenance, and training mean 
that arms transfers often result in long-term relationships between sender and receiver. The sender 
can decide to withhold spare parts, or can provide advanced training, all actions that should affect 
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 Fieldwork, DSEI, September 2015. 
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 Cases such as enduring rivalries are one of the few situations when states anticipate regular conflict with their 
rivals. For this reason, enduring rivalries should be a most likely case for states acquiring arms for conflict-related 
reasons. I take this into account in my case selection, described in further detail in the next chapter.  
37 Smith, Moore, Petruschell 1984, 1. 
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conflict. Yet these dynamics – particularly the relationships that are created – are absent from 
existing analyses.  
 
Logistics, Part II: Actors Involved 
The previous section put forward a dyadic critique: theories of the arms trade need to account for 
the political agency of the sender and receiver. Even within the same dyad, there are different rules 
for different weapons. Consider, for example, Lockheed Martin’s F-22 Raptor fighter jet. Japan 
and Israel are among the many US allies that would like to buy the plane, but the US prohibits the 
export of the plane, even to friends and allies.38 Other times a state can rebuff one type of weapon, 
but will happily accept another. During the 1960s, Pakistan wanted the F-104 fighter jet from the 
US, but rebuffed offers of similar jets, including the more capable F-5 jet. 
Adding an additional layer of complication, states think more broadly about the actors and 
relationships affected by each weapons transfer; political and military leaders are not satisfied with 
a dyadic approach. The US, for one, explicitly accounts for “the impact [of the transfer] on the 
preconceptions and the actions of the buyer’s neighbors.39” In other words, even though two states 
are directly involved in the transfer, states consider the effect of the weapon on the perceptions of 
its friends and adversaries.  
                                                 
38 James Simpson, “America’s F-22 Raptor: The fighter jet Japan desperately wants (but can’t have),” The National 
Interest, 10 July 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-f-22-raptor-the-fighter-jet-japan-
desperately-wants-16913; Robert Farley, “Imagine: F-22 Raptors for export,” The Diplomat, 8 May 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/imagine-f-22-raptors-for-export/. 
39 Military Assistance and Sales Manual, 1973, F-2. 
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States receiving weapons perform similar calculations. In 1961, the Soviet Union offered India 
an attractive deal for MiG-21 fighter jets, including assistance with India’s indigenous production 
facilities. However, India rejected the offer because it did not want other states – notably Pakistan 
and the US – to think that it was in the pocket of the Soviet Union. The anticipated reaction of 
states beyond the seller-buyer dyad can thus affect decisions to transfer weapons, which 
demonstrates the endogeneity of arms transfers: if anticipated reactions constrain or enable the 
sending of weapons, then cause and effect are not independent. However, most standard models 
of the arms trade are predicated on the absence of this type of endogeneity. 
There are now two confounding factors to existing scholarship: the long-time horizons and 
resulting complex causal chain, and the inclusion of actors beyond the dyad, introducing 
complicated relationships and further endogeneity. An examination of the economic dimensions 
of the arms trade is the final complicating factor. 
 
Logistics, Part III: Economics 
Though scholars and policy makers often discuss weapon “sales,” it is more accurate to refer to 
weapon “transfers.” The latter encompasses sales, gifts, credit financing, and loans. Though 
economic profit – or the minimization of cost and the maximization of benefit – is often considered 
a key factor in explaining the arms trade, states quite frequently engage in economic behavior that 
is not profit-maximizing.40 Grant-in-aid programs, military assistance programs, and offset 
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 GDP is often included in quantitative models, though its relationship to arms transfers is rarely explicitly 
theorized. Further, GDP is correlated with almost anything, making its presence in the absence of explicit 
theorization problematic.  
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agreements all complicate this economic assumption. In some extraordinary cases, a third party 
will finance the transfer. Some of the more notable examples of this arrangement include:  
• A marine patrol aircraft transferred from Australia to Thailand in the 1980s, financed 
by the UN High Commission for Refugees; 
• A combat helicopter transferred from Belarus to Cote d’Ivoire in 2002, financed by the 
United Kingdom; 
• French aircraft transfers to West Germany in 1965, financed by NATO; and 
• Numerous transfers of French aircraft to Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, financed by Saudi Arabia.41  
 
These arrangements further complicate the dyadic story about which states matter in explaining 
weapons transfers. In an even more complex case, in 2008 Germany transferred a helicopter to 
Panama, though the deal was believed to be financed by Taiwan, and the helicopter itself came 
from the US. Even if these complex deals were only a minority of all arms transfers, existing 
literature doesn’t have a way to account for states foregoing profit, or weighting political 
considerations over economic ones.  
Assistance programs are more common than third-party financing. These programs 
significantly reduce the economic cost of weapons transfers. During the Cold War, the US had a 
Military Assistance Program, which provided weapons at little to no cost to its friends and allies. 
The program generated no profit for the US Government.42 Such programs continue today. In 
2007, the US gave Israel a $30 billion dollar grant so that it could buy US weapons, and in 2013 
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 Examples included in SIPRI arms transfer database.  
42 Kemp and Miller 1979, 39-40. 
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Russia gave Bangladesh $1 billion for the same purpose. These grant-in-aid programs provide 
funding so that states may purchase weapons from the state giving the money, effectively reducing 
any profits that would have otherwise been made.  
Finally, offset agreements in procurement contracts require the seller to re-invest some of its 
profit in the purchasing state. These concessions can take a variety of forms, from allowing the 
buying state to produce a component of the weapon, sponsoring PhD students, or investing in green 
industry and healthcare.43 In recent years, many states have had an offset requirement of 100% of 
the procurement cost and there are some extraordinary cases that have required 400% of the 
procurement cost to be re-invested as an offset.44 Offset agreements complicate models of the arms 
trade in two ways. First, they question the assumption that arms transfers always result in profit 
for the seller, and a cost for the buyer/receiver. Second, they question assumptions about why 
states want arms. If a state can extract rents for domestic projects, then weapons transfers can 
become a means to economic development ends. 
These three logistical issues cast doubt on the likelihood that the arms trade can be studied 
quantitatively. At the very least, existing models are poor representatives of the actual arms trade. 
I constructed a new dataset of US arms transfers, 1950-2015, to attempt to correct for many of 
these issues. However, models estimated with the new data remain fragile, and inferences are 
difficult to make. Ironically, the finding that existing models are unrobust is, well, robust. The 
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following section outlines the new data collection and models, highlighting the continued difficulty 
of quantitative approaches.  
 
NEW DATA, STILL POOR MODELS 
 
 
In an attempt to address some of the issues raised above, I constructed a new dataset of arms 
transfers and potential explanatory variables. The new dataset uses the number of arms transferred 
between each dyad as the dependent variable, which captures real changes in transfers. The dataset 
includes dyadic and unit-level factors designed to better capture factors that affect arms transfer 
decisions. I restricted the dataset to US arms transfers, 1950-2012, for two reasons. First, US 
transfers are useful for reasons of case selection. The US has been the top exporter of conventional 
weapons, and far outpaces other transferrers.45 Since the US transfers weapons to all regions of 
the world, results should not be biased due to the omission of an entire region or time period from 
the resulting models. Second, focusing on US transfers allows me to account for qualitative 
changes within US policy that could explain changes in transfers over time. I conducted a review 
of US documents that set weapons transfer policy to ensure that changes at the level of US national 
policy were not driving any of these results. Fuller descriptions of models and data are available 
in Appendix A, but all results show the continued difficulty of incorporating the logistics of the 
arms trade into a large-n approach. 
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Even simple scatterplots show the lack of correlation between variables usually used in 
explanatory models and the arms trade. The graphs below show independent variables along the 
x-axis, and the volume of arms transferred between the US and recipient states on the y-axis.46 The 
value reported in each graph is the Pearson’s pairwise correlation (r), which is a measure of the 
strength and association between the two variables. The closer this value is to -1 or to 1, the 
stronger the relationship between the variables. As both the graphs and the Pearson’s value 
demonstrate, there is no strong or directional relationship between any of these variables and the 
weapons a state receives from the US. For example, it is not the case that states that share similar 
UN voting patterns with the US (Affinity Index) get more weapons than states that are more distant 
from US policy positions. The receiving state’s military expenditure is not correlated with weapons 
transfers, nor is the amount of trade with the US. These graphs indicate that other factors affect 
the arms trade, but cannot indicate what those other factors are. 
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 Note that the following variables are logged: Military Expenditure, US exports to Receiver, and Receiver GDP.  
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To test for statistical and substantive relationships in a multivariate context, I ran fixed effects 
panel models on the new dataset, and used country-level fixed effects to hold constant any 
corresponding time-invariant country specific (and US-specific) factors. As described in further 
detail in the appendix, these models raised more questions than they answered. The dataset I 
constructed includes most plausible independent predictors for the amount of arms a state should 
receive from the United States, including military/defense, economic, and political variables. The 
military variables that I included (all for the receiver) are: military expenditure, number of military 
personnel, whether or not the state has a defense pact with the US, fatalities during conflict in the 
previous year, and the highest hostility level of conflict in the prior year.47 Economic variables 
include imports from and exports to the US, and the receiver’s GDP. Finally, I included the 
receiver’s polity score and a measure of UN voting similarity between the US and the receiver.48 
In each model, I also included a lagged variable of the previous years’ arms transfers. 
The models did not provide clear answers to explain the arms trade. The only variable that was 
statistically significant in any of the models was the lagged arms transfer variable. Variables that 
were not statistically significant were often correlated with arms transfers in the opposite way from 
expected. For example, in the full model, including economic, conflict, and diplomatic variables, 
US imports from the receiver are negatively associated with arms transfers. Higher polity scores 
are correlated with higher levels of arms transfers. Neither the import or the polity variable is 
                                                 
47
 Because of high correlation, military personnel and military expenditure, and hostility level and fatalities cannot 
be included in the same model. For robustness, I swapped the hostility variable with the variable that codes the 
number of fatalities, and military personnel for military expenditure in some models. 
48
 In the analyses, I took the log of the following variables: military expenditure, military personnel, GDP, imports, 
and exports.  
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statistically significant.  Though the previous years’ transfers are strongly correlated with the next 
years’ transfers (p<0.001), the substantive import of the variable is minimal.  
When I split the data into Cold War and post-Cold War time periods, variables change direction 
in their relationship to arms transfers. The previous years’ transfers remain significant, though of 
marginal substantive meaning. During the Cold War there as a positive relationship between the 
receiver’s polity score and arms transfers: more democratic countries received more arms. In the 
post-Cold War period, that relationship flipped to be negative: less democratic countries received 
more arms. Though the variable is not statistically significant, the changes suggest larger political 
forces at work. Perhaps during the Cold War the US was more concerned about propping up 
(nominally) democratic states than in the post-Cold War period. Similarly, having a defensive 
alliance with the US was positively correlated with receiving arms during the Cold War, but 
negatively correlated during the post-Cold War period. This finding is even harder to explain, since 
alliances have largely remained constant over that time period. Again, the only variable with 
statistical significance is the lagged arms variable. The differences between the Cold War and post 
war period suggest that some larger process – whether the structure of the international system, 
some qualitative change to political relationships, or some unknown variable – explain the 
differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War period.  
Some of the country-level fixed effect indicator variables have statistical and substantive 
significance. That is, something about being Kuwait, rather than being Switzerland, is a powerful 
explanatory variable. This makes sense: Kuwait is of greater strategic value to the United States 
than is Switzerland, and is in an area of higher tension and higher likelihood of experiencing 
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regional conflict. Yet based on the models, these differences appear to be attributable to time-
invariant country-level traits that are distinct from the typical independent variables considered in 
quantitative arms studies. While we could attempt to assign a number to each country to represent 
its strategic value, or to try to capture regional tensions, such an endeavor would require significant 
case work and would ultimately depend on subjective judgments. All this suggests that arms 
transfers are irreducibly linked to different qualitative relationships between states, and that such 
relationships are not picked up in large-n analysis.49  
Since the earlier network analysis showed differences in transfer pattern by weapon type, I also 
compare the arms networks to the alliance network, a recurring explanation in existing literature. 
This comparison shows that the structure of the arms trade is distinct from other networks, and 
suggests more work needs to be done to explain why alliances are thought to be predictors of an 
arms transfer relationship.  
A rather intuitive explanation for the alliance-arms relationship is that states will transfer arms 
to their friend and allies, but not to states they are not allied with. Evidence from the 1950s, at least 
where missiles are concerned, seems to provide some initial evidence for this hypothesis (e.g., Fig. 
3). There is another reason to expect the arms network to look like the alliance network: 
interoperability and standardization. US-produced and Soviet-produced arms are not compatible 
with one another, but weapons produced within the same alliance structure are usually 
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these models cannot be easily incorporated into standard regressions because their assumptions about endogeneity 
are not compatible. 
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interoperable. This means that the arms transfer relationships established in the early 1950s should 
be reinforced over time – not only because of alliances, but because there is a type of lock-in effect. 
States that receive weapons from the US are unlikely, for practical reasons, to turn around and 
seek arms from the Soviet Union. 
Comparing the post-Cold War networks of different types of arms (Fig. 8) with the alliance 
network (Fig. 9) for the same period shows that this is not the case. Each of the weapons 
networks is like a tangled ball of yarn: there is no obvious clustering within these dense 
networks.  
The alliance network has distinct clusters representing the different alliance pacts. Note that 
this network is composed only of alliance treaties that have a provision for mutual defense, that 
exist in the post-Cold War period. There are no similarities between the structures of the 
weapons network and the structure of the alliance network. The dissimilarity between these 
networks means that it remains to be seen how and why alliances might have a relationship to 
arms transfers. Perhaps it is the case that alliance relationships were more important during the 
Cold War than after, but in that case I would expect to see the existence of a defense pact have a 
significant and substantive relationship to arms transfers in the post-Cold War period. The 
quantitative results reveal that alliances are not significant. 
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Figure 8: Missile, Armored Vehicle, and Aircraft Transfers, 2001-2012 
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It might also be the case that there are relationships between these variables and arms transfers, 
but that current methods of data collection are not fine-grained or nuanced enough to capture these 
Figure 9: Post-Cold War Mutual Defense Pacts 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power      
 
   40 
relationships. What would “good” data or models look like? First, we would need to address the 
concerns raised in the logistics section of this chapter. To address the issue of timing, we would 
need to collect data on each state’s planning cycle. Variables concerning India, for example, would 
have to be lagged fifteen years (to reflect its acquisition cycle). It is highly unlikely that such 
information could be collected for each state, especially since state policies change over time. To 
address the fact that states consider actors beyond the dyad, we would need to know: (a) which 
states “count” in each weapons transfer, whether geographic neighbors, other alliance members, 
and/or adversaries; (b) the views of the states that count; and (c) how those views affect the 
decision-making process. Acquiring this information would require in-depth case knowledge, after 
which a large-n analysis would seem offensively reductive. Finally, to address the economic 
issues, we would need data on the financing of each deal. States and weapons manufacturers are 
likely to hold this evidence tightly, fearing that recipients might compare deals and try to change 
the terms for future sales.50 Even if this data were available, collecting it and matching it to each 
transfer would be a laborious undertaking.  
There are additional issues raised by the new quantitative analyses presented here. Why do 
alliances seem to have mattered during the Cold War, but matter less so in the contemporary 
period? The network analysis highlights the absence of theorization about alliances: are they 
proxies for something else? do they mean the same thing over time? are they conditional on other 
                                                 
50
 There is, in fact, evidence that states are extremely reluctant to discuss elements of financing and aid. During the 
Cold War, the US was reluctant to release details of its financing agreements with states receiving its weapons. See, 
for example, Johnson 1994. 
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things? how would we know? States may want to restrain some allies, bolster others, and quietly 
pull away from others. An initial insight of this chapter was that not all states are the same – it is 
questionable to treat Argentina’s motivations for receiving arms as the same as Bulgaria’s, for 
example – and similarly, not all relationships are the same. Alliances can function, mean, and 
represent different things. Alliances are also sticky; few alliances are outright dissolved, which 
means that alliances that exist on paper – our usual method for “measuring” them – often manifest 
in wildly different ways. To wrangle with the alliance problem, scholars would need deep 
knowledge about each alliance, which is again a daunting undertaking.  
Because current quantitative models are not well equipped to deal with the insights about the 
arms trade presented here, I suggest a new approach for scholars interested in this research area. 
Qualitative case analysis, specifically process tracing, can account for the long time horizons and 
multiple actors involved in each transfer, and is well suited to studying the broader political 
relationships that are created through the transfer of arms.  
 
A PATH FORWARD 
 
Building on the problems identified in this chapter, I suggest two conceptual moves that should be 
made to continue studying the causes and consequences of arms transfers. First, the broad category 
of “conventional” is not analytically or theoretically useful. A tank is not a supersonic jet. A rifle 
is not a nuclear-capable missile. Even if we were solely interested in explaining conflict outcomes, 
it would make sense to differentiate between tanks and jets, since each weapon can enable very 
different military strategies and tactics. Network analysis shows that there are different sets of 
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relationships created by different types of weapons. Even when a state produces all types of 
weapons – the US and UK each produce ships, missiles, armored vehicles, aircraft, etc. – they 
transfer different arms to different states. Differentiating between types of arms should aid 
theorization about arms transfers, because it will explicitly recognize different patterns of transfers 
for different weapons. 
Second, politics need to remain at the forefront of analysis. If, as Clausewitz famously said, 
war is the continuation of politics by other means, then an analysis of the tools of war needs to 
account for the political decision-making and political context surrounding arms transfers. Put 
more crudely, weapons don’t make war; people do. It is deeply puzzling, and ethically troubling, 
that analyses of the relationship between arms transfers and conflict do not account for state goals, 
leaders’ opinions, or other international or domestic processes that affect decisions to go to war. 
War is a decision, not the inevitable outcome of an (im)balance in military power.  
These two conceptual moves also demand a new approach to research. I thus turn to qualitative 
case analysis and process tracing to determine the motivations for, and outcomes from, weapons 
transfers.51 The following chapter builds a theory of arms transfers that builds on existing work 
and accounts for the issues identified here. It provides a systematic way to distinguish between 
types of weapons, as well as the theoretical scaffolding to incorporate broader political and social 
relations between states.  
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 See Zaks 2017; Tannenwald 2015; Bennett and Checkel 2014. 
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Chapter 2. Put a Ring on it: Foreign Policy Effects of Weapons 
Transfers 
 
 “[You] do not sell arms without saying, in effect, ‘In light of the receiving 
country’s known policies, friends, and enemies, we anticipate that, in the last 
resort, we will be on their side in the case of any conflict. We shall want 
them to defeat their enemies.” 
- Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, 197152 
 
 “I do not share the opinion that the one who sells arms expresses a 
sympathy already by this act. It would become very difficult if we would 
adopt this principle.” 
- King Fahd, Saudi Arabia, 198253 
 
 
Weapons transfers are intimately linked to foreign policy and grand strategy because they 
reveal information about the political relationship between the sender and receiver. To 
actors in the international system, weapons are credible signals of alignment and intentions, 
even when the weapon does not affect the relative balance of power. State leaders and 
policymakers have long observed that weapons transfers have effects beyond the military 
balance. Scholarly assessments of the consequences of arms transfers have not 
incorporated this insight, and thus reaches contradictory conclusions: arms might increase 
the likelihood of conflict, or decrease it; arms might build alliance trust, or they might 
undermine it; or, they might have no independent effect on state behavior whatsoever.54 I 
argue that weapons affect a state’s military power and send signals about the relationship 
between the sending and receiving state. The signals sent by weapons transfers help states 
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 Quoted in Catrina 1988, 13. 
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 Quoted in Catrina 1988, 14. 
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 See, Diehl and Kingston 1987; Brzoska and Pearson 1994; Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz 1992; Kinsella 
1994. 
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differentiate between close friends, acquaintances, and opponents in a manner that is clear 
and comprehensible in an otherwise noisy international system. These political signals 
have observable effects on a state’s foreign policy behavior. 
Weapons are intimately linked to grand strategy and foreign policy because they create two 
types of power.55 Weapons most clearly provide material power, enabling a state to more 
credibly make coercive threats or undertake forceful diplomatic actions because of 
increased capabilities. Weapons transfers are also signals of political ties, which creates a 
more diffuse, relational power. Weapons transfers signal the extent and depth of states’ 
political alignments, and can even sort states in intra-group status hierarchies.  
Weapons transfers are bright lines against the noisy (and sticky) background that is 
state’s broader political networks. They affect the shape of and tensions in the network. 
State leaders use the ties created by weapons transfers as a convenient shortcut for 
understanding how states are related to one another, where the center of power is located, 
and the relative power of one group of states compared to another. 
In focusing on the signals sent by weapons transfers, I show, for example, that some 
transfers facilitate cooperation, while other transfers incentivize prevention or aggression. 
These foreign policy outcomes, determined by the signal sent by weapons transfers, more 
generally show the importance of the symbols and signals that make and unmake relations 
that constitute world politics.  
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 On grand strategy, and its connections to foreign policy, see Freedman 2013, 607; Posen 1986, 13; Bell 
2015, 88; Gray 2013, 3.  
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As the following empirical chapters show, without an analysis of the political effects 
of weapons transfers, explanations of international political outcomes are incomplete. 
Chapter three, on India and Pakistan, shows how weapons transfers can moderate a 
revisionist state’s impulses to take advantage of its weakened neighbor. The chapter on the 
Middle East offers a revised explanation for the 1967 war, focusing on the arms transfers 
that fueled uncertainty about political relationships. Chapter five demonstrates how 
weapons transfers expand foreign policy options available to states by allowing them to 
hold on to otherwise contradictory relationships. The US used transfers to simultaneously 
reassure Taiwan and deter China – the foundation of the policy of strategic ambiguity. 
Finally, chapter six shows that states remain sensitive to and interested in arms signals even 
when the state can produce its own weapons. These cases are specific instances of more 
general patterns in which weapons transfers have a causal effect on state behavior.  It is 
these political effects, and how they explain foreign policy decisions, that are the focus of 
the remainder of this chapter. 
This chapter develops an explanation of foreign policy behavior based on signals sent 
through international conventional weapons transfers. First, I situate my discussion of arms 
as signals within existing scholarship. Second, I go beyond existing literature by explicitly 
and systematically building a theory of the political effects of weapons transfers. Third, I 
discuss scope conditions for this theory. Fourth, I show the broader theoretical significance 
of this theory with respect to foreign policy, signaling, and hierarchies in international 
security.  I conclude with a discussion of case selection and concept analysis.  
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POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND ARMS TRANSFERS 
 
What do weapons do for a state? While existing literature acknowledges that states can 
seek weapons for purposes beyond relative capabilities, there is not yet a coherent 
description of the political effects of arms transfers. Scholarship generally treats 
“conventional weapons” as a monolithic category, overlooking differences between planes, 
tanks, and ICBMs. Any first step toward creating a typology of weapons must therefore 
take into account the different functions and perceptions of weapons.   
Weapons quite obviously affect relative capabilities. Greater capabilities give a state 
increased ability to coerce its adversaries or to conduct military operations. However, the 
effects of capabilities are not universal. A tank enables a very different type of fighting 
than long-range bombers; a refueling plane is quite different from a submarine. A logical 
first cut for differentiating among types of weapons is based on their military utility.  
Second, scholars have a sense that weapons can be acquired for reasons other than 
relative capabilities, but have not explored these purposes. With the exception of 
ambiguous statements that some weapons are more “symbolic” than others, non-military 
reasons for weapons acquisition are, in the conventional realm, largely ignored. Linguistic 
politics approaches suggest the salient point of information is the name of the weapon,56 
whereas others have argued the weapon itself is a symbol, and that supersonic aircraft are 
particularly notable because they are “expensive, visible, and get a great deal of attention 
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 Buzan and Herring 1998, 180. However, states often re-name weapons when they purchase them, and 
not all weapons have word names. For example, Egypt renamed its German “Bestmann” trainer aircraft the 
“Gomhouria,” (“the republic”) and Sweden renamed its Finnish “XA-200” armored personnel carriers the 
“Patgb-202.” 
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in the policy-making process.”57 Other weapons thought to receive significant attention are 
submarines and main battle tanks.58 It’s not clear, though, why submarines, supersonic 
aircraft, and tanks are conceptually distinct from other types of weapons.  
There is, however, a sense that weapons can be used as political signals. Arms can be 
part of a reciprocal agreement for some other good, or they can be a means of gaining 
influence in the receiving state.59 As I show later, weapons are long-term investments and 
providing (or denying) new technologies to a state is a central process in the development 
of status hierarchies. Unlike iPads, new fighter jet models are not released every year. The 
transfer of high-tech weapons thus creates durable status hierarchies between and within 
groups of states. Additionally, arms can send signals ranging from “gestures of political 
support,” to friendship and trust, to signals of technological modernity.60 In sum, arms can 
do things, but there is no consensus about which arms or what things. 
There is also a startling lack of attention to the decision not to sell arms, even though 
withholding arms can be an act of great political import. Freedman is a rare exception, 
accurately observing that, “though only limited political benefits can normally be 
expected from agreeing to sell arms, since this is seen in commercial terms, refusing to 
sell arms is a major political act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the 
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 Laurance 1992, 38. These weapons may also signal a long-term relationship because of maintenance 
contracts and continued need for spare parts. These “lifetime costs” are an essential, but oft-overlooked, 
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stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence of the would-be 
recipient.”61 However, other researchers have not pursued this line of thinking, perhaps 
because the usual databases focus on the arms transfers that come to fruition. Since 
withholding arms means a transfer does not appear in these databases, the act is usually 
ignored.62 
 
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND SYMBOLIC SIGNALING 
 
To understand the political effects of weapons, scholars need a way to talk about 
similarities and differences between and among types of weapons; the content of ties 
between states is just as important as the existence of one. This section develops a theory 
to explain the effects of weapons transfers on foreign policy by making two moves. First, 
I unpack the umbrella category of conventional weapons along the dimensions of prestige 
and military utility. This lets me discuss differences between weapons and the different 
conditions under which they will be transferred. Second, I explain the signals that weapons 
transfers send, and connect these signals to distinct foreign policy behaviors.  
 
Weapon Typology 
Weapons have dual functions: they most obviously affect capabilities, enabling actors to 
wage war and deter aggression. But there is also a symbolic dimension: states share 
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 Freedman 1978, 389-90. 
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 There is, of course, the problem of the dog that does not bite. While there are sometimes widespread 
reports about transfer denials, there are likely many such denials that simply are not known. Excluding non-
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understandings of prestigious and non-prestigious weapons. I create a typology of weapons 
by contrasting the prestige of weapons with the more familiar dimension of military utility, 
which provides the first step toward analyzing the political effects of weapons transfers. 
This typology draws on existing literature, as well as fieldwork at two international 
weapons exhibitions, where I observed the importance of prestige for the way different 
actors talked about, and purchased, weapons. 
Dimension 1: Prestige 
Prestige captures the symbolic dimension of weapons, the shared understanding that 
some weapons are more than others. This dimension builds on insights from other 
disciplines that have long recognized a difference between prestige and “functional” goods. 
Functional goods accomplish basic necessary tasks, whereas prestige goods are kept for 
use and displayed periodically to indicate wealth, success, and power.63 This distinction 
between prestige and functional goods needs to be modified to fit weapons transfers, since 
high prestige weapons are not simply for display, periodically dusted off for a military 
parade or two. Further, even relatively useless weapons are qualitatively distinct goods 
because they have the ability to harm, and are thus not directly comparable to regular gifts 
given between individuals, such as a vase or a ring.64 Prestige weapons are usually those 
with a high level of offensive striking power or technological sophistication. These 
weapons do more than the basic functional task of territorial defense, though I note that 
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 Hayden 1998, 13; Plourde 2009. Prestige has similarities to the conceptual family that includes honor, 
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 In some cases, a state may not have the ability to fully deploy weapons, making them entirely symbolic 
goods. Even in these cases, however, partial deployment or use still makes weapons qualitatively distinct 
goods. 
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firepower or technological sophistication is necessary, but not sufficient, as a cause of 
prestige.  
One insight that does carry over concerns reciprocity. On the level of the individual 
social relationship, giving a gift incurs a mutual obligation from the receiver to the giver, 
and the possession of prestige goods is a way to get others to recognize your importance.65 
At the level of interstate relations, there is still an implied mutual obligation – State A gives 
State B a weapon and expects state B to behave “properly”, however defined. Equally 
important, the transfer of prestige weapons is a statement about the type of relationship the 
states have. Just as diamond rings are usually exchanged between committed couples, 
prestigious weapons are usually exchanged between similarly committed/aligned states. 
Though nuclear weapons are recognized as prestigious weapons,66 prestige is not the 
privilege solely of the nuclear realm: there is a hierarchy of prestige in conventional 
weapons, too. Existing literature considers three types of weapons prestigious – supersonic 
aircraft, main battle tanks, and submarines.67 The criteria this implies for assessing prestige 
is unclear, since the three weapons are very different in use, firepower, and technological 
sophistication. Though highly capable and technologically sophisticated, supersonic 
aircraft are usually defensive weapons designed to quickly intercept an opponent’s aircraft. 
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Submarines, on the other hand, enable stealthy offense, have high capabilities and 
technology, and can be nuclear-capable. Main battle tanks are considered a prestigious 
weapons platform even though their offensive firepower is limited in both range and 
caliber, and their level of technological sophistication is significantly below that of fighter 
jets and submarines. By all of these measures, main battle tanks are an outlier on the list of 
prestigious weapons platforms. 
Clearly, the correlation between prestige and offensive power or technological 
sophistication is not determinative. I propose that perceptions play a large role in 
determining what types of platforms are prestigious, and that these perceptions usually cue 
on superpower actions. Main battle tanks are considered prestigious because of their 
association with the great power wars of the twentieth century.68 Similarly, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles are a prestigious platform because of their perceptual association with 
nuclear weapons,69 even though there are many weapons within this platform that are 
universally ineffective because they have poor targeting capabilities and poor 
construction.70 The opposite relationship holds, too. Refueling planes stand out as weapons 
that have extremely high levels of technology – from the sensors to detect how close it is 
to the plane taking on fuel, to the in-air delivery system, to an engine able to give lift to a 
massive plane, to all of the associated safety mechanisms – and that require an 
extraordinary level of skill to pilot, but these weapons are not considered prestigious. 
Though there may be a minimum baseline of either technological sophistication or 
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offensive power necessary to be a candidate for a prestige weapon, these factors are not 
determinative. Rather, prestige is determined by perceptions.71  
I observed the importance of perceptions in creating prestige during fieldwork at two 
international weapons shows. Many manufacturers tried to portray their weapons as 
particularly important by unveiling them at a designated time during the show, drawing 
significant crowds and creating an air of excitement by pumping music through nearby 
speakers, or using security ropes to allow only important visitors – usually in military 
uniforms or other official-looking attendees – nearest to the weapon. During an outdoor 
demonstration of a number of weapons, the “coolness” factor of an armored vehicle was 
enhanced through a hard rock soundtrack. The tempo of the music was used to manipulate 
the audience’s perceptions of the weapon on display, and varied based on how much 
perceptions of different weapons needed to be manipulated.72 More mundane weapons, 
like a firetruck and a fueling vehicle, were accompanied by explosions, to get the audience 
to pay attention and to associate these weapons with the battlefield, rather than support 
roles. Throughout the convention halls, brochures touted specific capabilities or linked a 
particular weapon to a known prestigious weapon. For example, Finnish arms company 
Patria emphasized its integration of weapons systems in its Armored Modular Vehicle as 
providing “the digital backbone for 21st century soldiers,” perhaps trying to portray this 
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armored vehicle – usually not very technologically sophisticated – as at the technological 
cutting edge, and thus prestigious. 
The concept of prestige is not reducible to the economic cost of the weapons transfer. 
First, states often give weapons at free or significantly discounted rates to friends and allies. 
Second, there is no agreed upon way to calculate cost. For example, the AGM-154 Joint 
Standoff Weapon, produced by Raytheon, has an acquisition cost of $3.3 billion. But 
because the Navy and Air Force ordered 12,000 missiles the per-unit production cost is 
$246,585.73 By contrast, General Dynamic’s M1A1 Abrams Tank has a per-unit cost of 
$2.38 million.74 The Abrams tank, though a useful main battle tank, was first produced in 
the 1970s, where as the JSOW is a brand-new missile. Determining prestige based on cost 
would be misleading in this case. Further, some transfer agreements include contracts for 
maintenance and/or spare parts. This would increase the value of the transfer, but would 
not indicate anything about prestige.75 
Prestige is a heuristic used by a variety of actors to make inferences about the future 
relationship between the sending and receiving states. This heuristic suggests that higher 
prestige weapons signify a greater relationship to come; states woo one another with the 
prettiest, most attention-grabbing weapons. Different types of weapons – like gifts between 
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two individuals – reflect the weight of the relationship, and change in type and/or amount 
as the closeness between the states changes.76 Weapons are certainly valuable for their 
military functions, but the symbol of prestigious weapons is a way of distinguishing allies 
from non-allies,77 can be an invitation to a closer relationship,78 and is an expression of the 
sender’s perception of the receiver.79 Prestigious weapons are a visible signal of 
commitment and interest, and states are therefore more circumspect in transferring these 
weapons. Less prestigious weapons are more likely to be transferred because they don’t 
signal a deep commitment; they are one of the means states have for expressing potential 
interest. Low prestige doesn’t mean that the weapon is devoid of use: support weapons like 
transport aircraft or armored personnel carriers are essential for both offensive and 
defensive operations. But because every state that has a functioning military needs to pay 
attention to the “tail” in the tooth-to-tail ratio, the transfer of low prestige weapons is not 
nearly as noticeable and does not constitute a political relationship in the same way as high 
prestige weapons.  
Treating prestige as a heuristic is in line with the cognitive psychology literature that 
reminds us that individuals use heuristic principles to reduce the complex task of assessing 
probability and predicting outcomes, especially in situations of high uncertainty.80 
Weapons prestige functions as a representative and an availability heuristic: it is the cue by 
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which states reduce complex inputs about the future.81 In this case, cognitive psychology 
applies as much to the state as to individuals. States are composed of individuals, and we 
know that people reflect on their lifetime of experiences in making associations between 
particular actions as part of a larger class of actions.82 This process should be compounded 
in states because of both institutional and national memories: while an individual will rely 
on events from her lifetime, states institutions and bureaucracies effectively increase the 
“lifetime” of events on which individuals can rely for making these judgments. Further, 
the actors involved as the individual, bureaucratic, and state-level decision-making process 
are especially attentive to signaling and intentions, increasing the salience of this heuristic. 
Prestige, then, is a perceptually determined assessment of weapons, that draws on 
technology, firepower, and the status of states that use the weapon. 
Dimension 2: Military Utility 
Military utility captures the ways in which a weapon affects a state’s relative 
capabilities. My use of the concept draws inspiration from Glaser and Kaufman’s call to 
broaden the conceptualization of the offense-defense balance.83 Military utility may 
incorporate appraisals of versatility, efficacy, reliability, portability, or maintenance. For 
example, there are a number of medium-range or intercontinental missiles that – because 
of targeting issues – cannot hit the broad side of a barn. Compared to similar types of 
missiles, these specific ones, such as the Chinese-made DF-3 missile, popular in the 1980s, 
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are rather useless.84 Similarly, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may initially 
be read as a capable weapons because of its technological sophistication and advanced 
engineering: it is a stealthy plane with vertical take-off and landing functions. But it has 
performance issues that include impaired aerial combat capabilities, a limited payload, and 
the tendency to decapitate pilots when making high-G turns. The F-35 is designed to be a 
single node in high-tech networked warfare, but for most states at most times it is not a 
militarily useful plane. I compare weapons produced within the same time frame so that 
vastly different levels of technology are not directly compared. 
Even if a weapon meets a baseline level of military utility, different strategic 
environments, skill level of militaries, or state infrastructure can reduce the usefulness of 
certain weapons for certain states. Some weapons can be more militarily useful for one 
country but not for another. An extreme example of this is Singapore’s recent obsession 
with Cold War-era German tanks. As an island city-state, it is unclear how Singapore 
would make use of the tanks, but it purchased nearly 200 Leopard Tanks and even built an 
underground storage facility for them.85 Tanks don’t make strong military sense for 
Singapore.  
As discussed in greater detail at the end of this chapter, military utility compares 
weapons produced in the same time period and results in a relative measure of capabilities. 
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It parses out differences in use so that not all weapons are assumed to have an equal effect 
on a state’s ability to wield power. 
Contrasting these two dimensions gives four types of weapons, shown in Table 2. 
Boom weapons are prestigious and highly capable. Contemporary examples include the F-
15 fighter jet, submarines (especially nuclear powered), and the S-300 missile defense 
system.86 Bling in the world of armaments are weapons that are significantly less effective 
than others of the same type. Historical examples include the F-104 fighter jet – a very fast 
and literally shiny plane that was ineffective as a defensive interceptor or mid-air fighter—
as well as the DF-3 missile, a medium-range intercontinental ballistic missile that has 
significant targeting issues that reduce its ability to be militarily effective. Backbone 
weapons are low in prestige and capabilities, include weapons like the KC-46 Pegasus 
tanker plane, mundane vehicles like Jeeps, and transport and training aircraft. These 
weapons are often ignored in analyses of the offense-defense balance, but backbone 
weapons are the unsung heroes of the military: they are essential for enabling most 
operations, but never get any of the credit. Finally, blip weapons are those low in prestige 
and low in capabilities. This category includes ammunition, firearms, and small bombs. 
Though all of these weapons do have military use, they need to be used in large quantities, 
and usually in conjunction with other weapons, in order to be useful; the scope of their 
usefulness is much more limited compared to other weapons. However, contexts of civil 
war or armed group movements can change the salience of blip weapons, and they can 
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become important intra-war signaling devices. For example, in some contexts having new 
M-4 rounds signals support from one individual/group to another, but AK-47 rounds do  
not.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While this typology is an important first step in breaking apart the diverse category of 
conventional weapons, on its own it does not provide any guidance about what weapons 
should be transferred between different states, or what types of transfers send what type of 
signal. For that, I shift to a relational lens, and explain how existing relationships generate 
expectations of different types of weapons transfers. 
 
Weapons Transfer Expectations and Signal Type 
Intuitively, the quality of states’ relationships should matter: closer states should transfer 
different types of weapons than states that have less in common or that do not share 
strategic goals. This is why, as explained in the Introduction, Turkey’s choice of China as 
a missile supplier caused such outrage among its NATO allies. Similarly, the routine 
transfers among NATO allies are less notable for their political signaling than they are as 
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 Military Utility 
 
 
 High Low 
Weapon Prestige 
High 
Boom 
(Type I) 
Bling 
(Type II) 
Low 
Backbone 
(Type III) 
Blip  
(Type IV) 
Table 2: Weapon Typology 
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evidence of standard operating procedure within the alliance, building inter-operability, 
bolstering the capabilities of the alliance, and reinforcing NATO as a political institution. 
The proposed transfer from China to Turkey was unexpected, whereas transfers among 
NATO allies are routine and expected.  
This relational dynamic has long been recognized by policymakers. Take, for example,  
United States Military Sales and Assistance Manuals, which all state: “The willingness of 
the U.S. Government to sell military equipment varies country by country in accordance 
with the military requirement, ability to maintain and use, compatibility with existing 
inventory, and impact on the preconceptions and the actions of the buyer's neighbors.”88 
In other words, states do not act in a dyadic vacuum: the relationship between the sender 
and the receiver and the receiver’s neighborhood affect which transfers are expected or 
unexpected.89 For example, US transfers to Saudi Arabia are not a dyadic process: US law 
prohibits the transfer of weapons that would make any Middle Eastern state qualitatively 
superior to Israel.90  
I generalize these relational patterns through the concept of strategic interest, which 
captures the extent to which states’ interests and ideologies align or conflict. This concept 
allows me to differentiate between weapons transfers that accord with existing ties and 
those that are more surprising, which is an important interim step in determining which 
transfers send different signals. 
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 Military Sales and Assistance Manual, 1973, p. F-2, emphasis added. http://www.samm.dsca.mil/samm-
archive/1973-masm-archive. 
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 See Jervis 1997, 17; Waltz 1979, 74; Gilpin 1981, 85.  
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 US Code Title 22 § 212. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power      
 
   60 
Strategic interest is a concept central to bargaining and deterrence theory, two bodies 
of literature that have addressed ways to send signals,91 and encompasses both instrumental 
reasons for alignment, such as common foe, natural resource or economic dependence, as 
well as diffuse or ideational reasons like shared worldview or cultural affinity.92 The degree 
of shared strategic interest between states can often be determined by threat perceptions 
and national security narratives, whether the states identify the same foe(s) and the threat 
posed by them, or whether states have similar ideas about how the world should work. 
Depending on the degree of shared interests between states, different types of arms are 
expected (because they confirm or cement existing relations) or unexpected (because they 
constitute a new relationships). Expected arms reinforce ties between the sender and 
receiver, and generally have a readily-apparent balance of power logic to them: states 
transfer weapons to bolster the relative capabilities of their friends, and refrain from 
bolstering capabilities of their opponents or of their friends’ opponents.93  
Table 3, below, summarizes the expected and unexpected transfers based on the degree 
of shared strategic interest. The following sub-sections explain why certain types of 
weapons are expected or unexpected in different contexts, and connects the 
(un)expectedness of the transfer to different signals.  
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Expected transfers: Reinforcement Signals 
Expected arms transfers accord with and support the status quo; they send a 
reinforcement signal. Oftentimes, these transfers become so routine and ingrained in 
relationships that the reinforcement signal goes unnoticed; it is part of standard operating 
procedure and only noticeable when there is an interruption to the reinforcement signal. 
Most types of weapons transfers are expected when states have substantial common 
interests. Prestigious and capable boom weapon transfers are expected for reasons of 
interoperability– facilitating joint operations – and because of bureaucratic standard 
operating procedure.94 Again, it’s not surprising that the NATO allies have remarkably 
similar arsenals, nor that these states engage in cooperative development of advanced 
weapons in order to reduce costs and share knowledge.95 Boom weapons transferred 
between states that share close ties reinforce and maintain these ties. Bling weapons – those 
that are highly prestigious but less militarily useful – are useful for reinforcing ties among 
states that share interests as well.  
                                                 
94 Long and Leeds 2006; Morrow 1993. 
95 Lorell and Lowell 1995; Fast 1981.  
Shared Strategic Interest Expected Transfers Unexpected Transfers 
Substantial common 
All, especially boom and 
backbone 
Denials, mismatched 
Mixed Backbone, blip Boom, bling 
Substantial conflicting None 
All, especially high 
prestige 
Table 3: Expected vs. Unexpected Transfers 
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Backbone weapons are expected transfers when states have substantial common 
interests, or when they have a mix of interests. When states have similar goals and policies, 
these weapons are desired for their military use. The workhorses of modern militaries, 
backbone weapons are essential for moving troops and materiel. When states have a mix 
of interests, these weapons are desirable because of their low prestige. The arms are useful, 
but don’t signal a deep political relationship, so the sender can transfer the weapons without 
fear of emboldening the receiver, and the receiver can accept the weapons without fear that 
it is signaling alignment with the sender. Blip weapons are also expected when states have 
a mix of interests. Though all of these weapons do have military use, they can be transferred 
without any signaling consequences because of their low prestige.  
Unexpected Transfers: Upgrade and Downgrade Signals 
Transfers can be unexpected in either a positive or negative way, which correspond, 
respectively, with upgrade and downgrade signals. An absence of transfers between states 
that have substantial common interests is unexpected. To rely on the familiar example of 
the NATO allies, it would be very surprising if a NATO ally was denied the transfer of a 
weapon other allies possessed, or if a NATO ally decided to seek weapons from outside 
the alliance. The lack of transfer sends a downgrade signal: it is a visible interruption to 
the shared ties between the states.96  
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 Some might argue that the lack of a transfer in this condition is epiphenomenal to a larger strategic 
interest shift (e.g., the US pivot to Asia might lead to fewer transfers to Europe). While it is plausible that 
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States, even if undertaking a strategic shift, will still want their friends and allies to have advanced 
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Downgrade signals can also come if the transfer is a mismatch with the receiver’s 
expectations. This can be caused by receiving a lower quantity or lower type of weapon, 
such as expecting fighter jets but receiving cargo planes. Mismatched transfers indicate a 
growing rift between the sender and receiver. Jordan, for example, expected to receive the 
F-104 Starfighter jet, a bling weapon, from the United States in 1967. It was instead sent a 
small number of backbone and blip weapons, including rifles and utility trucks, leading 
King Hussein to reconsider what he thought was a close US-Jordanian relationship. 
Importantly, a downgrade signal can be initiated by the sender or the receiver of a weapon. 
The sender can choose to prevent the receiver from acquiring a weapon, or the receiver can 
rebuff offers. The downgrade signal is sent regardless. For example, in March 2015, 
Sweden decided not to negotiate a new defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, a move that 
signaled new tensions and disputes between the two states.97 
Transfers that are unexpectedly positive – such as receiving a higher quantity or better 
type of weapon than expected – send an upgrade signal. These transfers represent a 
growing closeness between states. Where states have a mix of common and conflicting 
interests, the upgrade signal is primarily due to the prestige of the transferred weapons: 
boom and bling weapons send an upgrade signal. Because these states are equally at odds 
as they are in congruence, the transfer of a high prestige weapon signals a positive change 
in their future relationship, and the possibility of closeness and mutual support. The 
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Turkish-Russian missile defense deal signaled an upgraded relationship between those two 
states, since the S-400 missile is prestigious and very capable. Bling weapons are flashy 
and attention-grabbing; their transfer in cases of mixed strategic interest signals potential 
new points of agreement between the states. Even though it doesn’t have much operational 
use, the bling weapon is like an engagement ring: a promise of future political support 
based on mutual understandings, and is visible and comprehensible to observing states.  
Boom weapons are doubly unexpected because of the convergence of high prestige and 
high capabilities. Boom weapon transfers are a stronger signal of future political support 
than bling weapons. The capabilities dimension enables the receiver to make use of the 
weapon, and is thus an expression of confidence from the sender that the weapon will be 
used in line with their common interests, if it is used at all. Additionally, the number of 
weapons transferred matters for the strength of the upgrade signal. The transfer of a handful 
of capable and prestigious fighter jets is a weaker signal than is the transfer of a full 
squadron (or multiple squadrons) of the same jets.  
When states have substantial conflicting interests, the transfer of any type of weapon 
will send an upgrade signal, but again prestige is particularly important. Boom and bling 
weapons send stronger upgrade signals than backbone weapons. Lacking congruence of 
goals, these states would not find it advantageous to increase the relative capabilities of the 
other, and would not want to signal any type of relationship between them. The increase in 
capabilities and the attention given to prestige weapons is puzzling when the states do not 
have similar goals. The recent US lifting of the arms embargo on Vietnam is one example. 
Sending arms to Vietnam is not going to make the US a lot of money and will not change 
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the balance of power; experts predict that Vietnam’s arms requests will be minimal.98 
Further, the US and Vietnam are often at odds over the latter’s human rights record. It is 
therefore surprising that the US would lift its arms embargo and allow Vietnam to buy 
weapons. But under a symbolic signaling logic, this makes more sense: US arms sales to 
Vietnam are a signal to China about Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, and are 
potentially the start of a balancing coalition against China.99 The transfers constitute a new 
relationship, united in purpose to oppose China. This is also a case where the transfer does 
not make sense unless the states are placed in the broader relational context: it is only when 
considering Vietnam’s tensions with China that the US lifting of the arms embargo makes 
sense. 
The exposition of expected and unexpected transfers above describes general patterns 
and explains most cases. But states—and relationships between them—are not static, and 
so states’ expectations of what counts as an appropriate weapons transfers will change over 
time. The transfer of main battle tanks is unexpected when states have minimal shared 
interests, but if the states grow closer over time, those same tanks will be an expected 
transfer. Thus, as time goes on, I expect transfers to increase in intensity and content in 
order for states’ relationships to be maintained and not deteriorate.100 Relationships require 
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constant maintenance; continuity in relationships is hard work, and breeds increased 
expectations over time. Just like the children’s book, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie, states 
want more, larger, and more delicious cookies as time goes on.101 
 
Foreign Policy Effects of Signals  
 
Signals sent through weapons transfers have both long- and short-term effects. In the short 
term, the signal affects the receiver’s foreign policy, and has implications for the likelihood 
of regional conflict. In the long-run, the signals produce and communicate status 
hierarchies, allowing states to compare themselves to others in a group. This can also have 
implications for the likelihood of conflict, though the chain of events is longer, and 
outcomes are multi-causal. 
Foreign policy outcomes depend on the receiver’s general strategic orientation. 
Weapons transfers affect foreign policy, but do not radically change whether a state is 
status quo or revisionist; weapons are tools that affect when and how states pursue their 
goals.102 Changes in foreign policy behaviors come from unexpected weapons transfers, 
and the resulting downgrade or upgrade signal. Reinforcement signals, sent by expected 
weapons transfers, lead to foreign policy continuity. Because these transfers are generally 
in line with existing political relationships, states should not change their foreign policies.  
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Upgrade Signals: Bolstering or Aggression 
Upgrade signals facilitate bolstering behavior in status quo states, and aggression in 
revisionist ones. Status quo states want to build on their newly upgraded political 
relationship, and should take actions that include formalizing defense relationships, 
coordinating foreign or defense policies, or providing additional resources to their ally.103 
The status quo state’s goal is to use the upgrade signal to secure its position in regional 
affairs. For example, the US agreed in 1968 to provide F-4 Phantom jets to Israel, a move 
that “signaled an enhanced American commitment to Israel’s security.”104 This upgrade 
signal led Israel to more deeply coordinate its policies with the United States, and therefore 
exercise greater restraint in 1973 than it did in June 1967. While some of this restraint was 
surely due to feelings of military superiority stemming from Israel’s military victory in 
June 1967, the restraint was also due to the upgrade signal sent by the Phantom transfer. In 
stark contrast to June 1967, when Israel broke with both US and French policy desires, 
Israel in 1973 was willing to bolster its newly upgraded relationship with the US through 
deeper policy coordination and consultation.  
Revisionist states, on the other hand, should exhibit an aggressive foreign policy toward 
their adversaries. Following Mark Bell, I consider aggression “the more belligerent pursuit 
of goals in preexisting disputes or in pursuit of previously articulated interests.”105 This 
aggression can take a wide range of forms. For example, a state might try to provoke its 
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adversary into attacking, thus allowing the state to invoke mutual defense agreements.106 
Alternately, the state might be more aggressive in negotiations, refusing to compromise 
and trying to extract greater concessions from its adversary. Regardless of form, this 
aggressive foreign policy stems from the upgrade signal, which indicates that the receiver 
has the political support of the sender. 
It is also possible that the sender does not know just how aggressive the receiver will 
become, or how aggression will manifest. For that reason, upgrade signals should be the 
least common type of signal: senders do not want to endorse aggression or risk being 
dragged into conflict. For example, in 2014 the Canadian government approved a US$15 
billion deal with Saudi Arabia, for arms including advanced light armored vehicles.107 This 
transfer is seen as endorsement of Saudi Arabia’s repression of human rights, within Saudi 
Arabia and in Yemen.108 Opponents of the deal believe that it has signaled tacit support for 
the Saudi government, has contributed to increased abuses against civilians, and will 
ultimately damage Canada’s international reputation.109  
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Downgrade Signals: Re-alignment, Compromise, or Prevention 
Downgrade signals worry the receiver about the future health of its relationship with 
the sender, and again lead to foreign policy changes. I first expect both revisionist and 
status quo states to attempt to re-align with an alternate partner. Whether a feasible alternate 
exists depends on how tightly a state is tied to a particular group. States that are loosely 
incorporated into a group of states should find it easier to seek an alternate partner than 
states that are more tightly tied. For example, during the Cold War, Pakistan was loosely 
incorporated to the West – all of its ties ran through the United States. This made China a 
feasible partner, especially because of previous conflict between China and India. The 
shared rival (India) and flexibility in Pakistan’s relations presented China as a feasible 
alternate. Israel, on the other hand, was, by the 1960s, squarely incorporated into the 
Western bloc. It had received arms from the US, France, the UK, and West Germany, and 
was interested in joining the NATO alliance.110 These stronger ties made pursuing 
alignment with China and Russia a non-starter. 
Re-alignment is also more feasible if multiple states produce the same type of weapons. 
Saudi Arabia in part turned to Canada in 2014 because both Sweden and the United States 
had decided to suspend arms sales. Though in this case Saudi Arabia has not re-aligned – 
it remains a Western ally – the case shows that re-alignment can be affected by patterns of 
weapons production, and is not strictly due to polarity in the international system. If re-
alignment is possible, states will adjust their foreign policies in line with the signals coming 
from their new partner. If re-alignment is not an option, then I expect status quo states to 
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pursue a policy of compromise with their adversaries, and revisionist states to pursue 
prevention.  
Status quo states will seek to guarantee as much of the status quo for as long as possible, 
and will therefore seek to make a deal before they become more vulnerable to an 
adversary’s coercion. US signals of downgrade – including, in this case, the removal of US 
troops – to West Germany in the late 1960s facilitated ostpolitik as a strategy of 
compromise. Though West Germany wanted to pursue reunification with East Germany, 
the downgrade in its relationship with the US led West Germany to normalize relations 
with the Eastern bloc to ensure it did not become the target of Soviet or East German 
aggression.111 
Revisionist states should pursue prevention toward their adversaries. Instead of waiting 
for new political relationships to solidify, revisionist states will seek to act before they lose 
the ability to make changes to the existing state of affairs. This should especially be the 
case if revisionist states feel their adversaries are rising in power. The figure below 
summarizes the foreign policy effects of conventional arms transfers.  
                                                 
111
 Granieri 2009, 95; Griffith 1978. 
  71 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Theory of Arms Transfers and Foreign Policy 
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The first transfer(s) between states are a special case, because it makes evident ties that 
existed informally or just on paper. The first transfer establishes a baseline against which 
future transfers will be measured. The first transfer demonstrates the credibility and 
sincerity of ties and interests and is often preceded by years of economic aid (another 
indicator of shared interests), but the first transfer signals a new stage in the relationship. 
Unlike other goods, arms are unique in their power to constitute—or destroy—relations 
between states. This is clearly seen when the US transferred arms to Vietnam in late 2016. 
The US gave Vietnam US$58.9 million in foreign aid in 2015, but it was the lifting of the 
arms embargo that sent a signal about new diplomatic ties, and sent a signal to China about 
aggression in the South China Sea.112 The newness of these transfers – whether expected 
or unexpected – sets expectations for future transfers, but should not immediately enable 
aggressive foreign policy behaviors, because of the newness of the relationship. Similar to 
the expectations of realignment, states act cautiously following this first transfer, and 
policies will change after subsequent transfers. 
Receivers Exercise Agency, Too 
Much of the foregoing has implied that the receiver’s foreign policy is predetermined 
by the type of signal it receives. Readers are forgiven for coming away with the impression 
that this theory treats receiving states as non-agentic. The receiver exercises agency in two 
important ways. Receiver’s interpretation of events can differ from the sender’s, which 
results in “unexpected” foreign policy outcomes.113 For example, though US leaders 
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thought its negotiations to denuclearize Iran would be well received in the region, Saudi 
Arabia, a US ally, objected to new ties between the US and Iran. The US thought Saudi 
Arabia would welcome a non-nuclear Iran, but Saudi Arabia feared a new relationship 
between the US and Iran might jeopardize the Saudi-US relationship. In response, Saudi 
Arabia began diversifying its weapons suppliers, and bought prestigious weapons 
including the British Tornado and Hawk aircraft.114 Saudi Arabia also began showing off 
its non-US weapons, including the ineffective, but still prestigious DF-3 missile from 
China. This bling weapon, which Saudi Arabia purchased in the 1980s, was a central 
feature of military parades in the country.115 Experts remarked that Saudi Arabia’s display 
of the missiles “was intended to signal to Washington its current discomfort with the way 
the US has handled Syria, the Arab Spring, and the Iranian nuclear issue.”116 
Second, receivers can try to move senders into structurally central positions, thus 
binding the sender to the receiver. The history of US-Israeli arms transfers is instructive. 
Despite efforts to portray its transfers to Israel as one-off transfers devoid of signaling 
content, the US became widely identified as Israel’s primary weapons supplier by 1966. 
Repeated Israeli requests for bling and boom weapons, including M-48 Patton tanks, A-4E 
Skyhawk jets, and F-4 Phantom nuclear-capable jets, resulted in multiple US transfers to 
Israel – some made for the sole purpose of forcing Israel to temporarily pause its demands 
                                                 
114
 Sorenson 2014. 
115
 Rachel Oswald, “Saudi Arabia unveil ballistic missiles in military parade, but why now?” Defense One, 
30 April 2014, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/04/saudi-arabia-unveils-ballistic-missiles-military-
parade-why-now/83530/. 
116
 Aaron Stein, “A Gordian Knot: Missiles in the Gulf,” Arms Control Wonk, 30 April 2014, 
http://guests.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4372/a-gordian-knot-missiles-in-the-gulf. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   74 
on the US. As weapons transfers increased in type and number, the US found itself 
structurally central to relations in the Middle East, and unable to disengage, showing that 
receivers can exert significant influence over senders, too.   
Long-Term Effects on Hierarchy and International Order 
In the long-term, the signals sent through weapons transfer affect foreign policy is 
through the production and communication of status hierarchies within groups. Receiving 
one type of fighter jet instead of another type is one way that senders can draw boundaries 
around groups of states, marking some as closer allies than others, for example. This type 
of intra-group signaling is a common feature of international politics, and also affects state 
foreign policy choices. As shown in the following empirical chapter, giving or withholding 
particular weapons was one way the US and USSR signaled where receivers fit into 
alliance hierarchies.  
Today, the F-15 Eagle fighter jet plays this role. It one of a number of highly capable 
and prestigious fighter jets in the US arsenal, such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon jet. But the 
F-15 is used to distinguish significant non-NATO US allies from other US allies. It is used 
by Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. By contrast, the F-16 Fighting Falcon is used by twenty-
six states, including Chile, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. Though the F-16 has some 
European operators, such as Norway, the Netherlands, Greece, and Belgium, the plane is 
more widely distributed than the F-15. The spread of fighter jets is one key way of 
establishing status hierarchies, though states usually reserve the best for themselves. The 
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F-22 jet is only used by the US, and the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft is only used by six 
states: the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, and Saudi Arabia.117  
Establishing or clarifying a status hierarchy is often a deliberate motivation for sending 
(or denying) certain arms. States that feel they are in the core alliance or friendship of 
another state might act more aggressively than a state that sees itself as a more peripheral 
friend or ally. Once established, a status hierarchy feeds back into receivers’ expectations 
of what weapons they should receive. A US NATO ally would expect to receive the same 
weapons as other NATO allies, and would be surprised if it was excluded from receiving 
a high-status plane like the F-35. Similarly, when non-NATO allies like South Korea are 
included in the production process of the F-35, this can contribute to their status position 
as a major non-NATO ally.118 A state’s position in a status hierarchy also affects its 
perceptions of relative power, and feeds into the foreign policy choices a state can make. 
It is not possible to identify which weapons are used for status creation based on the 
capabilities or signal of the weapon alone. Status creation weapons are empirically 
determined, based on the discourse about the weapon(s). For example, the F-104 
Starfighter produced a US alliance hierarchy among US allies in Asia and the Middle East, 
but it’s not immediately obvious that the F-104 would serve this purpose rather than other, 
similar aircraft. 
 
                                                 
117
 This general trend makes the F-35 stand out even more. The states involved in producing the plane—
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the UK, and the US, with Israel, 
Japan, and South Korea as planned purchasers from the outset—don’t fit any of the usual patterns of fighter 
jet transfers or co-production ventures. 
118
 See “Global Participation: The centerpiece of 21st century global security,” Lockheed Martin, 
https://www.f35.com/global. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   76 
IMPLICATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
The theory developed in this chapter presents an explanation of foreign policy based on a 
symbolic signaling mechanism. States can, and often do, send signals that rely on symbols, 
rather than costly actions, and these signals matter because they have observable effects on 
states’ foreign policy behaviors. This type of signaling occupies the middle ground between 
the extremes of costly action and cheap talk: signals can come from social relationships 
and symbolic goods.119 Weapons transfers are not so exceptional that they are rare signals 
in international politics, nor are they so commonplace as to lose signaling meaning. They 
are instead common enough to be broadly comprehensible, but rare enough to have real 
foreign policy effects. Scholarship on signaling needs to be sensitive to context and 
contingency, and to the importance of shared meanings and understandings. Future 
research can identify other contexts where actors use social relationships and symbols to 
send political signals; I would suggest this type of signaling is not confined to weapons 
transfers, nor is it unique to international security.120  
This theory also demonstrates the importance of political relationships in explaining 
foreign policy and international security. Foreign policy is a complex and dynamic process, 
in which the past affects the present and the present will affect the future. To pull a dyad 
out of its historical and social context is to strip away relationships that matter for 
determining a state’s foreign policy choices. Further, states beyond the sender-receiver 
dyad matter. Whether through establishing hierarchies, or signaling to the receiver’s 
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adversaries, weapons transfers affect and are affected by the policies in multiple states. 
Relationships are not exogenous to behavior, nor is behavior exogenous to relationships.121 
The emphasis on relationships throughout this project also shows just how much effort it 
takes to maintain them. Maintaining relationships takes work, because the giver must 
constantly feed the ravenous beast.   
Finally, by treating arms as both military tool and symbol, this chapter shows the 
promise of linking materialist and constructivist approaches to international security. 
Addressing both dimensions of weapons shows that perceptions of relative power are a 
function of both military capabilities and relationships with other states. Weapons transfers 
serve the vital role of signaling and clarifying these political relationships. Combined with 
the focus on relationships, this work shows how international actors use symbols and 
signals to make and unmake relations that constitute world politics.  
 
SCOPE CONDITIONS 
 
Thus far the theoretical exposition has not specified which states are more or less likely to 
use arms transfers to send signals, nor which states are likely to purchase arms and receive 
signals. This section outlines key scope conditions, noting the difference between the 
theoretical expectations and what will be examined in the empirical chapters that follow.  
 
1: Who can send a signal? 
 
In theory, there are three types of states that are eligible to send signals through weapons 
transfers: major powers, regional powers, and states that occupy unique structural positions 
                                                 
121
 See Fowler et al. 2011. for an extended discussion of causality in networks.  
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   78 
in the international system. Major powers can send signals because they are the states that 
can most credibly offer military and political support to other states. It is unsurprising that 
during the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union engaged in this type of behavior. 
By contrast, when Albania transferred old Soviet MiG-19 aircraft to China in 1965, this 
transfer was more likely about China wanting the MiG-19 than any expression of closeness 
between Albania and China. Most major powers also export weapons, so this first scope 
condition is not especially constraining for the theory. This dynamic plays out in a similar 
fashion for regional powers. Whereas an Egyptian transfer to Cambodia would not have 
much signaling power, an Egyptian transfer to Syria or Jordan would, because of regional 
dynamics.  
The final type of state eligible to send signals are those in powerful structural positions. 
Their support is valuable by virtue of the structural position they occupy: states that are 
brokers between groups, or gatekeepers to a particular clique or group of states can exercise 
this power.122 Egypt and Yugoslavia – key members of the non-aligned movement (NAM) 
– were not major powers, but were still instrumental in spreading weapons to members of 
the NAM across the globe. Tracing weapons transfers from Egypt and Yugoslavia is one 
way to identify which states were included in the NAM and which states were excluded. 
Today, the UAE plays a similarly important role in distributing weapons—many of them 
secondhand—to other, smaller states in the Middle East. This second scope condition 
shows that power is derived from states’ structural position, and that weapons transfers are 
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still meaningful signals because they indicate inclusion or exclusion from particular 
groups. 
The empirical chapters that follow primarily tell a story about US foreign policy, 
though I often reference transfers from other states, including the Soviet Union and France. 
The Soviet Union should also have used arms transfers to send signals during the Cold 
War, but limited access to archival records prevents a similar in-depth study. However, US 
records about Soviet weapons transfers do indicate that the Soviet Union engaged in similar 
arms transfer signaling dynamics. French arms transfers in the Middle East during the Cold 
War provide an additional check on the theory, and suggest that other major states can also 
send signals through arms transfers.  
 
2: Who buys arms? 
 
The decision to pursue arms is different in the conventional than in the nuclear realm. 
Whereas states that want nuclear weapons have to build their own, or at least locate nuclear 
facilities within their borders, most states don’t have the option to sustain their own military 
with a domestic conventional arms industry. With the exception of the United States, all 
other weapons-producers need to export weapons in order to economically support their 
own domestic industry.123 The necessity of maintaining an export market means that states 
rarely develop their own arms industry; nearly all senders of weapons are also receivers. 
                                                 
123
 See **Kapstein and Caverley on Tier I and Tier II states. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   80 
SIPRI identified 155 states that purchased major conventional arms between 2012 and 
2016; the vast majority of countries seek arms.124 
 
CONCEPT ANALYSIS AND CASE SELECTION 
 
To assess this theory, I use a multi-method research design that incorporates the 
quantitative analysis from the preceding chapter. I use three historical case studies to 
explore the causal mechanism of signaling and reveal of information, and also include a 
chapter of shorter contemporary cases that illustrates the ongoing relevance of this 
mechanism in explaining the link between arms and foreign policy today. This section 
describes how I evaluate the concepts to provide consistency across cases and time periods, 
and concludes with a section on case selection. 
 
Prestige 
 
To determine prestige, I first differentiate among weapons platforms – that is, I separate 
out in broad brush strokes aircraft, from armored vehicles, from missiles, and then within 
each of those categories, between attack/bomber aircraft and training/transport aircraft. 
This is in line with existing literature, which names supersonic aircraft, main battle tanks, 
and submarines as prestigious weapons. Though these weapons are not all offensive – 
supersonic aircraft are usually used as defensive interceptors – they all do have some sort 
of forward usage, either through firepower (tanks, submarines), or by movement (primarily 
aircraft and submarines). Aircraft and submarines are also technologically sophisticated. 
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There is, then, a non-determinative correlation between the tactical offense and 
technological sophistication and perceptions of prestige. In determining what weapons are 
prestige, I look for a baseline of either offense or technology, and then dig further into 
perceptions of the weapon.  
Establishing a baseline means that there are some weapons that are never candidates 
for prestige, such as armored vehicles or rifles. These weapons have uses, but they don’t 
meet the necessary requirement for consideration as a prestige weapon. Digging further in, 
I look for examples of actors talking about the weapons without reference to its usage. Is a 
weapon called glamorous, cool, or flashy for reasons other than its military usage? Do 
actors acknowledge problems or faults with the weapon and still desire it nonetheless? This 
type of analysis relies heavily on archival resources (for official opinion), and on historical 
news coverage (for both popular and official opinion). I have found—both from the 
empirical evidence and through my fieldwork—that public opinion about prestige in the 
realm of military instruments follows military opinion. This is likely because the general 
public does not know enough about various types of weapons to adjudicate between “cool” 
and “cool and useful,” so in cases where the official opinion is not known, the public 
reaction to weaponry is a good gauge of perceptions. 
The DF-3 missile, produced by China and popular in the 1980s, is an example of a 
weapon considered prestigious despite its shortcomings on the capabilities side. The DF-3 
is “exceedingly inefficient for the delivery of conventional munitions,” but Saudi Arabia 
purchased a number of them from China in 1988, and then went on to display these 
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weapons at a military parade in 2012 to demonstrate the prestige of its military.125 
Similarly, the F-104 fighter jet, as will be shown in greater detail in Chapter 4, had Mach-
2 capabilities and a literally shiny body. But these capabilities did not make it tactically 
useful: the lightweight construction needed to enable Mach-2 meant the F-104 could not 
carry a meaningful payload; its short and narrow wings led to stalling problems in the 
engine, severely limiting the plane’s use as an interceptor (its primary function). Various 
high-level US officials referred to this plane as a “glamour weapon,”126 or a “shiny 
object,”127 while simultaneously acknowledging the universal limitations on the plane’s 
employment.  
The other way prestige is indicated is when actors reference the weapon’s lack of local 
tactical utility, but still desire the weapon. In 1968, the US considered giving Taiwan a 
squadron of F-4C aircraft, more for “reasons of prestige and desire to obtain some 
reaffirmation of US defense commitment, than by anticipated military needs.”128 Though 
the F-4C was a capable aircraft, it would not have been of military use for Taiwan’s specific 
requirements. Taiwan thought there would be political benefits to receiving the prestigious 
weapon. Using this type of evidence allows me to get a sense of what actors thought about 
different types of weapons, and gives me more leverage on perceptions of prestige than 
imposing the requirement that all weapons of type X are necessarily prestigious.  
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Military Utility 
 
Military utility is a relative measure, comparing the specific weapon’s performance to 
others of the same type, and is also concerned with potential local uses of the weapon. On 
the first point, I compare the capabilities of weapons produced and in use at the same time. 
For example, the F-104 fighter jet (mid-1950s) is compared to the F-86 (late-1940s), the 
F-5 (late-1950s), and the F-100 (mid-1950s). In addition to being produced in the same 
time frame, the empirical record shows that these planes were often discussed during the 
same negotiations, and that some of them were believed to be interchangeable with one 
another. I take note of the characteristics of the weapon, including speed, range, payload, 
caliber, etc., in order to get a sense of the relative capabilities of the weapon. A weapon is 
considered less tactically useful if a) it significantly underperforms compared to other 
available weapons, or b) it cannot perform its primary function. On the first criterion, if 
comparable tanks have an average speed of 25 miles per hour, and the tank under 
consideration tops out at 15 mph, the tank significantly underperforms compared to its 
peers. On the second criterion, though it might seem incomprehensible that states would 
produce, buy, and sell weapons that cannot perform basic functions, this does happen. The 
DF-3 missile, produced by China, was notorious for its inability to hit its programmed 
target. 
For local context, I look at a variety of factors that can impede a state making full use 
of the weapon. The example of Singapore hoarding old German tanks is extreme; the island 
city-state has no land borders, and tanks generally destroy city roads. There are, though, 
more general reasons why a weapon can have diminished local use. 
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Geography 
Mountains or water barriers can make it difficult to use certain weapons. For example, 
supersonic aircraft can be less effective in mountainous areas because radar – needed to 
guide these planes and their ordnance – is often not placed in this difficult terrain, and the 
topography can interfere with signals from more distant bases.  
State infrastructure 
States can lack the physical infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, or waterways, to use 
weapons. For example, India desired main battle tanks from the US and UK, but would 
have been unable to deploy these weapons in the places where it would have fought because 
the tanks were too heavy to drive over bridges. Though the armor on the tanks and caliber 
of its main gun contributed to the prestige of these tanks, there was little tactical use for 
them in the places where India would fight. 
Military skill level  
As technological sophistication increases – and thus the likelihood of prestige – so too 
does the level of skill needed to both master the weapon and incorporate it into operations. 
It can take a year for pilots to learn to fly a new aircraft, never mind for that aircraft to be 
effectively incorporated into existing arsenals. For surface ships and submarines, weapons 
that involve the workings of an entire crew, this learning can be even greater. For example, 
though the F-104 fighter jet was a prestigious Mach-2 aircraft, but Pakistan’s low level of 
pilot skill and lack of integrated radar capability severely diminished the tactical utility of 
the aircraft. Though soldiers and pilots can be trained to operate new weapons systems, in 
many cases this takes a significant period of time. The US estimated it would take a 
minimum of nine months for experienced Pakistani pilots to learn to fly the F-104, never 
mind use it in tactical maneuvers.  
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Missing or deficient support and maintenance 
Weapons have an attrition rate from use (battle deployment as well as general wear and 
tear). Without proper maintenance and support, including the steady flow of spare parts, 
the operational life of the weapon quickly decreases, particularly in areas of harsh 
conditions (e.g., extreme weather temperature, or deserts where sand can get into engines 
and can also damage stealth technology). For this reason, the number of weapons can often 
matter for tactical utility; if a state does not have weapons to replace damaged ones, or to 
cannibalize for spare parts, there is limited use to the weapon. Though the lack of support 
systems is a constraint on tactical utility only in extreme cases, since supply and 
maintenance agreements are often included in the initial weapons contract, it can affect the 
speed with which a state can employ a new weapon. For example, US arms transfers to 
Vietnam are expected to be only a gradual change in Vietnam’s military capabilities, partly 
because of the types of weapons it will receive, and partly due to Vietnam’s lack of the 
necessary support and maintenance structures.129 
 
Shared Strategic Interests 
 
Recall that this concept captures both “objective” types of alignment, such as defense pacts, 
shared threat perceptions, significant economic ties, or natural resource dependence, as 
well as diffuse or ideational ties like shared worldview, or cultural affinity. Defense pacts, 
economic ties, and natural resources are readily observable through existing databases. The 
other reasons, though, require a deeper knowledge of the cases, and of national security 
                                                 
129
 Franz-Stefan Gady, “US arms sales to Vietnam: A military analysis,” The Diplomat, 6 June 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/us-arms-sales-to-vietnam-a-military-analysis/. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   86 
narratives. The degree of common and conflicting interests is an important part of the 
framework, but it is not the primary dimension of interest. I therefore rely on archival 
evidence, memoirs, and heavily on secondary sources to determine shared worldview, 
regional goals, and threat interpretation. Where there are disagreements – either within 
governments or in the scholarly literature – about national security or worldview, I note 
this in the footnotes, and default to the perspectives of the heads of state and civilian and 
military leadership that had say over what weapons to send and accept. 
The problem of economic ties 
In the contemporary period economic ties can serve analytical purpose – though that 
role should be based on the relative weight of the tie (i.e., how much trade occurs between 
states) rather than simply the existence of a trade tie – the economics of weapons transfers 
during the Cold War are more complicated. Prior to 1982, the United States provided 
weaponry on a grant basis through the Military Assistance Program.130 This often took the 
form of the US providing grant funding to a country so that it could “buy” US weapons. It 
was therefore not a prerequisite that the country be able to afford the weapon in order to 
receive it. 
Even in the current period of weapons transfers, qualitative changes to the ways that 
weapons deals are negotiated has further complicated the effects of economic variables. A 
confluence of factors – increased competition from new weapon suppliers; greater cost of 
research, design, and production; reductions in military spending; and longer life-spans and 
dual-purpose weapons – now mean that every weapons sale is crucial for defense firms. 
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Only weapons manufacturers in the US – who can rely on the immense US military budget 
– are somewhat free from this pressure to constantly earn sales. This dynamic has flipped 
the usual story of leverage. Traditionally, supplying weapons to a state gave the supplier 
leverage over the receiver: by threatening to cut off future transfers the supplier could affect 
the receiver’s policies both foreign and domestic. However, the imperative to gain business 
has given leverage to the receivers. They have been able to extract additional goods and 
services – known as offsets – from the defense manufacturers. For some states this has 
involved the transfer of technology or knowledge alongside weapons. For others, offsets 
have become an integral part of the state’s development. Malaysia, for one, has used offsets 
to jump-start its Green Technology sector, to fund domestic infrastructure projects, and has 
even leveraged weapons purchases from the UK into spots for Malaysian students at higher 
educational institutions in the UK. I provide this extended discussion of the economics of 
weapons trade to show that a) cost-benefit analysis of purchasing weapons has to take into 
account intangibles like technology and education, and b) the economics of the weapons 
trade has become increasingly complex over the last fifteen years and can no longer simply 
be an input variable. The chart below summarizes the key questions asked of the evidence 
in order to determine prestige, military utility, and shared strategic interest. 
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Table 4: Concept Analysis 
 
Case Selection 
 
The three cases share a general strategic environment characterized by (1) an enduring 
rivalry; (2) power asymmetries; and (3) great power interest. This strategic environment 
means each case is ripe for conflict, states are interested in the balance of power, and have 
the possibility of receiving arms from an external supplier. Therefore, the cases present a 
number of countervailing conditions for a signaling argument.131  
I leverage between- and within-case comparison in three cases, US arms transfers to: 
India and Pakistan, 1954-1966; Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, 1962-1969; and China and 
Taiwan, 1970-1979. Each case takes place during the Cold War, and the bipolar 
international structure holds a variety of variables constant. Finding the same patterns, 
processes, and outcomes between cases reduces the likelihood of a confounding variable 
or process doing the work. 
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Prestige Military Utility Strategic Interest 
• Does the weapon meet the 
baseline of offensive power or 
technology? 
• Do actors reference the weapon 
without talking about its use? 
• Do actors acknowledge the 
weapon’s lack of local use, but 
still want it? 
• When was the weapon last used 
by a great power? 
 
• Does the weapon perform its 
primary function? 
• How many weapons were 
included in the transfer? 
• How old is the weapon? Is it 
second-hand? 
• What is the state’s 
integration capacity (e.g., 
missiles, radar)? 
 
• Do states share threat 
perceptions? 
• Do the states have defense 
pacts? 
• Does one state depend on the 
other for natural resources or 
other goods? 
• Do the states share cultural, 
language, or other affinity ties? 
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Within each case I analyze transfers of each type of weapon, vary whether they are 
expected or unexpected, and also give examples of non-transfers. I trace the transfers from 
negotiation through delivery to outcome, in order to directly connect the weapon transfer 
to foreign policy behavior. The transfers analyzed in each case are not independent of one 
another; transfers at later periods of time build on the expectations and outcomes of 
previous ones.  
There are, then, two sets of “casing.” The first is around types of state relationships – 
each case is a different example of friend and adversary configurations. The second is 
around types of weapons transferred within each case: I trace the four types of weapons 
and the lack of transfer in each. The transfers vary in type and amount, and I note transfers 
that both occur and did not occur. Each case address foreign policy behaviors that are 
puzzling, and that can be answered by understanding the signals sent and (mis)perceived 
in each case. 
India and Pakistan 
This case shows how signals sent through weapons transfers help explain the ebbs and 
flows in the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. It begins with Pakistan’s signing 
of defense agreements with the US in 1954, and ends with the 1965 India-Pakistan war in 
Kashmir. The chapter addresses why Pakistan – a revisionist state – did not take advantage 
of India’s defeat by China in 1962, and instead allowed the status quo to reign in the 
disputed territory of Kashmir. The chapter also addresses how pivotal deterrence failed in 
1965, and encouraged Pakistan to attack India. More broadly, this chapter shows how 
weapons transfers are implicated in producing and communicating status hierarchies: some 
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of the fighter jets received by Pakistan indicated that it was a high-status US ally, while the 
denial of other planes knocked Pakistan down a few rungs on the status ladder. 
Israel, Egypt, and Jordan 
This case study focuses on the development of US-Israeli relations, beginning with the 
1962 transfer of Hawk surface-to-air missiles, and ending with the 1968 transfer of F-4 
Phantom jets, cementing the United States as Israel’s primary weapons supplier. The case 
study offers an amended explanation of the 1967 war, by focusing on the pivotal role of 
Jordan, and on Israeli anxiety. The United States failed to reassure Jordan in April 1967 – 
it had expected to receive fighter jets and instead received rifles and utility trucks. Feeling 
snubbed by the US, Jordan unexpectedly aligned with Egypt. Simultaneously, Israel 
received contradictory signals from the US and France, which fueled its anxieties about its 
political alliances with these states.  
China and Taiwan 
Finally, the case of China and Taiwan shows how the policy of strategic ambiguity was 
developed and sustained through weapons transfers. While the US was initially aligned 
with Taiwan and opposed to mainland China, the Nixon administration’s opening to China 
was the beginning of shifting allegiances in the area. Arms transfers to Taiwan helped 
reassure it that the US would prevent a Chinese attack, and also deterred China from 
making a move against Taiwan. The case shows how arms transfers compare to other 
signals, such as diplomatic visits, economic aid, and public statements.  
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Chapter 3. Shooting for the Starfighter: US transfers to India and 
Pakistan, 1954-1965 
 
Situated on the front lines of the Cold War, India and Pakistan were key pieces in 
political maneuvering at the grand strategic level. The US and Soviet Union wanted to 
prevent each other from developing client states in South Asia. India and Pakistan fiercely 
contested disputed territory in Kashmir, and had an almost pathological fear of one another. 
As each sought weapons and allies to obtain military and political superiority over the 
other, the sub-continent seemed ripe for conflict. 
This chapter uses weapons transfers from the US to India and Pakistan between 1954 
and 1967 to explain key foreign policy puzzles: why did Pakistan draw away from the US, 
and toward China, in the mid-1960s? why did war erupt in Kashmir in 1965, and not 
earlier? The signals sent by weapons transfers (and the lack of certain transfers) help make 
sense of these otherwise puzzling behaviors.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first provide the historical background necessary to 
make sense of the relationships between India, Pakistan, and the superpowers. I then show 
the expectations generated by my theoretical framework, and explain the specific weapons 
transfers analyzed in this chapter. Finally, I trace a series of arms transfers from negotiation 
to outcome, to demonstrate how the signal sent by the transfer explains political outcomes. 
I conclude with more general observations about signaling in social networks, status 
hierarchies, and the role of (mis)perceptions. 
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CONTEXT AND EXPECTATIONS 
 
India and Pakistan gained independence from the British Empire in 1947; India retained 
the majority of the British military equipment while Pakistan inherited a tenuous 
geostrategic position and a distinct lack of military hardware.132 Split into East and West 
Pakistan, the country was vulnerable to incursions from both India and China, and fought 
an almost-immediate war with India over the territories of Jammu and Kashmir.133 This set 
the stage for Indo-Pakistani relations throughout the Cold War. Control over Kashmir 
continues to plague Indian-Pakistani relations to this day, and proved a thorn in superpower 
dealings with the subcontinent. The imperative to gain and hold control of Kashmir 
animated foreign policy behaviors in both India and Pakistan. 
The quality of the relationship between the United States and both Pakistan and India 
fluctuated during the first decades of the Cold War. Following independence, the US 
incorporated Pakistan into its military assistance bureaucracy. Pakistan signed Mutual 
Defense Assistance Agreements in 1950 and 1954, and US weapons were sent to Pakistan 
beginning in 1955. Pakistan also joined Western-oriented regional defense treaties, 
including the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later 
CENTO) in 1955.134 India, on the other hand, maintained a non-aligned position and 
received weaponry and aid from some Western States (primarily France and the UK) as 
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well as the Soviet Union. The alignment of Pakistan with the West and India as a neutral 
party held until October 1962, when India fought a border war with China.  
Fought on the heels of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the border war was seen by India and 
the US as heralding new Chinese interest in the subcontinent. At the strategic level, this 
conflict fundamentally altered how US policymakers viewed South Asian politics. The US 
rushed emergency military aid to India and began to view India and Pakistan as cogs in the 
greater Cold War struggle, rather than as regional rivals. The Kennedy administration tried 
to woo India to a more Western-friendly position by taking advantage of the vulnerabilities 
India felt after the 1962 war.135 An uneasy triad of relations persisted from 1962-1965, with 
the US hoping to improve its relations with India while maintaining strong ties with 
Pakistan. Such a triad was impossible to maintain, and Pakistan, feeling slighted by new 
US interests in India, attacked India in September 1965.136 The US imposed a complete 
arms embargo on India and Pakistan as a result of this war, a ban which was only lifted in 
1975. Overall, then, the intensity of the relationship between the US and India and Pakistan 
varied between 1954 and 1967.    
There are two final pieces of information necessary for understanding regional 
dynamics. First, by any account of relative military power, India remained preponderant 
over Pakistan even after Pakistan received US weaponry. The numerical balance of forces 
grew from 2.5 to 1 in 1952 to a maximum of 11.5 to 1 between 1962 and 1965. However, 
this was a numerical—not a quality—balance; India simply had a larger population and a 
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larger army.137 These crude measures overlook strategic considerations that would have 
prevented India form using all of its military power in a conflict with Pakistan. Most of 
India’s forces were deployed along the Himalayan border with China, and would not have 
been available for engagement with Pakistan.138  
Second, the weapons received by Pakistan, and later by India, were part of the US 
Military Assistance Program (MAP). This program provided weapons at little to no cost to 
US friends and allies.139 Weapons provided under MAP meant that economic constraints 
were due to US budget outlays, not the purchasing power of India or Pakistan. MAP aid 
also has a longer logistics and planning period than outright purchases. Pakistan would 
submit its “wish list” to the military officer in charge of the Military Assistance Advisory 
Group, who would make an evaluation of Pakistan’s military needs, and forward his 
recommendations to the Ambassador and to State Department officials in the US. These 
policymakers would analyze the political consequences of transferring the recommended 
weapons. Weapons were only transferred after this lengthy process. As a result, transfers 
were planned three years in advance, with some State Department officials arguing for a 
five-year planning process. The degree of bureaucracy involved in administering MAP aid 
meant that neither Pakistan nor India was able to get weaponry quickly. Funding for the 
program was also subject to the whims of Congress, which allocated funds to the 
Departments of State and Defense. With the exception of emergency aid – which could 
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only be extended in dire circumstances and on a limited basis – US arms transfers were 
planned years in advance of when the weapon was delivered. 
 
Expectations: Balance of Capabilities 
 
The enduring rivalry over Kashmir and the general hostility between India and Pakistan 
means that this is a hard case for my signaling argument: the primary logic of weapons 
acquisition should be based on building real military capabilities. Both states should be 
sensitive to changes in the relative balance of power. They should actively seek capable 
and prestigious weapons, and be skeptical of less capable, though prestigious weapons. 
Specifically, India and Pakistan should desire weapons that help extend supply lines and 
get troops into the mountainous region of Kashmir, and light tanks and subsonic jets that 
would enable fighting on Western and Eastern borders. India and Pakistan should seek 
allies that will boost their military capability relative to the other, and should urge those 
allies to commit to defend them against aggression from the other. Finally, India and 
Pakistan should exploit moments of weakness in the other, whether that weakness stems 
from declining military power or perceived lack of political will to hold Kashmir.  
Because India and Pakistan were situated on the front lines in the Cold War, the US 
and USSR should use weapons transfers to accomplish their own “strategic goals.” While 
existing literature is ambiguous about what “strategic goals” means, we can assume that 
the US wanted to protect the sovereignty of its ally (Pakistan) and wanted to woo India to 
the West. The Soviet Union wanted to similarly cultivate India as a friendly state, and to 
prevent the US from influencing the subcontinent through Pakistan. Knowing that India 
and Pakistan were concerned about relative capabilities, we should thus see the US and 
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Soviet Union providing weapons to sweeten the deal: they should transfer highly capable 
and prestigious weapons when trying to influence India or Pakistan. To restate this point: 
weapons acquisition in India and Pakistan should be guided by the balance of power. All 
parties involved should want to send and receive highly prestigious and highly capable 
weaponry. It is therefore highly unexpected for either state to seek weapons with minimal 
military capabilities, or to restrain itself from taking advantage of momentary weakness in 
the other. 
Finally, Pakistan’s military was entirely dependent on the United States. Unlike India, 
it did not inherit former British equipment and was unable to produce even small arms 
domestically. Therefore, Pakistan should have been vulnerable to US leverage and 
pressure.140 Pakistan’s foreign policy should conform to US strategic goals, and the US 
should be able to restrain in Pakistan in its dealings with India. Pakistan’s vulnerability 
should increase its support for the SEATO and Baghdad Pact/CENTO alliances. By 
contrast, India could rely on its large stockpile of colonial British weaponry, and had 
independent manufacturing capabilities for small arms. Therefore, India should have more 
foreign policy freedom, but should be careful not to jeopardize its non-aligned position by 
accepting too many weapons from either the US or USSR. 
The sections that follow discuss a series of weapons transfers, beginning with the 
transfer of F-86 fighter jets and M-47 Patton tanks from the US to Pakistan in the late 
1950s. As the first transfers between the US and Pakistan, they were expected and 
reinforced ties between the two states. Pakistan next requested, and expected to receive, 
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the F-100 advanced fighter jet. This transfer was denied, since the plane was given only to 
the NATO allies. The denial was quickly followed by non-transfers caused by US budget 
reduction and changes in administration. Pakistan took the combination of the F-100 denial 
and subsequent non-transfers as a signal that its relations with the US had soured. It 
therefore sought reassurance through the transfer of the F-104 Starfighter, a flashy bling 
weapon that would have signaled strong ties to the US. After China and India fought a 
border war in 1962, the US extended military aid to India. Though these transfers were of 
backbone and blip weapons, India and Pakistan both interpreted the transfers as a signal of 
change. Pakistan, fearing a budding US-India relationship, again requested the F-104 for 
reassurance purposes, but was ultimately denied the weapon.  
Many of the weapons transfers were negotiated simultaneously, or in quick succession. 
Further, negotiations with one state were often conducted concurrently with negotiations 
with others. The transfers that resulted from one negotiation effected subsequent 
negotiations. The analysis that follows highlights important simultaneous or successive 
events that bear on the weapons transfers and the effects of the signals. After analyzing 
each series of transfers, I turn to alternate explanations to show that the signal from the 
weapon transfer, not something else, accounts for observed behaviors.  
 
AMERICA’S MOST ALLIED ALLY: FIRST TRANSFERS TO PAKISTAN 
 
Between 1950 and 1955, Pakistan signed two mutual defense assistance agreements with 
the US, and joined the regional defense organizations SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. The 
multitude of ties with the US led Pakistan’s President, Mohammed Ayub Khan, to describe 
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Pakistan as America’s “most allied ally.”141 These defense agreements were signed in large 
part because Pakistan portrayed its strategic use and its vulnerability in a way that appealed 
to the US. Even before it signed defense agreements with the United States, Pakistani 
leaders and media tried to cultivate an image of a friendly South Asian state. Shortly after 
independence, Pakistani Prime Minister Noon said that the US should realize, “Pakistan is 
the Eastern bastion against communism as Turkey for Western nations. It is in the interest 
therefore of the US to give military and economic support to Pakistan as well as to 
Turkey.”142 Dawn, a left-leaning and progressive newspaper, published an editorial in April 
1952 describing Communism as a “prowling monster,” and stating that Islam “shared with 
the democratic west the basic concept of liberty and freedom of conscience.” The editorial 
urged closer relations with the United States.143 The Pakistani government gave rhetorical 
support to the US intervention in Korea, to show that it was committed to the defense of 
the “free world.”144 
Pakistan’s rhetorical maneuvering was successful in framing the future of Pakistan as 
a vital strategic interest for US policymakers. The US defined its objectives in Pakistan as 
“the continuance of non-Communist governments willing[ness] and [ability] to resist 
Communist blandishments or pressures from within and without.”145 By emphasizing its 
opposition to Communism, Pakistan smoothly played to broader national security 
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narratives in the United States. The State Department’s Pakistan Working Group, stated 
that the US provided military assistance to Pakistan primarily for political reasons, in order 
to “maintain an atmosphere of friendly relations.”146 The State Department noted the 
political importance of Pakistan, “with its western wing oriented toward the Middle East 
and its eastern portion oriented toward Southeast Asia, provided a logical choice to 
incorporate pivotally in the security arrangements which were created to shore-up both 
regions against further communist aggression.”147 Though their motivations were slightly 
different – Pakistan felt US support was necessary for its survival as a country, whereas 
the US thought Pakistan was an important front-line in the Cold War148 – the outcome was 
the same: Pakistan was incorporated into US alliance and policy structures. 
The shared threat perceptions, particularly with regard to China, led Pakistan to expect 
US transfers of highly capable and prestigious weapons. These expectations were met: in 
1956, Pakistan received 76 M-47 Patton tanks and 120 F-86 Sabre jets; both among the 
most capable available at the time. As the first transfers, my theory anticipates that these 
weapons reinforce the ties that existed on paper and the shared worldview between Pakistan 
and the US. Pakistan should feel more confident and secure in its regional position. India 
should object to the weapons both on the basis of Pakistan’s increased capabilities as well 
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as the evident political alliance between the US and Pakistan. The observed outcomes of 
the initial transfers largely accord to these expectations. 
US officials portrayed the transfers as routine and obvious actions between close 
allies. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles summarized the transfer of F-86 Sabres in 
1956:  
The planes form part of the long-term program worked out between Pakistan and the 
United States on the basis of the military aid agreement. The undertaking to include 
modern jets in the program was reached in 1954 soon after the agreement was signed. 
It takes about eighteen months in ‘lead time’ to schedule, produce, and deliver this type 
of aircraft. As has been stated previously the purpose of the United States program of 
military aid to Pakistan is to help defend the Middle East and Southeast Asia against 
possible Communist aggression.149 
In an effort to manage India’s opposition to the transfers, US Ambassador Horace Hildreth 
recommended handling any publicity about the planes’ arrival “in such a way as to attempt 
to show arrival of these planes was no emergency move by GOP or US due to developing 
situation but dated back to commitments made nearly two years ago.”150 The statements 
from Dulles and Hildreth both emphasize that the arms transfers were a perfectly natural 
extension of the shared strategic interests between the US and Pakistan. 
As expected by my theory, the Indian reaction focused on the balance of power and 
beliefs that Pakistan’s belligerency would increase. The leader of Uttar Pradesh, a state in 
northern India, called the transfer “an act of hostility to India,” that greatly endangered 
India’s security.151 He was not wrong: the F-86 matched the capabilities of India’s primary 
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fighter jet – the British-produced Hunter – with the benefit of being ten years newer. India 
further believed that this type of US support for Pakistan led Pakistan to adopt a 
confrontational approach with India.152 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Ayub, 
“The mere fact that large scale rearmament and military expansion takes place in Pakistan 
must necessarily have repercussions in India. The whole psychological atmosphere 
between the two countries will change for the worse and every question that is pending 
between us will be affected by it.” He went on to say that the “expansion of Pakistan’s war 
resources with the help of the USA can only be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India 
and one that is fraught with danger.”153 The effects of US military aid affected US-Indian 
relations, too. In the defense realm, India turned to the Soviet Union in order to offset US 
aid to Pakistan.154 This was the first step in closer relations between India and the Soviet 
Union.155 In other areas, India let negotiations with the US over an air-transit agreement 
flounder inconclusively, and Nehru regularly attacked the US and US-sponsored defense 
pacts.156 
The F-86 and M-47 transfers increased Pakistan’s military capabilities, and also caused 
its relations with India to sour. The transfers increased Pakistan’s confidence in its capacity 
to use force, which led Pakistan to increase its belligerency in other international arenas, 
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including the 1955 Bandung Conference.157 Equally important, even these routine, alliance 
standard operating procedure transfers had broader political consequences: they reinforced 
the nascent US-Pakistani relationship. 
These initial transfers were important because they were the first transfers from the US 
to Pakistan. My theory expects that first transfers always have a political signaling effect, 
and this effect was particularly evident in the case of Pakistan. Even after signing the two 
mutual defense agreements, US weapons did not immediately pour into Pakistan. Ayub, 
then the Commander in Chief of the Army, expressed dissatisfaction with what he 
perceived as the US dragging its feet. He told US Consul General Eugene Fisk that 
Pakistan’s lack of weapons from the US meant that he “cannot trust the Americans’ 
word.”158 More disconcerting to the US, Ayub said that the King of Saudi Arabia told him, 
“you cannot rely on the Americans; you cannot trust them.” Ayub knew that the Shah of 
Iran, and leaders in Lebanon and Iraq held similar opinions.159 Ayub further warned, 
“people are saying that America is resorting to political opportunism with Pakistan. If this 
becomes a widely held opinion you are not going to succeed in your policies in this area.” 
160 For Ayub, and other leaders in the region, the fact of US military deliveries was 
important to demonstrate the strength and sincerity of the US commitment to Pakistan. 
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Once the jets and tanks were delivered in late 1956, Ayub and others had proof of the US 
commitment.  
The first transfers were essential in making the ties that existed on paper real to both 
Pakistan and external observers. But the F-86 also raised Pakistan in the US alliance status 
hierarchy. As reported by the New York Times in June 1956, the F-86 “would give Pakistan 
a modern jet air arm superior to that of almost any other Asian ally of the United States 
except Nationalist China.”161 Because only Taiwan had similar jets, observers interpreted 
this transfer as signaling Pakistan’s elevation to the status of significant ally. The F-86—a 
rare weapon in this part of the world—signaled the seriousness with which the US 
approached its relationship with Pakistan. 
The initial transfers made Pakistan more confident in its relations with the US, elevated 
Pakistan to the status of key Asian ally, and represented the sincerity of US commitment 
to its allies. Thrilled that it had been raised to the status of an important Asian ally – 
equivalent to Taiwan – through the F-86 transfer, Pakistan next requested the F-100 fighter 
jet to test the extent of its importance to the US. The F-100 was a Mach-capable plane with 
a significantly larger operational radius than the F-86.162 The capabilities and the prestige 
of the F-100 made this a very desirable weapon for Pakistan. Pakistani Ambassador 
Mohammed Ali said that Pakistan was aware that F-100 fighter squadrons were being given 
to the NATO allies, and as a key ally of the US, Pakistan wanted the same equipment.163  
                                                 
161 Telegram State (Dulles) to Karachi, 25 June 1956, RG 59, Box 3875, Folder 790D.5MSP/1-1156, 
document 790D.5-MSP/6-2356, USNA. 
162 Telegram State (Rusk) to Rawalpindi, 2 September 1963, RG 59, Box 3757, Folder DEF 19-3 Defense 
Affairs, USNA. 
163 Memorandum of Conversation, “light bomber and fighter squadron for Pakistan,” 11 April 1958, RG 59, 
Box 3876, Folder 790D.5-MSP/1-258, document 790D.5-MSP/4-1158, USNA. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   104 
However, the US had to deny this request because there were not enough planes to give 
to both NATO and Pakistan. If Pakistan wanted the plane, it would have to wait two years 
for production to increase. Thus, Pakistan achieved the same status as Taiwan, but it was 
not, in US eyes, structurally equivalent to the core, Western European allies. This abrupt 
introduction into alliance hierarchy may have passed without incident, but cuts to the 
foreign aid budget meant that the denial of the F-100 coincided with both reduced funding 
for other military equipment and the completion of the initial 1955 defense assistance 
agreement. 
 
DOWNGRADE SIGNALS AND THREATS OF RE-ALIGNMENT 
 
This confluence of factors – denial, completion, and reduction in budget – amounted to 
non-transfers, and caused anxiety among Pakistani leadership, who believed they were 
seeing signals of a downgraded US-Pakistan relationship. Their doubts about the strength 
of the US commitment increased once the Kennedy administration came to power. 
Kennedy and his advisors suggested that India, not Pakistan, was a more natural partner 
for the US. After the Senate decision to cut future US military aid to Pakistan, Ambassador 
Ali told US officials in Washington that his government “interpreted recent trends in 
American opinion with regard to military aid as indicating a loss of interest on the part of 
the United States in Pakistan.”164 As anticipated by my theory, Pakistan threatened to 
pursue re-alignment as the result of these downgrade signals. The entire rationale for the 
US alignment with Pakistan – strength against Communist aggression – was thrown into 
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crisis when Pakistan threatened to seek arms from the Soviet Union if the US did not 
continue to treat Pakistan as a full ally and provide her with more military equipment.165 
In 1958 the US began planning its military transfers to Pakistan for fiscal years 1959 
and 1960. The initial US commitments made to Pakistan under the 1954 Aide Memoire 
were nearing completion, and the MAP proposal for fiscal year 1960 was austere – a 
result of near-completion as well as US Congressional budget cuts. William Rountree, 
US Ambassador to Pakistan, warned that a program lacking in bling and boom weapons 
would provoke a significantly negative reaction in Pakistan.166 
US budget cuts led the US to say, in 1958, that it could not give Pakistan bomber planes 
until at least the 1960 fiscal year. This exacerbated Pakistan’s fears of future abandonment. 
Prime Minister Noon said this was evidence that the US had “gone back on its word,” and 
now was denying the transfer of weapons that had been promised.167 State Department 
documents from May 1958 show that the US was not planning to transfer any additional 
boom or bling weapons to Pakistan: “The department does not recommend the provision 
of more military hardware than is necessary to fulfill the commitment in the 1954 Aide 
Memoire plus reasonable quantities of maintenance material and replacements.”168 This 
was, from Pakistan’s perspective, a marked change in its relationship with the US. The 
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initial delivery of F-86 Sabres and M-47 Patton tanks seemed to foretell a growing 
relationship, built on the regular transfer of prestigious and capable weapons. Pakistan had 
come to expect that its relationship with the US would be maintained through similar – if 
not more – weapons transfers. Yet just a year later, the US seemed to be signaling a 
downgrade and a more distant relationship with Pakistan. 
Pakistani officials thus threatened re-alignment – possibly with the Soviet Union – if 
the US did not resume weapons transfers. Writing from the US Embassy in Karachi, 
Langley noted “Almost all papers warned that military aid cut will undermine US prestige 
in area and enhance Communist prospects in area.”169 In an interview with France’s Le 
Monde, Ayub expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of US aid provided to Pakistan. 
He then stated that Pakistan would seek aid from other countries.170 
The US finally realized that maintaining its relationship with Pakistan would take 
continual investment through a regular stream of transfers. Faced with the possibility of 
the most allied ally turning to the Soviet Union, the US tentatively agreed to transfer B-57 
bombers in 1960. The only confirmed transfers for the year were 10 medium tanks, much 
less than the 98 tanks that were scheduled before Congressional budget cuts.171 Rountree 
urged the US to take Pakistan’s crisis of faith seriously, by granting approval for Pakistan’s 
weapons requests. He urged the US to supply more tanks in 1961, and for the transfer of 
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more advanced weapons, like the F-104 Starfighter jet or Sidewinder missiles for the 1961 
fiscal year, in order to avoid a “major” split with Pakistan.172 
Officials within Pakistan echoed Rountree’s suggestion for the transfer of F-104s. The 
negotiations over this plane show the importance of weapons as signaling devices, and how 
a less militarily useful plane can be used to repair rocky relations between allies.  
 
SUPERSONIC BLING AND ALLIANCE REASSURANCE 
 
On the heels of the non-transfers caused by US budget cuts, as well as indications that the 
Kennedy administration was interested in pursuing relations with India, Pakistan requested 
the F-104 fighter jet. The US approved the request, and ten jets were delivered in 1962. 
This bling transfer was a test balloon for Pakistan. Based on the denial of the F-100 and 
the non-transfers due to budget cuts, Pakistan was not sure about its relationship with the 
US. The bling transfer was an unexpected, if welcome, surprise, that increased Pakistan’s 
confidence in the US-Pakistani relationship. My theory expects this upgrade signal to result 
in greater policy coordination between the US and Pakistan. Concretely, Pakistan should 
accede to US demands to stop calling for negotiations over Kashmir. Nor should Pakistan 
take aggressive action toward India in other areas. Overall, the F-104 served as a symbol 
of Pakistan’s importance as a US ally, and of the newly reinvigorated relationship between 
the US and Pakistan.  
All the states involved knew the F-104 was the ultimate bling weapon. This Mach-2 
capable, sleek, shiny aircraft was taken as a symbol of a close future relationship – 
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reinforcing common goals between sender and receiver. It was nicknamed the “missile 
with a man on it,” and set the world record for speed and altitude of a piloted aircraft.173 
The plane proved so difficult to effectively incorporate into combat operations that it was 
more useful as a NASA chase plane than as a staple of the US Air Force.  
The F-104s military limitations were widely known. Under Secretary of State George 
Ball wrote, “The F-104 A/B, though superficially glamorous because of its Mach 2 speed, 
is purely a day fighter-interceptor with very limited bomb-carrying capacity; its range is so 
short that without effective intercept control (which [Pakistan] does not have), it has only 
limited intercept capability and considerably lesser capability to bomb Indian bases 
effectively.”174 Benson Timmons, the Deputy Chief of Mission in New Delhi, referred to 
the planes as “shiny objects.”175 Ambassador to India Chester Bowles said that the F-104 
was “extremely costly, hard to fly, and prone to accidents.”176 
Even Lockheed – the plane’s manufacturer – was aware of issues with the plane. The 
engine was so prone to stalling during certain maneuvers that Lockheed produced a comic 
warning pilots about the signs of stalling. The US Air Force concluded the F-104 was less 
effective than older MiG models.177 The MiG, produced by the Soviet Union and later 
copied by China, was the plane Pakistan was most likely to encounter in the air. The risks 
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of stepping into the cockpit were known beyond the US: German pilots referred to the F-
104 as the “Flying Coffin,” and “the Widow maker,” while Canadian pilots added the 
moniker “Aluminum Death Tube.”178  
Pakistan’s pursuit of the deficient F-104, rather than more capable alternatives, is 
difficult to explain using existing power-based arguments. Pakistan should, according to 
these theories, pursue the most capable weaponry. Yet Pakistan formally requested the F-
104 seven times between 1959 and 1961. Pakistan lacked the radar equipment and training 
to make the plane useful in military operations, and had no space program that could use 
the F-104 as a chase plane. US advisors believed the Pakistani Air Force would not be able 
to “absorb the new technology,” a polite way of saying the US did not think Pakistan would 
be able to operate or effectively use the F-104.179   
The F-104 transfer sent an upgrade signal to Pakistan. It yanked US-Pakistani 
relationships out of a downward spiral, and increased Pakistan’s confidence in its alliance 
with the US. I thus expect Pakistan’s foreign policy to continue along the same path: it 
should be committed to upholding the status quo in the region.180 India, recognizing the 
signal of reassurance, should revise its expectations about any gains to come from the 
Kennedy administration. More broadly, the F-104 transfer should be understood by 
regional observers that the US was committed to Pakistan. If any of these observers also 
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had questions about the commitment of the US to their causes, or their own standing within 
the US alliance network, they should seek the F-104 as well. 
US officials knew the signaling power of the F-104. Back in 1960, as US budget cuts 
were beginning to be felt by MAP recipients, US Ambassador Rountree urged his superiors 
to provide the F-104 to Pakistan to signal US commitment. In a May 1960 telegram to the 
State Department, he wrote, “it is important that Ayub, GOP and key military officers be 
aware that US is promptly performing on its military aid commitments to Pakistan. Failure 
on our part to respond immediately and in meaningful manner would undermine Pakistani 
confidence in repeated assurances that US stands by its allies, especially in time of 
need.”181 JM Wilson, the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security, noted that there was 
“no military requirement for modernizing the F-86s with which the PAF [Pakistani Air 
Force] has recently been equipped.”182 Representing the view of the State Department, 
Wilson recognized that the F-104 would have been primarily a political transfer. 
The F-104 was a focal point during Ayub’s visit to Washington in July 1961. Kennedy 
administration documents prepared in advance of the visit show that the US was aware of 
a growing rift with Pakistan, and wanted a way to heal that rift. The papers said, “Pakistan’s 
underlying anxiety is that the Administration attached less importance than did the previous 
administration to allies, and greater importance to neutrals, particularly India.”183 The 
primary goal of Ayub’s visit was to “allay Pakistan suspicion that we regard India as more 
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important than Pakistan, and consequently intend to give India more favorable treatment. 
We must stress the importance of regional cooperation as a means for developing 
indigenous strength in the subcontinent.”184 Within the State Department, the F-104 was 
seen as a signal of “our continued willingness to support Pakistan.”185  Within Pakistan, 
normally pro-US military chiefs were worried that the US no longer desired a close 
relationship with Pakistan, and wanted the F-104 as proof that the US was still committed 
to that country.186  
Ayub left the meeting with Kennedy with a promise that the F-104 would be expedited. 
The plane was not delivered fast enough for Ayub, who instructed his Finance Minister to 
again request the F-104 in November.187 Finance Minister Shoaib’s renewed request came 
on the heels of Ayub’s anxiety that the US was going to extend arms aid to India.188   
Pakistan received its first F-104s in 1962, and, feeling optimistic about the US 
commitment, felt no need to hedge against abandonment. Assured that the US would act 
in Pakistan’s interest, Pakistan remained willing to negotiate over Kashmir, but did not 
increase or otherwise change its pressure on India to negotiate.189  The primary result of 
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the transfer was to uphold the status quo: Pakistan did not feel the need to take aggressive 
action because it was confident in its relationship with the US.  
As expected, India understood this upgrade signal and lowered its expectations about 
changes that would come from the Kennedy administration. Selig Harrison, part of a 
mission sent to India in 1965, observed that certain US weapons transfers to Pakistan had 
signaled “the special character of the relationship of the United States with Pakistan,” 
which “prolonged and reinforced Indian intransigence.”190  Indian Charge d’Affairs D.N. 
Chatterjee said that India felt inferior to Pakistan because of the F-104, even though India 
had been informed about Pakistan’s limitations that prevented full use of the plane.191 India 
believed that the US had no desire to harm India, but saw the F-104 transfer as a way to 
“pacify an ally angry over unrequited love.”192   
India, as a status quo state, resisted efforts to open negotiations over Kashmir. It 
rejected US offers to act as a mediator in the Kashmir dispute, saying that third-party 
interference would not help. Robert Komer, the Kennedy administration’s point man on 
Southeast Asia, wrote that Nehru turned down the offer because he believed it would 
“inevitably involve some change in the status quo to their disadvantage.”193 
Beyond reassuring Pakistan about US commitment, the F-104 became a relational good 
in the US alliance network. Just as the US feared, other states requested the jet as a symbol 
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of US commitment to them, particularly if these states saw Pakistan as a peer. The US 
begged Pakistan not to publicize the F-104 transfer because the US believed Iran would 
demand the plane as evidence of “equal treatment.”194 Saudi Arabia did demand the F-104, 
even though the US evaluated the Saudi Air Force as “not technically very advanced” and 
unable to handle the plane.195 Showing the durability of the F-104 as a political signal, the 
US used the plane to signal commitment to Taiwan in the 1970s, as the opening to China 
was taking place. Even though Taiwan had more advanced—and capable—planes than the 
F-104, and even though Taiwan never requested the plane, the F-104 remained a symbol 
of US commitment, and proved valuable in this situation as well.196 The F-104 reverberated 
throughout the network as a symbol of close ties with the United States. 
 
Signals or the Balance of Power? 
 
Neither the balance of power nor economic incentives can explain the foreign policy shifts 
in this period. There were no balance of power reasons for Pakistan to want the F-104. 
According to existing explanations, the transfer should not have stabilized Pakistan’s 
foreign policy orientation for three reasons. First, the plane itself had dubious military 
potential. Deficiencies in the plane itself, and Pakistan’s lack of radar capabilities that 
rendered the F-104 operationally less useful for military moves against India. Second, even 
capable supersonic aircraft are not useful in mountainous areas like Kashmir, which was 
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the geographic focus of most of Pakistan’s military might. Finally, even if Pakistan had 
been granted permission to buy the plane, its high cost would have placed the plane out of 
reach. The low tactical advantage, high economic cost, and repeated statements that the 
plane symbolized the relationship between the US and Pakistan support the interpretation 
that the plane was a signal of US-Pakistani ties, and that this signal contributed to 
Pakistan’s lack of interest in negotiations with India. 
 With respect to India’s behavior, there is again no balance of power or economic 
reason for India to be upset at the F-104 transfer. Though India had initially been hopeful 
that the new Kennedy administration would downgrade relations with Pakistan and make 
overtures to India, the F-104, even though it didn’t change military capabilities, played a 
role in India’s rejection of Kashmir negotiations.  
The best evidence for understanding the events in this period as signaling is the 
durability of the F-104 as a signal of alliance reinforcement. The F-104 proved a durable 
reinforcement signal, as Pakistan again sought the plane in 1963 and 1964, right as the US 
was extending military aid to India. 
 
SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA 
 
The first years of US relations with the subcontinent primarily reinforced ties between the 
US and Pakistan. Once the US realized that good relations with Pakistan required satisfying 
Pakistan’s continual appetite, the US tried to calibrate its arms transfers to keep Pakistan 
sated. Weapons transfers from 1956 to 1962 helped shore up Pakistan as a buffer against 
Communism. However, relations on the subcontinent changed after India was defeated in 
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a border war with China in November 1962. The US rushed arms aid, including rifles, 
ammunition, and transport aircraft to India under Section 503 of the US Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961.197 This emergency aid was followed by the December 1962 Nassau 
Agreement, under which the US and UK agreed to give India an additional $120 million 
in military assistance. The US signed a further commitment in June 1963, agreeing to 
transfer communications and transport equipment – backbone weapons.198 US military 
assistance to India caused a rupture in the US-Pakistani relationship. The US through it 
was extending a life boat to a state trying to push back the tides of Communism. Pakistan 
instead saw the US helping not an anti-Communist Cold Warrior, but a kid who didn’t 
realize he could stand up in the shallow end of the pool.  
The causes of the different US and Pakistani views on India are threat perceptions and 
rhetoric. India successfully narrated itself as yet another state threatened by Communist 
aggression, which opened the door to arms transfers from the US. Indian President Nehru 
successfully framed his struggle with China in a way that appealed to the US and fit with 
broader strategic narratives, laying the groundwork for expected weapons transfers. On 27 
October 1962, he said that the US should support India with military aid “not only because 
of their friendly relations with us, but also because our struggle is in the interests of world 
peace and is directed to the elimination of deceit, dissimulation and force in international 
                                                 
197
 Ganguly 1972, 220; Crawford 2003, 143. The US and UK had the ability to rush arms to India for two 
reasons. First, most of the aid was rifles and ammunition, small arms that are produced in greater quantity 
than larger arms, and that are logistically easier to transport across long distances. Second, the US agreed to 
give up its place in line so that the planes, produced in Canada, could go to India. Had the US not been 
willing to do this, India would have had to wait for more planes to be produced, defeating the purpose of 
emergency aid. 
198
 Ganguly 1972, 221; Cohen 1976, 50; Brecher 1979, 626. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   116 
relations.”199 Kennedy agreed, and wrote a letter to Ayub justifying US aid to India: “We 
see another instance of Communist aggression almost as close to your borders as Cuba is 
to ours – the Chinese Communist attack on India… In my judgment the long-run 
significance of this move cannot be exaggerated.”200 For both the US and India – the future 
of the subcontinent was at risk, and led to new strategic interests between the US and India. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, was convinced that India was playing the part of a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing. General Musa, the Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army, said that 
he thought a Chinese attack was a “bogey” and that “no serious military planner could 
conceive of such an attack.”201 Foreign Minister Bhutto was similarly convinced that India 
planned to milk Western military aid for everything it could get, and would then turn 
around and make a peace agreement with China.202 
These different threat perceptions and narratives – with the US desiring to take a 
vulnerable India under its wing, and Pakistan perpetually skeptical of its neighbor – led 
India to expect backbone, and perhaps even bling, weapons, and Pakistan to expect the US 
to refrain from transferring weapons to its chief rival. What the US saw as arms transfers 
to bolster a humiliated India (and therefore the subcontinent) against a growing Chinese 
threat, Pakistan interpreted as a signal of US alignment with India at the expense of 
Pakistan. 
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Unable to reconcile itself to any shared strategic interests between the US and India, 
Pakistan interpreted the US arms transfers to India as a signal of change. This was 
exacerbated by the US choice to deny further Pakistani requests for F-104 jets. As 
expected, Pakistan shifted its foreign policy toward realignment, while India, after getting 
its first transfers, cautiously explored expanded relations with the US. India tried to gauge 
the extent of US interest by requesting additional, more prestigious weapons. I further 
expect the Soviet Union to see US transfers to India as an indication that the US was trying 
to win India over to its side, and to take steps to prevent this by offering India weapons, 
too. I expect China to recognize an opportunity to drive a wedge between India and 
Pakistan to prevent the formation of an anti-China coalition, and to recognize the rift 
between the US and Pakistan by presenting itself as an alternate alignment partner. More 
broadly, Pakistan’s allies in the region should be surprised and upset that the US aided 
Pakistan’s chief rival, and should be supportive of any shifts in Pakistan’s foreign policy. 
The actual course of events accords with these expectations, with one notable 
exception. The Soviet Union did not transfer weapons to India in the wake of US transfers. 
In fact, it reneged on a previous deal to supply India with MiG planes. However, Soviet 
actions were designed to send a signal to China, its fellow Communist ally. Since China 
had just fought a war with India, the Soviet Union was wary of antagonizing a Sino-Soviet 
split by arming India and potentially enabling it to fight back.203 
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Backbone, not bling: Arms for India  
 
US emergency arms aid – infantry weapons and light artillery – arrived in India between 3 
and 12 November 1962. As reported in The Hindu, this arms assistance affected more than 
military capabilities. The initial airlift “was more in the nature of a token of intent to 
develop an ongoing large-scale military supply relationship. [On Nov 12] Nehru told a 
group of visiting American journalists that India was seeking all kinds of aircraft from the 
US, as well as equipment to manufacture arms.” 204 The C-130 and the weapons it carried 
were tangible first evidence of new ties between the US and India. The arms signaled a 
significant US policy shift and set the stage for changes on the subcontinent.205  
States beyond South Asia also believed the backbone weapons transfers – the first 
between the US and India – opened the door to closer Indo-American relations. The Soviet 
Union, according to Ambassador Galbraith, thought there was a high likelihood US 
military aid would lead to a military alliance between the US and India.206 Iraq, an ally of 
Pakistan, thought that the transfers were a betrayal of Pakistan and urged Pakistan to leave 
CENTO since it was clear that the US had sided with India over Pakistan.207 Swedish 
Ambassador Gunnar Jarring wanted to know “whether there was a basic change in India’s 
non-aligned military attitude. Ambassador Jarring said he recognized that there was 
obviously some change by reason of the fact that India had accepted foreign military 
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aid.”208 This widespread reaction shows the attention states pay to arms transfers, and that 
they see arms transfers as credible signals of alignment. 
Within India, the transfers were believed to herald a new era. The Times of India, 
reflecting government views, thought the occasion was historic: “This will start a new 
relationship between the two countries which might well prove to be a turning point in 
India’s history.”209 The Indians themselves thought that the initial aid would open the door 
to greater requests, including “manufacturing capacity, tanks and other armored 
equipment, and an air force.”210 
As expected, the transfers did affect Indian foreign policy. In contrast to its previous 
insistence on non-alignment, India cautiously pursued areas of shared interest with the US. 
Ambassador Galbraith reported that India was now willing to work with the US both 
politically and militarily in Asia, a “remarkable advance” and “fundamental shift” in Indian 
foreign policy.211 India, he observed, viewed the “US and Commonwealth countries as 
steadfast friends in contrast with Chinese Communist intruders and ambiguous Soviets.”212 
The budding relationship between the US and India seemed to blossom over the next year. 
The US gave up its own place in line so that India could receive Caribou transport planes 
                                                 
208 Memorandum of Conversation “Indian-Chicom situation; Kashmir problem” 6 December 1962, p. 1, 
RG 59, Box 1399, Folder 691.93/12-162, USNA.  
209
 HR Vohra, “US Assistance is in the offing” Times of India, 31 October 1962, p. 9, PQID: 346972520. 
210
 Ibid., 410. 
211
 Galbraith 1969, 458. 
212 Telegram New Delhi (Galbraith) to State, 25 October 1962, RG 59, Box 1398, Folder 691.93/10-1562, 
USNA. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   120 
from Canada.213 India was incorporated into the MAP bureaucracy in early 1963, putting 
it on the same footing as US allies including West Germany and Pakistan.  
Building on these signals of closeness, Indian Ambassador B.K. Nehru delivered a 
letter to the State Department urging prompt delivery of weapons. The letter was an 
ambitious “shopping list” of all the weapons India desired.214 India did not expect to get 
most of the weapons on the list, and instead viewed the requests as testing the waters for a 
subsequent request for fighter aircraft and supporting technical personnel. If India were to 
receive fighter planes, the transfer would “mark a change in India’s policy.”215   
Included on India’s shopping list was the F-104, and main battle tanks. India 
recognized, however, that “political considerations” made the transfer “not ruled out but 
not likely.”216 The political situation it references was the US-Pakistani relationship, which 
it thought would constrain US transfers to India. Nonetheless, the list was a way for India 
to gauge US interest in India relative to US interest in Pakistan. The F-104 Starfighter 
would be the prize won by the favored partner. Crucially, India’s requests were for 
signaling, not military power, reasons.217 India’s recent conflict with China had proven that 
supersonic jets were not effective in mountainous fighting.218  Further, military maneuvers 
in the border areas required transit over bridges, but none of the bridges were strong enough 
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to support the weight of the requested tanks.219  The weapons India wanted would not have 
affected the military balance against China, or against Pakistan in Kashmir.  
Because of the complex signaling environment on the subcontinent, the US government 
was not in agreement about how to treat India’s requests. Giving the F-104 would have 
caused problems in the US-Pakistan relationship. Yet some within the US government 
supported the transfer. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot, the 
transfer of US weapons would prevent the Soviet Union from scoring “a particularly 
politically glamorous” victory by providing India with similar weapons. But “more than 
any other single gesture, this would signify that the Indians can depend upon us in meeting 
their security requirements.”220 Even though backbone US arms aid helped India on the 
battlefield, the F-104 would be the bellwether for US-India ties. 
Ultimately, the naysayers won and India never received the F-104. The US did not want 
to alienate Pakistan by sending such a strong upgrade signal to India. The US did, however, 
help India build its own supersonic engine, which shows that the symbol of the F-104, 
rather than supersonic capabilities, was the primary issue in this transfer. The US lending 
support to India’s domestic industry is a particularly puzzling move. Indian self-sufficiency 
would free it from reliance on others for this type of plane, possibly making India less 
interested in arms transfers for political reasons. This would have been a significant 
qualitative step for India’s production ability, and should have been the target of much 
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outcry from Pakistan. Strangely the domestic production project received negligible 
attention from Pakistani leaders and the Pakistani press. Pakistan cared more about rumors 
of India receiving an F-104 than it did about actual US assistance that increased India’s 
capabilities. Symbolic politics, not relative capabilities, was the guiding logic behind this 
event. 
In the long run, US arms aid to India remained constrained by Pakistan’s anticipated 
reactions, and India never received the prestigious boom or bling weapons it truly wanted. 
The US found itself stuck, and more deeply constrained by its relationship with Pakistan 
than it had anticipated. The US could not be a philandering partner, making and breaking 
political relationships at will. Relationships created by arms transfers last longer than the 
proverbial one-night stand. As a result, India received mixed signals from the US. The first 
set of transfers opened the door, but the US never let India into the house. Due to these 
mixed signals, India’s foreign policy underwent minimal revision, and changes were 
primarily rhetorical. India was not confident enough that the US shared its strategic goals 
that it was willing to actually change its policies, and refused repeated entreaties to re-open 
negotiations over Kashmir.221 The lack of bling and boom weapons – and resulting upgrade 
signal – further meant that India was “aghast” at suggestions that it coordinate policies with 
the US by joining Western military alliances.222  
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Pakistan, on the other hand, did significantly shift its foreign policy in the wake of US 
arms aid to India. Its reaction was out of sync with the minimal weapons India did receive. 
Pakistan reacted like a jilted lover, a feeling reinforced by US transfer denials. 
 
Pakistan’s response: Re-alignment and criticism 
 
At first glance, Pakistan’s reactions to US arms aid to India seems out of proportion. The 
backbone and blip weapons did not significantly change India’s capabilities, and are 
weapons with relatively less signaling power. And yet Pakistan threw what can only be 
described as an international temper tantum. Pakistan greatly feared that the bling and 
backbone weapons were a harbinger of closer US-India relations, which it though implied 
a downgrade to US-Pakistan relations. 
David Sneider, Counselor for Political Affairs at the Embassy in Karachi, wrote that 
Pakistan’s reaction was “was the frustrated reaction of a nation which found itself caught 
in the web of dependence upon the US and yet in basic conflict with the policies of its 
mentor in the area most crucial to Pakistan’s national interest, India.” From the Pakistani 
point of view, “the US-Pakistan special relationship were clearly invalidated by US 
military aid to India.”223 If nothing else, Pakistan expected the US to leverage its aid to 
India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Sneider directly connected Pakistan’s actions to US 
military aid, remarking that “since late 1962, Pakistan has behaved virtually like a wounded 
bull, thrashing about and seeking to give vent to its disillusionment with the West,” and 
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that its foreign policy actions were “reactive, based on its disenchantment with its 
alignment with the West.”224 That is, US-Pakistan relations were fundamentally changed 
by virtue of US arms transfers to India. The souring of relations with Pakistan was an 
unintended consequence of sending arms to India. Pakistan’s interpretation of its enduring 
rivalry with India mean that positive relations with one constituted negative relations with 
the other. From the Pakistani point of view, US arms aid to India implied a downgrade 
signal to Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s disenchantment with the US resulted in a multi-pronged re-alignment 
policy. One strand saw Pakistan oppose the US on issues of general foreign policy and in 
intra-alliance politics. Sneider noted “increasingly divergent courses in key international 
issues [such as] Communist China, Vietnam, and Congo.”225 In stark contrast to the 
rhetoric of support Pakistan gave the US during the Korean War, Pakistan criticized the 
war effort in Vietnam. In March 1965, Bhutto deplored US use of poison gas in Vietnam, 
even though Pakistan had just a few months earlier gratefully received large quantities of 
riot control gas. Bhutto’s criticism coincided with arms deliveries to India. In 1963, 
Pakistan invited Indonesian President Sukarno for an official state visit, even though 
Pakistan’s fellow SEATO member Australia – who was providing troops to the US war 
effort in Vietnam – feared aggression from the Sukarno regime.226 Pakistan thus broke with 
SEATO by not offering rhetorical support for the US in Vietnam, and its invitation to 
                                                 
224
 Ibid., p. 7 
225 Ibid., p. 2. 
226
 Telegram Karachi (McConaughy) to State, 22 June 1963, p. 2, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential 
Papers, President’s Office Files. Countries, Pakistan: Security, 1963 (JFKPOF-123-006). 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   125 
Sukarno was a slap in the face to Australia. Writing from Karachi, Ambassador Walter 
McConaughy believed these general divergences were due to “Pak[istan’s] frustration with 
recent decision [to] give India long term arms assistance.”227  
Pakistan also tried to make life miserable for the US on the subcontinent, by ramping 
up its calls for negotiations in Kashmir. As McConaughy said, Pakistan thought “that 
prospects for Kashmir settlement are diminished in direct ratio to extent Western military 
aid to India,”228 but nonetheless hoped it could coerce the US into supporting Pakistan’s 
position. Gone was the cooperative Pakistan, willing to coordinate its policies with the US. 
Instead, Pakistan thought that a policy of agitation – pitting its revisionist aims against 
India’s status quo desires – would force the US to make up its mind about which country 
on the subcontinent would retain its support.229 
Recognizing that its threats to pursue negotiations over Kashmir were ineffective in 
changing US policy on the subcontinent, Pakistan upped the ante by threatening to sever 
its alliance ties to the US. Ayub told McConaughy that he was considering leaving 
SEATO,230 in part because Foreign Minister Bhutto suggested this would be a way to 
“strike home to the US her resentment over present US policy toward India and exert real 
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pressure on the US to reconsider and change this policy.”231 Pakistan wanted to make clear 
that this was no playground spat: further US arms transfers to India would result in the 
dissolution of US-Pakistani ties.  
The second strand of Pakistani re-alignment took the form of increased public and 
private criticism of the United States. It was not only the upper echelons of Pakistani 
political elite that saw transfers to India as a betrayal. A few days after arms arrived in 
India in November 1962, Pakistanis observed a national day of protest against US aid to 
India.232 Shortly thereafter, demonstrations erupted throughout the country. Protestors 
carried signs that said, “End all military pacts with United States and Britain,” and “A 
Donkey is more trustworthy than a Yankee.” They shouted slogans like “Down with the 
United States,” and “Down with Britain”233 Extra-parliamentary groups, “including such 
extraneous bodies as the Pakistan Writers Guild, passed resolutions condemning Western 
arms aid to India.”234 US arms aid to India united the Pakistani general public to an extent 
rarely seen.235 
At the elite level, statements emphasized betrayal, and increased in frequency as it 
became clear that India would be incorporated into the US military assistance bureaucracy. 
In a report to President Johnson, Dean Rusk noted that Pakistan’s statements and actions 
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were “a reminder that Pakistan is not reconciled to United States military assistance to 
India, that the Kashmir issue is not dormant, and that Pakistan has the capacity to 
exacerbate tensions any time it wishes.”236 An editorial in Dawn, which had less than ten 
years previously extolled the virtues of alignment with the US, said “American policy 
involves reckless defiance of realities of regional situation and is responsible for 
perpetuation of discord and tension in area. This policy is morally indefensible because it 
based on most cynical disregard of considerations that involve close ally’s security.”237 The 
editors encouraged “a most careful reappraisal of our external policy and our position in 
world in which changing dictates of realpolitik matter far more than alliances entered into 
in spirit of sincerity and devotion to principles.”238 This theme of betrayal and loss of the 
moral high ground infused nearly all of Pakistan’s statements after November 1962.  
During an interview with London’s Daily Mail in July 1964, Ayub said, “During the 
Dulles-Eisenhower era US policy had moral content but now Americans do not hesitate to 
let down their friends. Today American policy is based on opportunism and is devoid of 
moral quality. Pakistan…has been let down by politicians she regarded as friends.”239 The 
Commander in Chief of the Army, General Musa, was similarly concerned about the 
“moral side” of US arms aid to India. He elaborated: “Pakistan now finds itself frustrated 
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and disillusioned, and public opinion is genuinely unsettled. [Pakistan] had been placed in 
the shadow of death by an active ally.”240  
The emphasis on betrayal and immorality is downright strange. US arms aid to India 
did not threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity, or its military balance in Kashmir. The US 
actually informed Pakistan of its arms deliveries to India. None of this was enough to affect 
Pakistan’s perception that its chief ally was developing a relationship with its chief rival. 
As noted in a July 1964 State Department briefing paper, “Pakistan saw its position as the 
nation most favored by the US on the subcontinent reduced by our decision to provide arms 
aid to India.”241 Despite repeated US assurances to the contrary, Pakistan believed US arms 
aid signaled shifting allegiances: arms spoke louder than words. 
The final strand of Pakistan’s re-alignment was the most significant. Ayub thought that 
by drawing Pakistan closer to China (a US rival), he would be able to pressure the US into 
foregoing deeper ties with India.242 Maxwell Taylor, the chief US military advisor for 
Pakistan believed that Pakistan did not genuinely want to be close with China. He wrote 
that Ayub had “embark[ed] on a campaign of sharp criticism of US behavior coupled with 
moves to ‘normalize’ relations with Red China. Such moves appear useful to him both in 
neutralizing an unfriendly neighbor and goading the US to pay greater attention to his 
needs.”243 Finance Minister Muhammad Shoaib admitted as much. He told Ambassador 
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McConaughy that “not very expensive” arms aid from the US to Pakistan would be the 
most promising stop-gap means of checking Pak[istan’s] drift toward China.”244 Ayub 
reinforced this when he told McConaughy that “as long as we pursue policies toward India 
which he considers inimical to Pakistan’s national interest – specifically, continued 
substantial US military aid to India and US failure to seize recurring opportunities to press 
India decisively for a solution of Kashmir issue – [Pakistan] will pursue a China policy 
running at an angle to, and therefore interfering with, US objectives in Asia.”245 
Pakistan’s closer relations with China took the form of a border agreement and a civil 
air agreement in 1963. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman warned, “a commercial 
air link in itself might not appear on first hand to be of great consequence, but in the present 
context of world affairs, it eased Chicom communications problems and helped Chicoms 
present better image to world. Pakistan should be very careful in its dealings with Chicoms 
and not jeopardize its relations with the Western world.”246 Though these ties were not as 
strong as those created by arms transfers, US officials still felt the moves were significant. 
This is especially the case because Pakistan signed cooperative treaties with China even as 
it remained a member of anti-Communist alliance SEATO. 
The US was well aware that Pakistan’s foreign policy shifts were caused by US arms 
aid to India. To some extent, Pakistan’s hysterical response worked because it constrained 
US actions in India. For example, the US used C-130 transport planes (backbone weapons) 
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to get supplies to India’s border with China. The US did not give the planes to India, and 
instead had US pilots fly the cargo runs. This is because the State Department knew “if we 
had given the C-130s to the Indians the Pakistanis would have been furious.”247 A transfer 
of the C-130 would have further infuriated Pakistan, and the US wanted to prevent the 
eruption of tensions between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s questions about US intentions 
increased when India was incorporated into the military assistance bureaucracy in late 
1963. Ambassador McConaughy argued against this change, because it “would in 
[Pakistan’s] view present quite different situation and add to [Pakistani] suspicions of US 
intentions.”248 Arms transfers and MAP aid signaled, in Pakistan’s eyes, that the US had 
chosen India over Pakistan as its preferred partner.  
Pakistan gave the US one last chance to prevent alignment shifts by requesting 
additional F-104 fighter jets in late 1964. Receiving the jet would have, in Pakistan’s mind, 
been evidence that its relationship with the United States had not changed, despite US 
overtures to India. From the US point of view, however, providing the F-104 would have 
“rewarded” Ayub for his criticism of the US; the US believed its relationship with Pakistan 
had changed, but that the change was caused by Pakistan’s turn to China.249 The US was 
therefore unwilling to give Pakistan such a clear and unambiguous signal of US support. 
Dean Rusk instead proposed a meeting between Johnson and Ayub as a way “to 
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demonstrate our awareness and appreciation of Pakistan’s security concerns and our 
continuing efforts to meet these concerns in every reasonable way.”250  
 Rusk and Ambassador McConaughy wanted to offer Pakistan other weapons. These 
alternate boom weapons, they believed, would reassure Pakistan without endorsing its 
recent “bad behavior.” Rusk wrote, “as we chart our course in the troubled waters of US-
Pakistan relations during the months ahead, I believe it important that we be prepared to 
give Ayub a clear signal of our continued willingness to support Pakistan unless its conduct 
impairs our ability to do so.”251 Their proposal was a five-year military assistance plan that 
would include weapons like the F-5 or F-100 fighter jet, both capable planes.252 Though 
just eight years earlier Pakistan wanted the F-100 as evidence of its status relative to 
NATO, it found the 1964 offer lacking. Similarly, though the F-5 matched or exceeded the 
capabilities (on paper) of the F-104, it was used primarily by lesser US allies, such as 
Taiwan, South Korea, and Iran. The F-104, on the other hand, was still in production by 
Italy, France, and Germany—who had figured out how to make the F-104G version an 
actually effective military tool. Pakistan still saw the F-104 as the signal of commitment 
and high status within the US alliance networks, and thus rebuffed US offers of alternate 
fighter jets. 
Ironically, Pakistan’s efforts to frighten the US into abandoning its new ties with India 
had the opposite effect. The US saw its ally running into the arms of its opponent, and saw 
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India, a neutral state, warming to closer ties with the West. Pakistan’s coercive gamble 
failed, as the US found it increasingly difficult to remain allied with a state that was friendly 
to Communist China. India, the subcontinent’s democracy, and a state that wanted to 
defend against China, was a more attractive partner. 
Whether the events following the 1962 Sino-Indian war would have led to a complete 
reexamination of US policy is unknown. War broke out between Pakistan and India in 
July 1965, which resulted in a complete US arms embargo against both states. The 
embargo lasted until 1975, and US relations with both states never again resumed pre-war 
dynamics.  
 
Signals or the Balance of Power, Part 2 
 
Though Pakistan did not cut ties with the United States, it is clear that US arms aid to India 
fundamentally changed the Pakistani-US relationship. This section provides evidence that 
Pakistan was not concerned about the relative balance of power, and instead acted based 
on its interpretation of signals, and what it perceived to be a new US-India coalition. 
US transfers to India did not change the military balance. India remained preponderant 
over Pakistan for the entire period, with the numerical balance of forces ranging from 2.5:1 
in 1952 to 11.5:1 from 1962-1965.253 Most of the increase in the later period was due to 
India’s increase in the number of divisions within its army, and is not attributable to US 
arms aid. More revealing than the numerical balance is India’s enduring belief that 
Pakistan’s armed forces were qualitatively better equipped. The many years of US arms 
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aid were believed to have given Pakistan a qualitative edge.254 Pakistan, on the other hand, 
saw India as superior and an increasingly looming threat. Beliefs about the superiority of 
the other’s forces make explaining the events during this period based on the balance of 
power very difficult, particularly because supersonic jets and heavy tanks would not have 
been useful weapons in Kashmir. There are three other reasons to suspect a balance of 
power mechanism was not the primary factor. 
First, the timing of Pakistan’s turn to China, and leaders’ linking of friendship with 
China to US arms to India is hard to ignore. Contemporary analysts attributed Pakistan’s 
growing closeness with China to US arms aid to India.255 Writing while Pakistani overtures 
to China were crystallizing, Dobell muses, “It is plausible that many of the pro-Chinese 
utterances made by senior Pakistan officials were voiced more with the aim of forcing a 
re-assessment of the Aid India policy in Washington than for any effect they would have 
in Peking.”256 That is, Pakistan’s flirtations with China were understood as a direct 
response to the US arming India.  
Second, Pakistan did not object to the US helping India develop its own supersonic 
engine; it only objected to rumors that India would receive the F-104. If the balance of 
power were at work, Pakistan should have cared much more about the supersonic engine 
than the F-104. The bling weapon would not have significantly helped India’s military 
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balance in Kashmir, but being able to develop its own supersonic engine would have freed 
India from dependence on the US or USSR.257 India would be less vulnerable to external 
leverage, and domestic production capability would have hardened India’s negotiating 
position in Kashmir. Perhaps, we can argue, Pakistan cared less about the engine because 
it would have taken time for India to develop, test, and finally employ its own planes. If 
the balance of power were at work, surely Pakistan would have jumped at opportunities to 
increase its own capabilities. 
The US offered Pakistan the F-5 or F-100 fighter jet. If balance of power were the 
primary motivation, Pakistan should have accepted this offer. The F-5, first offered in 1963, 
was determined to be “fully capable of handling Chinese bombers,” as well as MiGs (which 
were found in Indian and Chinese arsenals).258 Like the F-104, the F-5 and F-100 are Mach-
capable planes.259 Pakistan refused these planes, insisting on the F-104. Why Pakistan 
would forgo capable and prestigious planes is deeply puzzling to the balance of power. 
Similarly, if the US were concerned about preventing an arms race, it should have been 
more willing to provide the F-104, a rather ineffective weapon, than the F-5 or F-100. 
Again, the F-104 was associated with core Western allies, while the F-5 was a tool used by 
the weaker, peripheral allies. Pakistan wanted confirmation that it was equivalent to the 
European allies, not the “others”, and so rejected the F-5. We have, then, a series of three 
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contradictory actions: Pakistan’s apathy at India’s indigenous production efforts; the US 
offering arms that could have fueled an arms race; and Pakistan’s rejection of those same 
weapons in favor of the F-104. US actions make sense as an indication that the US “was 
not especially happy over Pakistan’s continued flirtation with China.”260 Pakistan’s actions 
simply cannot be explained by the balance of power. Rather, in search of a reinforcement 
signal through the F-104, a rebuffed Pakistan felt impelled to turn to China.  
The balance of power does explain why the Soviet Union did not try to out-jockey the 
United States in sending weapons to India. The fear of a Sino-Soviet split restrained the 
USSR. As reported in the Times of India, the Soviet Union announced it was sending only 
minimal military aid to India: twelve unarmed MiGs over two years, with assistance in 
building a MiG factory in the future. The reporter – who covered all of India’s weapons 
negotiations – noted that the Soviet announcement was to reassure China. “This is like 
telling China: ‘This can have no bearing on your fight with India.’”261 But there are 
signaling undertones here, too. By refusing to send weapons to India, the USSR signaled 
that it ranked China above India, and did not want to provoke any split in the Communist 
bloc. 
Finally, a balance of power explanation focuses on the rivalry between India and 
Pakistan and the importance of Kashmir. Not only did Pakistan reject planes that might 
have helped it in Kashmir, it also sought a different symbolic weapon that would have no 
bearing in a land war in Kashmir. Pakistan tried to get a submarine from the US, and when 
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this attempt proved impossible, it threatened to request a submarine from the Eastern bloc. 
Such a move was feared by the US, but not because of the capabilities it would give 
Pakistan. Writing from Kashmir, Knox said, “In any case for CENTO ally to have to 
acquire such major and symbolic weapon from such quarters, after having been turned 
down by US, might have long-lasting effect on Pak foreign policy orientation and 
specifically on the US-Pak relationship.”262 In seeking out a different partner, Pakistan 
would be asserting its independence and signaling its dissatisfaction with the current state 
of affairs, in a way that had no capabilities bearing on the Kashmir dispute. 
A balance of power explanation would have expected Pakistan to accept fighter jets 
from the US, and would have evaluated a Pakistani submarine based on relative 
capabilities, not the signal it would send about Pakistani-US relations. The US should have 
been able to repair its relations with Pakistan by increasing Pakistan’s relative power. And 
yet, Ayub declared in January 1965 that there would be no improvement in relations with 
the US as long as the US continued to give arms to India.263 Arms to India were the 
animating cause for Pakistan’s actions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter used arms transfers to explain the highs and lows in US relations with both 
Pakistan and India. Weapons were essential in cementing Pakistan’s relation with the 
United States in the 1950s, and were instrumental in making Pakistan feel confident and 
                                                 
262 Airgram Karachi (Knox) to State, 5 July 1965 “Pak desire to purchase US submarine.”, p. 2, RG 59, 
Box 1760H, Folder DEF 19 Military Assistance US-PAK 1/1/64, USNA. 
263
 Venkataramani and Arya 1966, 118. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   137 
secure over the following decade. The F-104 fighter jet, a militarily ineffective weapon, 
played a large role in bolstering Pakistan’s confidence in the US in early 1962. The denial 
of that same weapon just one year later encouraged Pakistan’s anxieties about its ties with 
the US. Ultimately, the ruptures in US-Pakistani relations were caused by non-transfers to 
Pakistan and transfers to India, which led Pakistan to strike against India in 1965. 
The preceding discussion also shows the evolution of relationships over time, and the 
high degree of investment needed to maintain them.  Expectations for future transfers are 
based on previous transfers. The initial transfer of the F-86 and M-47 from the US to 
Pakistan in the mid-1950s set a baseline for the relationship between those two countries. 
Pakistan expected to continue receiving boom weapons, and began reinterpreting its 
relationship with the US when it was denied these weapons. Weapons that might reassure 
at one time period can be disappointing at a later one.  
Pakistan and India’s interest in the F-104 shows how weapons produce and 
communicate status hierarchies with alliances. The F-86 elevated Pakistan to the status of 
important Asian ally, as it was the only Asian state beside Taiwan to have the plane. 
However, the denial of the F-100, a plane sent to the core European allies, signaled that 
Pakistan had not achieved the same status as Western Europe. Pakistan’s 1962 reception 
of the F-104 led Saudi Arabia and Iran to request the plane as evidence of equal treatment. 
These two states saw Pakistan as a peer and believed the plane was necessary to ensure 
they did not fall behind Pakistan in the status hierarchy. More broadly, savvy arms 
suppliers can use weapons transfers to rank their friends and allies, and to create intra-
group cliques within a larger group of allies. This also shows that the signaling effects of 
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weapons transfers reverberate through a network, and are not confined to a dyad, or even 
triad. States are embedded in networks of relationships; understanding these networks is 
essential for explaining why and when states act.  
Finally, this chapter shows the importance of perceptions in explaining weapons 
transfers. Leaders’ perceptions dictate which weapons transfers are expected or unexpected 
– even if more objective factors, like the balance of power or shared interests – suggest 
otherwise. When states agree about what weapons are expected, foreign policy outcomes 
generally accord with my theory. When leaders have divergent perceptions, foreign policy 
outcomes are “surprising” from the perspective of one of the actors. This was most clearly 
seen when the US began providing arms to India after the 1962 conflict with China. The 
US and India both perceived these transfers as expected, based on shared interest in 
containing China. Their Cold War lens narrated transfers as stemming the tide of 
communism. Pakistan, on the other hand, interpreted the transfers through the lens of its 
regional enduring rivalry with India. It could not understand why the US was arming India. 
Pakistan’s outrage at US-Indian arms transfers was surprising to US officials, but the 
outrage was expected from an enduring rivalry point of view. As Jervis noted, “statesmen 
believe that others will interpret their behavior as they intend it and will share their view 
of their own state policy.”264 Divergent interpretations, or a mismatch of lenses, can lead 
to unanticipated consequences. Even when states are attentive to the signals their weapons 
transfers send, there is no guarantee that all actors will agree about the political implications 
of the signal.  
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Chapter 4. Of Phantoms and Mirages: Misperceived Signals and the 
1967 War 
 
Israel’s destruction of the Egyptian Air Force on 5 June 1967 was the culmination of a 
months-long crisis between Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. In April, in response to raids 
along its border, Israel shot down six Syrian jets. On 15 May, Egypt sent troops into the 
Sinai, and soon demanded that the United Nations remove its Emergency Force from the 
Gaza Strip. On 22 May, Egypt’s president, Gamel Abdel Nasser, closed the Straits of Tiran 
to Israeli shipping, and on 30 May Egypt and Jordan signed a bilateral defense pact. By 10 
June, Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. 
Explanations of the conflict abound. Some argue the increasingly escalatory steps were a 
needed diversion from domestic problems in Egypt and Israel.265 Others suggest war was 
never the intended outcome, and that demonstrations of resolve had deterrent purposes, but 
failed and led to war.266 Both explanations overlook the changing landscape of political 
relationships in the year prior to the war. I argue that ambiguities about political 
relationships, as signaled by arms transfers, created an environment that incentivized 
belligerency and escalation, which pushed states down the path to war. 
Arms transfers contributed to ambiguity in two key ways. First, the United States 
bungled a series of arms transfers to Jordan in late 1966 and early 1967. The transfer sent 
a downgrade signal, and convinced King Hussein he could no longer count on US political 
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support. This was one of the primary reasons Jordan unexpectedly signed a bilateral 
defense pact with Egypt in May 1967. Second, by approving the sale of some weapons but 
denying others, the US and France sent mixed signals to Israel, causing Israel to feel 
politically abandoned by its two major allies. Faced with the twin problems of a new 
Egyptian-Jordanian coalition and looming political abandonment, Israel saw preemptive 
action against Egypt as its only feasible option. War was not inevitable; the signal sent by 
arms transfers played a key role in the processes that ultimately led to war.  
This chapter makes an empirical contribution to explanations of the 1967 war, and 
theoretical contributions to scholarship on signaling and power. To the former, I highlight 
Jordan’s pivotal role in the conflict, and the role of misinterpreted signals in the months 
prior to war. On the latter point, I show that the interpretation of signals is socially 
contextual and contingent. All parties in the Middle East openly acknowledged the political 
significance of arms transfers in a way not seen in other regions. This both increased the 
saliency of the signals sent by arms transfers, and helps explain the frequent divergences 
between superpower and regional interpretations of signals. While the United States and 
Soviet Union approached their relations with the Middle East through the systemic 
perspective of the Cold War, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel operated under a regional 
framework that was more attuned to their specific context. Arms transfers that might have 
had a minor effect in India or Pakistan, for example, often had significant and amplified 
effects in the Middle East. This suggests, then, that the meaning of signals is not exogenous 
to social settings, nor is it or constant over time. Instead, scholars need to be aware of the 
social context that shapes the legibility and meaning of signals over time. With respect to 
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power, this chapter shows that states weigh their relative power against adversaries as both 
a function of military power and political relationships. A strong political relationship 
means a state can draw on the resources – military, economic, rhetorical – of an external 
partner, whereas a weak political relationship indicates that a state will be fighting on its 
own. Arms transfers are an essential tool for clarifying whether or not a state should expect 
its partners to have its back.   
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the limits of existing explanations, 
based primarily on the balance of power, for explaining the 1967 war. I next explain the 
particularly salient role of arms transfers, before providing background information on 
relationships and interest from the 1956 Suez Crisis to 1962. I then explain the foreign 
policy effects of arms transfers to Israel and arms transfers to Jordan, highlighting 
differences in how signals were interpreted, and the processes that led to the 1967 war.  
 
EXPLAINING JUNE 1967 
 
The Chief of Staff of the Egyptian military, Abd al-Hakim Amr, said, “No one seems to 
have expected a Middle East war in the spring of 1967.”267 Just one month before the war, 
Israeli intelligence assessed the prospect of war as “very distant,” in part because the Arab 
states did not have good relations with one another.268 The surprise of the war has led to a 
vibrant debate about its causes. Existing explanations of the 1967 war overlook the pivotal 
role of Jordan, who signed a bilateral defense pact with Egypt on 30 May, as well as Israel’s 
uncertainty about its defense commitments from the US and France, its great power 
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patrons. Both Jordan’s defense pact and Israel’s uncertainty are a direct consequence of the 
signals sent by arms transfers and non-transfers.  
One common explanation for the war sees it as a series of inevitable escalatory 
moves.269 The ratchet effect of move and counter-move took the states from a low-level 
border conflict to war. In response to border infiltrations from Syria, Israel undertook a 
series of reprisals, culminating in the 7 April 1967 shooting of six Syrian jets.270 Israel, this 
explanation holds, viewed engaging the Syrian military as a deterrent action, but Syria and 
Egypt read this as escalatory.271 Then, in response to perceived Israeli escalation, Nasser 
moved his troops into the Sinai to function as a deterrent against further Israeli action. He 
then closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.272 Nasser, however, didn’t view the 
Straits as an international waterway, and did not think Israel would view his actions as 
tantamount to declaring war.273 For Israel, closing of the Straits was casus belli. Faced with 
an imminent threat, Israel then took preemptive action against Egypt’s air force.   
Other explanations for the war incorporate the domestic politics of Egypt and Israel. 
Some have suggested that the war played a diversion role in Egypt and Israel, or that 
escalation was the result of domestic forces pushing for more aggressive and belligerent 
policies.274 In a slightly different version of the domestic politics explanation, some have 
explained the war as Nasser’s attempt to win a political victory over Israel which would 
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have strengthened pan-Arabism.275 This explanation does seem to have some support: 
Jordan did sign a defense pact with Egypt on 30 May, and agreed to place its military under 
pan-Arab command.  
Finally, one of the more curious explanations for the war points the finger at the Soviet 
Union. This explanation holds that Nasser’s move into the Sinai was the result of 
intelligence manipulated by the Soviet Union. Egypt was told that Israel was massing 
troops along the Syrian border, and so had to act to defend its ally.276 
While each of these explanations might address various parts of the 1967 war, they all 
raise questions about the political agency of each actor and why the war happened when it 
did. The escalation story presents a clean timeline, but it overlooks the political decisions 
that were made in the leadup to war. Israeli leaders flew to Washington and Paris to 
converse with allies; decisions were deliberated over a period of weeks and only after 
internal discussion.277 In Egypt, Nasser and his advisors discussed the consequences of 
closing the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.278 Actions were not automatic or 
inevitable. Nor was the war a result of an imbalance of military power. A September 1966 
arms survey conducted by the CIA determined “Israel remains qualitatively superior over 
any of the various combinations of Arab states with which it could be expected to come 
into direct conflict. In addition, Israel possesses the industrial capacity to improve and alter 
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armored vehicles and to rehabilitate aircraft.”279 The State Department similarly assessed 
the military balance as favoring Israel, and asked, rather facetiously, “If the Arabs were 
able to destroy Israel, why have they not done so in 17 years?”280 
The domestic politics story focuses primarily on Egypt, thus overlooking the role of 
Israel and of Jordan. Finally, the Soviet story strips agency away from Egypt by making it 
incapable of assessing any intelligence received from the Soviet Union. Zeev Maoz pushes 
back against existing explanations of the 1967 war because they do “not link the political 
and military circumstances in Israel to the management of the May-June crisis itself.”281 
While Maoz focuses on Israeli policies and practices, he is right to insist that any 
explanation of the war link political and military circumstances. I argue that arms transfers 
are precisely this link. 
Existing explanations overlook how the political environment in Jordan and in Israel 
set the conditions for war. Crucially, this political environment was created by the signals 
sent through arms transfers. The 1967 war was not the result of an imbalance in power or 
domestic politics gone awry: it was caused by ambiguous political relationships, as 
signaled by arms transfers. US actions toward Jordan in the months preceding the war 
confused Jordan about its relationship with the US. Without a clear signal of support from 
the US, King Hussein signed a bilateral defense pact with Egypt on 30 May – a stark 
reversal of his prior foreign policy.  France, to whom Israel had been a loyal partner, 
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instituted an arms embargo in early June, leaving Israel with questions and concerns about 
what type of support, if any, it should expect from its patron. This embargo was especially 
confusing given the nuclear cooperation between France and Israel.282 The US, meanwhile, 
denied a series of transfers to Israel in April 1967, and was generally unwilling to see itself 
as Israel’s great power patron, despite what it signaled by its arms transfers. Facing 
uncertain support from its friends, and a new Egyptian-Jordan coalition, Israel 
preemptively destroyed Egypt’s air force on 5 June. The remainder of this chapter shows 
how arms transfers are the crucial missing link between the political and military situation 
in the Middle East.  
 
ARMS TRANSFERS AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
Even though the balance of power is an unsatisfactory explanation for the specifics of the 
1967 war, states in the Middle East were concerned about gaining military superiority over 
one another.283 Interest in the relative balance was due, in part, to the generally high 
tensions in the region. In the words of Shimon Peres: “seeded along the borders are political 
and strategic mines, and each, if it explodes, is liable to become a pretext for war. The 
borders themselves are not permanent, not recognized, and not traditional.”284 Mohammed 
Heikal, journalist and confidant to Nasser, wrote, “the stage was set for an increasingly 
complex and volatile situation in the region.”285 Concerns about maintaining military 
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superiority heightened concerns about an arms race. Fear of an arms race made the US 
reluctant to transfer arms to any state in the Middle East. As Walt Rostow noted in April 
1964, “The arms race is, I believe, the danger ahead. It is already expensive (both the UAR 
and Israel now spend over 10% of their GNP on security) and will grow both more 
expensive and more dangerous.”286 The weapons Israel and Egypt desired included 
prestigious and capable weapons like bomber planes, as well as smaller, but still useful, 
weapons such as surface-to-surface missiles, and air defense systems/surface-to-air 
missiles. Main battle tanks are also very useful, though the military using them would need 
a steady supply of replacement tracks and the technical knowledge to maintain and repair 
the tanks in a harsh desert environment. 
While the military interest of states in the Middle East was similar to the interests of 
India and Pakistan, the social context of arms was different. This unique context increased 
the importance of the signals sent by arms transfers, and raised their foreign policy stakes. 
Shimon Peres bluntly wrote, “What water is to agriculture, armaments are to security.”287 
He illustrated this through an extended discussion of the political significance of fighter 
jets:  
Whereas the prop plane had long been manufactured by numerous countries and 
stocks were available all over the world, from Japan to Canada, the basic 
production of jets was confined to five countries alone: the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Sweden. The governments themselves were 
involved in the development and manufacture, and kept scrupulous supervision 
and control over their disposal. No country could acquire them from any one of the 
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five in a simple commercial transaction. The considerations were almost wholly 
political. Indeed, the sale of jets was a marked expression of political friendship.288 
Peres was not alone in considering fighter jets an obvious sign of friendship. Egypt and the 
Soviet Union often pressured Jordan to purchase Soviet MiG fighter jets as a way to clearly 
align itself with “anti-imperialist” forces.289 This signal of political alignment was so 
important that the Soviet Union offered to sell Jordan the highly advanced and prestigious 
MiG-21 at two-thirds its usual price.290 
Main battle tanks served a similar signaling function, even in cases where the tank had 
more limited use. Writing from Damascus, US Ambassador Ridgway Knight remarked, 
“Whether or not it makes military sense, tanks are regarded here as a prime symbol of 
military strength. In Syria, the unsophisticated tank is the elite weapon.”291 Arms, he knew, 
were powerful because they conferred military strength and signaled political relationships. 
Regional actors were fluent enough in the signals sent through arms transfers that weapons 
had the potential to strengthen or to sever political relationships.292 
A unique feature of the high salience of arms transfers was the role of visiting 
weaponry. Visiting weapons were not as strong of a signal as an arms transfer, they were 
more akin to courting behavior, rather than a signal of exclusive and dedicated 
relationships. Both the Soviet Union and the United States dispatched forces to demonstrate 
solidarity with friendly states in the Middle East. These forces would make a show of 
                                                 
288
 Peres 1970, 36-37. 
289
 Stephens 1971, 439. 
290
 Levey 2006, 530. 
291 Airgram Damascus (Knight) to State, 26 March 1964, p. 2, National Security File, Country File – Israel, 
Box 138 (2/2), Folder 2, LBJ. Emphasis original. 
292 Telegram State (Symmes and Rusk) to USUN, 8 August 1968, p. 2, RG 59, Box 1558, Folder DEF 12-5 
ISR 1/1/68, USNA. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   148 
anchoring or flying around highly visible areas. For example, in late 1967 the Soviet Union 
sent a squadron of Tu-16 bombers to visit Egypt. The US State Department recognized that 
this was meant to be a “gesture of support rather than signaling any intent [to] resume 
fighting. As such their impact [was] more political than military.”293 The US Sixth Fleet, 
based in the Mediterranean, played a similar role for Israel. The particular social context 
in the Middle East meant that actors gave extra attention to the political meaning of arms 
transfers. Beginning in 1956, major powers transferred arms to the region, establishing 
relationships that affected the 1967 war. 
 
RELATIONS FROM SUEZ TO 1962 
 
The 1956 Suez Crisis and its aftermath are necessary points of background information for 
understanding the relationships and relational ambiguities that contributed to the 1967 war. 
Beginning in 1956, Israel and Egypt became respectively identified with the Western bloc 
and the Soviet sphere. Though Nasser’s Egypt was formally non-aligned, and Nasser 
himself was a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, Egypt frequently accepted arms 
from the Soviet Union, and often positioned itself as an alternative to Western ideas and 
interests. Jordan, meanwhile, was stuck in the proverbial middle: the USSR offered King 
Hussein prestigious weapons, but the monarch’s desire to avoid aligning with Nasser and 
the Soviet bloc led him to turn to the United States for weaponry. Each state additionally 
had to deal with the interests of three superpowers: the United States, France, and the Soviet 
Union. Thus the late 1950s into the early 1960s were a period of shifting allegiances and 
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exploratory relationships as each state tried to consolidate its power and position in the 
Middle East. This section briefly outlines the primary interests of each state and the key 
relationships that developed between the Suez Crisis and 1962. 
France was an underappreciated force in relations in the Middle East. Under Charles 
de Gaulle, the French government sought to reclaim grandeur and influence by inserting 
itself into Middle East relations via arms deals.294 France started this process by rushing 
arms to Israel during the Suez Crisis. Under de Gaulle, this escalated to include the sale of 
prestigious and capable boom weapons, which France hoped would pressure Egypt into 
ceasing aid to revolutionary forces in Algeria.295 An arms agreement signed in June 1956 
brought advanced AMX-13 light tanks, Mystére fighter jets, and light weapons and 
ammunition to Israel.296 As a result of this arms aid, the Israeli press hailed France as its 
new champion, and Israeli diplomat Ephraim Evron noted that “the arms trade between 
Israel and France was a tangible expression of their growing friendship.”297 This friendship 
was clearly expressed through French assistance in Israel’s nuclear ambitions. France was 
integral to the construction of Israel’s nuclear reactor at Dimona.298 
France thought it could be Israel’s primary partner, and its link to Europe. De Gaulle 
encouraged Israel to establish closer relations with West Germany and Europe, and to 
lessen its dependence on Washington.299 Beyond transferring arms, France agreed, in 
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November 1959, to help Israel develop short-range missiles to counter a growing 
“psychological” threat of Egyptian missile possession.300 Shimon Peres, then Director 
General of the Defense Ministry, was even given an office in the French Defense 
Department. 
The primary consequence of these arms sales was that France became identified as 
Israel’s chief strategic ally. France “often voted along with Israel as a minority of two in 
the [UN] General Assembly,” and in less public negotiations.301 Writing from the US 
Embassy in Paris in 1964, John Bovey observed: 
France’s influence with the Government of Israel is that of a major Ally. This is 
equally the way the Arab Governments must view it today. When the Arabs look 
at this relationship they therefore probably continue to perceive a potential 
threat…French military assistance has been a major factor in Israel’s survival. 
More, it made Israel the ‘tool and spearhead of the imperialists’ in Arab eyes. 
Israel’s French-strengthened military kept Cairo looking East while France was 
militarily engaged in North Africa. It continues to be a governing factor in the 
formulation of policies in Arab states.302 
 
France’s actions from Suez through the early 1960s led Israel to expect a continued flow 
of arms, and for continued rhetorical and material support in any future conflicts with the 
Arab states.  
Israel’s relationship with France during this period was very different than its 
relationship with the United States. Under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, 
US policy was to protect the territorial integrity of states facing threats from Communism, 
which translated into bolstering Arab states deemed most likely to resist communism.303 
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The Johnson administration continued the policy of containment, and articulated four goals 
for the Middle East: (1) contain the influence of the Soviet Union to those places it already 
existed; (2) maintain stability to ensure the flow of oil; (3) limit the supply of US military 
hardware to the Middle East; and (4) ensure Israeli security.304 In practice, this meant that 
the US did not want to become identified as Israel’s primary strategic partner, and was 
more than happy for France and Europe to take on the role of Israel’s military suppliers. 
As explained later in this chapter, the US-Israeli relationship dramatically changed with 
the 1962 transfer of Hawk missiles.  
Though nominally non-aligned, Egypt started developing a strong political relationship 
with the Soviet Union in 1955. In that year, the Soviet Union arranged for Egypt to receive 
$200 million of advanced Soviet arms from Czechoslovakia in exchange for Egyptian 
cotton.305 In many ways, the Soviet Union had similar motivations to France when it 
arranged for the transfer of T-34 tanks and MiG-15 aircraft. Like France, the Soviet Union 
wanted to gain a “center of influence” in the Middle East, through which it could contest 
US efforts, and guide regional events.306 The Soviet aid program for Egypt, including arms 
transfers, was the largest it undertook in any non-communist country, and resulted in the 
transfer of “such advanced Soviet weapons as surface-to-surface missiles (SAMs), MiG-
21 (Fishbed) jet fighters, Tu-16 (Badger) jet bombers, and Komar guided missile boats.” 
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307 Nasser believed that Egypt’s military superiority would allow him to pursue his 
hegemonic goals in the Arab world,308 and so welcomed the infusion of Soviet weaponry.  
While Egypt and Israel are often treated as the two centers of gravity for analyzing 
conflict in the Middle East, focusing on them elides the crucial role of Jordan. Jordan’s 
King Hussein took the throne in 1953, and accepted US aid in the aftermath of a coup 
attempt. Aid from the US made Hussein a frequent target of Egypt and Syria. US aid 
increased to some US$50 million annually in development and economic aid by the early 
1960s.309 The US saw Jordan as an important ideological battleground, since King Hussein 
was more “moderate” in his pan-Arab ambitions than was Nasser.310 The Kennedy 
administration believed Jordan was “the key to the precarious stability in the Middle 
East,”311 and found Hussein’s open profession of anti-Communism an encouraging sign.312 
However, the US was sensitive to the balancing act King Hussein felt he must undertake – 
ensuring that he was not vulnerable to Soviet- or Nasser-induced coup attempts, but not 
breaking entirely with the Arab states. The US thus tried to facilitate close US-Jordanian 
relations without compromising Hussein’s independence.313 Similarly, Hussein was 
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skeptical of Soviet offers of weaponry, believing they were an attempt to “acquire a 
foothold in the Arab world.”314 
This early period established clear relationships between all of the states – even as 
Jordan maintained a difficult balancing act. The consolidation of a new French-Israeli 
partnership, and a budding relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union set 
expectations for future actions. These background relationships are essential for 
understanding the stops and starts on the path to war, beginning with the 1962 transfer of 
Hawk missiles from the US to Israel, which introduced relational ambiguity and 
uncertainty about future actions. 
 
AMBIGUITIES AND DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT THE US-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP 
 
The contemporary close relationship between Israel and the United States is often taken 
for granted. However, such a close relationship was not the inevitable outcome of history. 
The US deliberately avoided transferring arms to Israel in the 1950s for fear of becoming 
identified as Israel’s chief supporter. Even after it began giving Israel arms in the 1960s, 
the US refused to see itself as Israel’s military or strategic partner. Ambiguities about this 
relationship – whether Israel could or ought to rely on the political and defensive military 
backing of the US – occupied the diplomatic corps of both countries in the years preceding 
the 1967 war.  
Relational ambiguities first emerged with the 1962 sale of Hawk surface-to-surface 
missiles. While Israeli political and military leaders thought that the Hawk sale signaled a 
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growing interest from the US, US officials believed the transfer was a one-time exception 
devoid of political meaning.  
For Israel, Hawk missiles were was concrete evidence of a new US-Israeli relationship. 
Haim Yahil, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, described the transfer as a “dramatic 
turning point in the history of American-Israeli relations.”315 Writing with the benefit of 
hindsight, Abraham Ben-Zvi calls the Hawk sale, “an insufficiently acknowledged 
watershed in Middle Eastern history,” and notes, “the US-Israeli diplomacy that produced 
it sheds light on Israel’s strategic thinking in the run-up to the Six Day War of 1967.”316 
Israel interpreted this transfer as a signal of political support for two reasons. First, the 
Hawk missiles are extremely useful military tools, and were an important weapon for the 
US military from 1959 until 1994. Israel was the first non-Western state to receive the 
Hawk.317 Second, the missiles would counter the psychological threat posed by the missiles 
Egypt received from the Soviet Union.318 Egypt’s Soviet weapons would be addressed both 
by Israeli possession of a capable (and prestigious) counter weapon, and the signal sent by 
this transfer.  
 The Hawk sale was unexpected – and was therefore, according to my theory, an 
upgrade signal – because of an existing US arms embargo against Israel, dating to 1956. In 
Peres’ words, the Hawks were “the first major weapons to breach the wall of America’s 
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arms embargo.”319 They were interpreted as a “crossing of the Rubicon” and “a valid index 
of a major swing in the American posture toward Israel.”320 Peres communicated this 
interpretation to US officials during his visit to Washington in May 1962. He said that the 
Kennedy administration needed to show “willingness to supply something that would be a 
demonstrable indication of [US] concern for supporting Israel and maintaining a military 
balance.”321 As Bass observed, “Ben-Gurion wanted both the missile and the marker.”322 
Despite multiple indications from Israeli leaders that the Hawk missiles were important 
symbols of a political relationship, US officials were unwilling to acknowledge this broader 
significance. Dean Rusk informed US embassies of the sale by writing that it was “not a 
change or reversal of long-standing US policy. The US intends to continue to avoid 
becoming a major supplier of offensive or sophisticated weapons to parties to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It is [a] single decision designed [to] meet [a] specific need for an improved 
air defense.”323 Diplomat Phillips Talbot, who opposed the sale, urged the State 
Department to avoid establishing a “special military relationship” with Israel.324 
Approaching the Hawk sale from a Cold War framework, most US officials saw the 
missiles as a status quo weapon that would stabilize the regional military balance and 
bolster Israeli deterrence. While McGeorge Bundy believed there was a valid military 
reason for giving Israel the Hawks, he was alone in noting “one can read into their [Israel’s] 
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present insistence all kinds of collateral political moves.”325 The rest of the Kennedy 
administration was (perhaps willfully) ignorant of the political significance of the Hawk 
sale. 
These different interpretations led to different expectations about the effects of the 
Hawk transfer. Kennedy expected that the Hawk would ultimately encourage Israel to 
make concessions to the Arabs.326 The Department of Defense believed the sale was 
necessary to “fill an important gap” in Israel’s air defense, but that the Hawks “would not 
alone act to shift the balance of military power between Israel and its neighbors.”327 They 
were, in US eyes, status quo weapons to shore up an ally’s military posture. 
While the US and Israel were at odds over how to interpret the political significance of 
the Hawk sale, third party observers were not. The British – who had wanted to sell their 
own Bloodhound missile to Israel in 1959 – were “startled” by what they saw as “the 
American leap into the Middle Eastern arms-sales business.”328 The Brits did not sell the 
Bloodhound because they thought the sale would jeopardize British standing in the Arab 
world, and assumed similar reasoning would prevent the US from selling weapons. Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan was so surprised by US actions that he sent a protest note 
directly to Kennedy.329 Nasser similarly reacted to the political implications of the sale. US 
Ambassador John Badeau, after informing Nasser of the sale, wrote that Nasser seemed 
“unperturbed by [the] military implications” of the deal, but that the politics of the sale 
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were problematic.330 The sale would make it more difficult for Egypt to continue working 
with the US, since the US had clearly chosen sides in the Middle East conflict. Nasser also 
warned the transfer would lead to more Soviet arms pouring into the region. In Beirut, pro-
Nasser newspaper al-Akhbar ran an editorial that said, “Arabs can expect to be stabbed in 
the back by the US. Arabs everywhere should beware of Kennedy.”331 
In the short term, then, there were substantial differences in actors’ interpretations of 
the Hawk sale. The US saw a one-time exception to its policy of not becoming a major 
supplier of weapons to the Middle East, whereas Israel, Egypt, and even the British 
interpreted the sale as a major upgrade to US-Israeli ties. 
The relational ambiguities created by the Hawk transfer stem from the long-term 
implications of the transfer. From the Israeli perspective, the transfer set a baseline for 
future expectations. Warren Bass is insightful on this point: Because Kennedy was the first 
president to break the embargo of major weapons sales “after his term, Washington was 
deciding which arms to sell the Jewish state, not whether to sell any arms in the first 
place.”332 And indeed this is what happened. To the great puzzlement of US officials, 
Israeli arms requests escalated immediately after the Hawk missiles were delivered. In 
October 1962, Israel requested the prestigious F-104 fighter jet and advanced Genie air-to-
air missiles.333 Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir followed this with a September 
1963 request for US tanks – an important symbolic weapon – and additional surface-to-
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surface missiles (SSMs). In November 1963, Minister of Defense Levi Eshkol again asked 
for SSMs, tanks, and for some way to counter growing Egyptian naval strength. Rather 
than seeing the Hawk sale as a blip on the radar, Israel viewed the sale as the opening of a 
door to the possibility of a special relationship with the US. 
 
Brokered tank sale and multi-party signaling 
 
Whereas Israel wanted to continue receiving US weapons as evidence of a growing 
political relationship, the US took pains to avoid such a perception. Though Israel used the 
Hawk transfer as an entryway to request multiple types of weapons, it was particularly 
interested in tanks. In January 1963, Ambassador Avraham Harman asked the US to 
provide tanks for free under the military assistance program.334 This bold request stunned 
the US, and was rejected outright. Robert Komer explained that providing tanks under the 
aid program would “not only spook the Arabs, but lay ourselves open to constant pressure 
for all sorts of hardware.” 335 Undeterred, Israel continued making these requests, and by 
May 1964 the US conceded there was a legitimate military need for Israel to acquire 
modern tanks.336 
Because the tank was an especially symbolic weapon in the Middle East, the US wanted 
to find a way to provide Israel with the weapons, but to dampen the signal that would be 
sent by the transfer. As reflected in notes from a National Security Council meeting, “for 
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political reasons, it is probably inadvisable for the US to provide Israel with tanks, but the 
US should assist Israel behind the scene in meeting its requirements from among Western 
European sources.”337 Komer further elaborated the dilemma: “we are already tabbed as 
Israel’s greatest friend and protector, and open US sale of tanks would compromise our 
relations with Arabs…”338 Even Meyer Feldman, Israel’s champion within the Johnson 
administration, recognized the political problem of directly supplying tanks, 
acknowledging that it would be a “dramatic shift in US policy.”339 Thus was born the 
“German Deal,” a US attempt to provide Israel with modern US tanks without becoming 
“overt supplier.”340 
Using the West Germans as a tank broker seemed to be the least-bad option for meeting 
Israel’s military needs without signaling a deeper political relationship between the United 
States and Israel. President Johnson said as much in his instructions to the team tasked to 
set up the deal: “We intend to see that Israel gets the tanks it needs, but without exposing 
the US to unacceptable political risk.”341 If all went according to plan, West Germany 
would give Israel 150 of its own US-produced M-48 Patton tanks, and in return the US 
would replace the West German arsenal with newer versions of the tank.342 Since West 
Germany already provided military aid to Israel, “[the] inclusion of tanks should raise no 
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new policy issue” for West Germany.343 The existing military aid tie was supposed to mask 
the hand of the United States guiding this deal. Key to using the West Germans as tank 
brokers was secrecy: all parties, including German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 
and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eskhol, agreed to keep the deal secret. 
The brokered deal failed when it became public in October 1964. West Germany 
suspended the arms sales out of fear of damaging its relations with the Arab states (and 
perhaps goading them into recognizing the German Democratic Republic). Only 40 tanks 
had been delivered to Israel.344 While the collapse of the German Deal was a disaster for 
the US, it was a boon for Israel. As the National Security Council noted, “The Eshkol 
government also preferred the M-48 for political reasons: the purchase of this tank would 
help to establish an American-Israeli arms pipeline, however roundabout, which Israel 
could later strengthen.”345 The Eshkol government believed it could pressure the US into 
meeting the remainder of the German deal, which would fulfill Israeli political objectives 
for in the tank transfer.  
British and French tanks would have met Israel’s military needs, but Israeli leaders 
were quite explicit in wanting the M-48 Patton tank because of its political significance. 
During Eskhol’s visit to Washington in June 1964, he sought military purchases that would 
“symbolize a close military association with the United Sates.”346 In the words of the 
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National Security Council, “We judge [Israel’s] request for US tanks is designed primarily 
to project the image of a close military association with the United States.”347 Possessing 
US tanks, transferred from the US, was one way that Israel hoped to “project the image of 
a de facto alliance” with the United States.348 Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban said “the 
provision of tanks would…be considered concrete evidence of US determination to fulfill 
its assurances. It would also symbolize a closer US-Israeli military association.” 349 
Though Israel would have happily accepted the M-48 from West Germany – after all, 
the tanks were US-made – nothing could beat a direct transfer from the US. Under immense 
pressure to honor the German Deal, the US finally agreed, in July 1965, to provide the 
remainder of the M-48 tanks that should have arrived from West Germany. Just as with the 
Hawk missile sale three years prior, US Ambassadors in the region were instructed to tell 
their hosts that the “sale to Israel would be an exception to our arms sales policy made to 
prevent significant arms imbalance from posing a threat to peace resulting from 
overconfidence or from desperation.”350 
The US anticipated significant negative reactions from its tank sale to Israel, and Dean 
Rusk solicited input from the embassies throughout the region. The responses were not 
optimistic: “Replies indicate no gains to [US] from transaction and probable severe damage 
to US policies and interests in Near East. Posts suggest no means [to] mitigate reaction 
which could include: 1) rupture diplomatic relations, 2) retaliatory actions against oil 
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installations, 3) shift to greater dependence on USSR, 4) accelerated spiral of arms race, 5) 
pressure to expel US from military bases, and 6) growth of anti-American sentiment.”351 
The CIA shared this estimate, writing that Arab states would see the tank sale “as evidence 
of a firm decision on the part of Washington to choose Israel over the Arabs.”352 
To Israel, the transfer of these boom weapons reinforced its interpretation of the Hawk 
sale as a significant step in US-Israeli relations. The open willingness of the US to fulfill 
the German Deal sent an upgrade signal, and led Israel to pursue bolstering behavior with 
the US. This was seen most clearly through changes to Israel’s border policies. Between 
1949 and 1973, Israel had a policy of conducting reprisal raids. This was a policy of striking 
at bordering Arab states in response to violence along the border.353 Raids were, according 
to prevailing Israeli logic, designed to induce cooperative behavior in the Arab 
governments by demonstrating that challenges to Israel’s security would result in a 
considerably larger “balance of blood.”354 Between October 1964 (when tanks began 
arriving in Israel), and October 1966 (the delivery of the remaining US tanks), virtually no 
raids were carried out by Israeli infantry or paratroop units.355 This resulted in lower fatality 
rates than in preceding or subsequent years.356 While some of this change is due to 
differences in Israeli leadership – Levi Eskhol and David Ben-Gurion disagreed about the 
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efficacy of reprisals – the change is also likely due to Israel’s increased confidence in the 
US because of the tank transfers. In the words of Abba Eban, the tank sale would “guard 
against the contingency [that the US would not act to support Israel in its time of need] and 
would be concrete evidence of US determination to fulfill its assurances.357 “The provision 
of tanks,” he said, “was important both substantively and psychologically.”358 Israel 
partially modified its own foreign policy to satisfy the US, hoping to build and strengthen 
this newly-confirmed relationship. 
Following the tank transfer, Israel turned its sights to fighter jets. Israeli leaders thought 
they had leverage to request additional boom weapons because of concurrent US arms 
transfers to Jordan – explained later in this chapter. The National Security Council 
determined that “as a corollary to an offer to Jordan, the [US] should offer to make a 
comparable sale to Israel and should inform the Jordanian government at the time the latter 
is given our proposal.” 359 The corollary proposal would include “a limited number of 
American aircraft in view of recent shifts that appeared to have taken place in the Near 
East arms balance.” The US “would stress we do not intend to become a primary supplier 
to Israel.”360 Recognizing that he had the upper hand, General Ezer Weizman, commander 
of the Israeli Air Force, pressed for prestigious fighter and bomber aircraft. He requested 
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165 A-4E Skyhawk bombers, and 45 F-4 Phantom jets.361 Though this request was absurd 
– the US was not willing to provide 210 planes to Israel – the request nonetheless 
communicated Israel’s feelings about the US-Jordan transfer, and its need to be reassured 
that the US was not seeking to develop a close relationship with one of Israel’s adversaries. 
Again hesitant to become openly identified with Israel, the US agreed to sell 24 combat 
aircraft, of a type to be determined later, only if Israel could not find suitable planes from 
Western European suppliers.362 Perhaps having learned from the failed deal to use West 
Germany as a tank broker, the US did not offer to arrange an aircraft transfer from Western 
Europe, but it did push Israel to consider non-US planes.363 The US tried to preemptively 
dampen signals sent by arms transfers by telling Israel that “we would expect Israel to 
agree not to request additional aircraft sales from the United States in the time frame 1966-
1971…We would also expect Israel to rely on Western Europe as its primary supplier for 
military equipment, including aircraft in the future.”364 This was yet another attempt to 
steer Israel to interpret the transfer as a one-time boost in military strength, rather than a 
transfer that signaled a growing political relationship.    
 
Skyhawk jet sale and further divergences 
 
Israel claimed it was unable to find suitable jets in Western Europe, and pressed the US to 
transfer planes. The internal US negotiations over what type of plane, and how many, show 
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that US leaders were sensitive to the signaling dynamics involved in arms transfers, but 
were unwilling to acknowledge the signals being sent to Israel. The US first offered to give 
Israel the F-5, a plane that was not on General Weizman’s wish list. 
Though the US did not try to arrange a formal brokerage agreement as it did with the 
tanks from West Germany, it suggested the F-5 for similar reasons. Produced in Europe, 
the F-5 would have placed one degree of separation between the US and Israel. From the 
US perspective, this separation was a desirable shield that would obscure a direct link to 
Israel. The US also hoped Israel would prefer this plane because it was a staple of the 
European air forces, which would symbolize Israel’s entrance into the inner circle of US 
alliance hierarchies. As Robert Komer explained, “the public image of the F-5 may be more 
“defensive,” and therefore better from our point of view; but the differences here may be 
quite subjective and superficial. (I now understand that Northrop Aviation has proposed to 
the Dutch and the Belgians a consortium arrangement to produce F-5s in Europe; while 
tentative, this prospect might be an attractive option for the supply of aircraft to Israel.)”365  
Israel, unwilling to accept another brokerage-type arrangement with the US, rejected the 
offer of the F-5, and insisted that Western Europe did not produce planes that met its needs. 
The US finally agreed to sell Israel the A-4E Skyhawk bomber in February 1966, just seven 
months after the German Deal. 
The Johnson administration tried to be as explicit as possible with Israel about the lack 
of political commitment implied by the Skyhawk transfer. US officials “admonished 
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Israel’s leaders not to view the deal as a nascent strategic relationship,” and told Israel to 
look to Europe, and “not to bother [the US] on planes for the next several years.” 366 As 
with the German Deal, the Skyhawk transfer was supposed to remain secret. 
Actions again spoke louder than words, as Israeli leaders interpreted the Skyhawk sale 
as a momentous political occasion. In a note to Levi Eshkol, Eban wrote that the transfer 
was “a development of tremendous political value.”367 Israel’s neighbors also feared the 
transfer foretold a strong relationship between the US and Israel. In Cairo, Al-Ahram wrote 
that the transfer meant American arming of Israel “had assumed grave proportions for the 
first time.”368 US officials tried to downplay the signal sent by the Skyhawk, by describing 
the plans as “a type which has been in service for some time and whose performance is 
considerably below that of the MiG-21s now in service in the UAR and Syria.”369 The US 
was unable to portray the Skyhawk as a backbone weapon. Even popular media understood 
the significance, as explained in a Christian Science Monitor article from May 1966:  
Rightly or wrongly, Israelis view the recent sale of United States jet bombers to this 
country as a precedent-setting departure from traditional American policies regarding 
the Middle East. The principal novelty read by Israelis into the Skyhawk sale concerns 
the question of who should be the principal guarantor of Israel’s survival against 
steadily escalating Arab armaments… The increase in United States prestige clearly is 
noticeable following the Skyhawk announcement, with Israelis hitherto accustomed to 
look to France as the source of vitally needed jet planes. This trend is so marked that 
one Israeli Cabinet member commented: “Columbus may have been the first to 
discover America, but he obviously was not last.”370 
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Another Israeli official said that the Skyhawk sale meant the US was “ready for a new form 
of partnership.”371 The Skyhawk sale exemplified Israeli policy to “strive for a continued 
intensification of existing US commitment and the creation of sui generis strategic 
relations.”372 
 If the Skyhawk sale had been the only arms transfer from the US during this period, it 
is likely that Israel would have been content with the signals coming from its new patron. 
Believing that actions were more credible than words, Israel saw a progression of 
increasingly capable and prestigious weapons, beginning in 1962 with the Hawk missiles, 
and ending with the 1966 Skyhawk transfer. However, simultaneous to the collapse of the 
German Deal for tanks, Jordan asked the US for arms. The complicating role of Jordan in 
understanding state action in the Middle East shows that states beyond the transfer dyad 
pay attention to symbols, and that the foreign policy effects of arms transfers to one state 
can interact with the effects of transfers to a second. US arm transfers to Jordan undercut 
signals sent to Israel, and led to ambiguities – from Israel’s perspective – about who the 
US would support in a regional conflict. 
 
THE US AND SOVIET UNION FIGHT FOR INFLUENCE IN JORDAN 
 
In August 1964, Jordan asked the US for arms in order to resist pressure from Egypt that it 
buy arms from the Soviet Union.373 Though Jordan was, at this point, a member of the 
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Unified Arab Command, it did not share many of Nasser’s more “radical” policy 
preferences.374 The Johnson administration was therefore sympathetic to Jordan’s request, 
and feared a Soviet arms deal with Jordan would be “the beginning of the end” of a pro-
Western orientation in that country.375 Because the Soviet Union had offered arms at 
significantly reduced costs, Jordan felt it would be forced to accept unless the US could 
offer a better deal. 
Recognizing the pressures on Jordan, as well as an opportunity to repel Soviet 
advances, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended selling Jordan 100 M-48 tanks, to 
be delivered between 1965 and 1966. He also recommended preempting further Soviet and 
Egyptian pressure on Jordan by “cooperat[ing] with Jordan in finding suitable supersonic 
aircraft from Free World sources on the understanding that, if Jordan is unsuccessful, we 
would then tell the Jordanians we would sympathetically consider selling them 20 F-104s 
with deliveries starting in 1968 or 1969.”376 
Despite US efforts to paint the tank sale as part of a long-standing agreement to 
modernize the Jordanian army, the sale successfully identified Jordan as a friend of the US, 
and helped Jordan rebuff the Soviet offer of arms. Even the New York Times was aware of 
the political significance of this sale, writing in January 1966 that “Jordan presents an 
illustrative example of the political motivations behind American arms contributions… the 
United States now finds itself under political pressure to increase the supply of tanks and 
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jet planes, probably to be supplied by Britain, to dissuade Jordan from turning to the Soviet 
Union to modernize and increase its arsenal.”377 These first major transfers helped Jordan 
remain steadfast against pressures to buy Soviet weaponry.  
The political motivations behind and consequences of the tank sale were obvious to 
outside observers. The sale of tanks to Jordan allowed it to maintain some independence 
from Nasser, which led Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram to indirectly accused the US of 
trying to divide the Arab world by giving arms to Jordan.378 These concerns were amplified 
after a mid-1966 agreement to sell Jordan F-104 Starfighters, scheduled for delivery 
beginning in 1968. The F-104, the ultimate bling weapon, was accompanied by US 
demands that Jordan make no arms purchases from the Soviet bloc.379 
The signals sent by the tank and F-104 might have been enough to reassure Jordan of 
the US commitment, except for an Israeli raid on the Jordanian town of Samu on 13 
November 1966. This raid – the first in two years to use paratroopers and infantry380 – 
destroyed homes and killed 15 Jordanian soldiers. It made King Hussein nervous about 
Israeli territorial ambitions, and the degree to which the US would support its ally’s 
belligerency.381 Despite the agreements for tanks and the F-104, Hussein was not 
convinced that the US would act to protect Jordan against Israeli action. He thus pressed 
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for US arms as such a signal: “to Hussein, weaponry from the United States represented a 
tangible show of support and also served to deflect Nasser’s criticism that the king coddled 
Israel.”382 The F-104 fighter jets and M-48 tanks, agreed to earlier in 1966, had not yet 
been delivered; Hussein needed an immediate sign that these first agreements were not just 
talk. 
 
The ties that could have bound: Weak signals after the Samu raid 
 
The United States miscalculated in its response to Jordan after the raid on Samu. Instead 
of expediting the delivery of particularly symbolic weapons, like the F-104, the US 
provided minimal weapons and did not in any significant way sanction Israel. To King 
Hussein, this was a clear signal that he would have to face Israel alone. 
The weak signals sent by the US are puzzling because Hussein was very explicit about 
his need for bling and boom weapons after the raid. Hussein explained that he faced both 
domestic and international pressures threatening his regime. Between the raid on Samu in 
November 1966 and May 1967, Jordan’s relationships with its Arab neighbors were 
deteriorating, with both Egypt and Syria calling on Jordanians to overthrown Hussein.383 
Shortly after the raid, a radio broadcast from Cairo called on the Jordanian Army to 
overthrown King Hussein.384 Hussein observed numerous “verbal assaults” directed at him, 
stating “I learned by way of the international press and “The Arab Voice,” the Cairo radio 
and that of Damascus, that “before liberating Tel Aviv, we must liberate Amman!””385 On 
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21 May 1967, Syrians, whom Hussein viewed as acting in concert with Cairo, sent a car to 
Jordan that exploded on the border at Ramtha. The King believed the car “had been meant 
to explode in the center of Amman. Result: 14 Jordanians killed. This compelled us to sever 
diplomatic relations with Damascus.” Hussein’s relations with Syria – and by extension 
with Cairo – were plummeting. He said: “the incident filled Jordan with unease. In such 
delicate circumstances, we no longer knew who was less trustworthy: Israel, or our Arab 
allies!”386 Further, in the months prior to June 1967, “Nasser was saying that Wasfi Tal 
[the Jordanian Foreign Minister] was a spy for the British and the CIA. The Jordanians 
were being branded all the time as imperialist tools, traitors, and spies.”387 Nasser did not 
support Hussein as Jordan’s leader, and seemed to take all opportunities – direct and 
indirect – to weaken Hussein’s domestic support. 
The US was well aware of these issues, and considered sending arms to Jordan to signal 
US support for King Hussein and to help him rebuff domestic and international threats. US 
discussions were sincere enough to be covered in the New York Times, which noted that 
King Hussein had been under “serious pressure to demonstrate that the United States in 
fact stands behind him,” which would require “something more than just pious expressions 
of support.”388 Observing the situation from Cairo, US Ambassador Luke Battle wrote, 
“Possibility has also occurred to us that Egyptian are perhaps not totally adverse to idea of 
short little war that would tidy things up and get rid of Hussein in process. And we certainly 
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agree that Cairo press and radio have…exploited every opportunity to make situation worse 
and have undoubtedly contributed greatly to that tension in Jordan which Egyptians 
privately claim they wish to avoid.”389 Though Battle ultimately believed Egyptian action 
against Jordan was unlikely, its notable that hostilities between the two made this a 
plausible scenario.  
Despite noting the intense pressure facing King Hussein, the US delivered only modest 
blip and backbone weapons, and dismissed any calls to sanction Israel. The US provided 
an “emergency” delivery of six 105mm howitzers, utility trucks, and fifteen 106mm 
recoilless rifles.390 It seems incomprehensible that the US thought the delivery of a handful 
of non-prestigious weapons would assuage Jordan’s concerns. Dean Rusk captured this 
oddity when he explained: “We are considering all factors bearing on situation. 
Consequences go far beyond Jordan. There was question of our relations with Shah and 
other leaders who will be watching whether or not we properly support Hussein. This is 
front page news around the world. For this reason we decided earlier speed up certain items 
to Jordan, such as jeeps and advancing delivery date of two training planes. This was 
nothing dramatic but was designed to give psychological boost to Hussein and [the 
Jordanian Army].”391 Rusk thought that providing jeeps and rifles, and accelerating the 
delivery schedule for more prestigious weapons would be the desired signal of support, 
both for King Hussein and other allies watching the US response. But these transfers of 
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blip and backbone weapons did not reassure Jordan (as boom weapons would have), nor 
did they reinforce its existing relationship with the US (as the F-104 would have). The arms 
were so out of line with his expectations, King Hussein could only see the transfer as a 
downgrade signal. At the end of May, he traveled to Cairo and, in a major reversal of prior 
Jordanian policy, signed a defense pact with Egypt. 
 
Realignment and the Egypt-Jordan defense pact 
 
Given the general hostility between Jordan and Egypt, the bilateral defense pact signed on 
30 May 1967 was unexpected. More surprising still was that King Hussein approached 
Nasser to propose the defense pact, and agreed to place Jordanian troops under Egyptian 
command.392 Conventional explanations of foreign policy cannot explain this radical shift, 
but realignment followed by compromise with a former adversary is expected in my theory. 
The mismatched arms transfers to Jordan sent a downgrade signal, confirming, in Jordan’s 
eyes that the US would back Israel at the expense of its relationship with Jordan. After 
losing its primary political partner, Jordan turned to Egypt as a way to try to guarantee its 
territorial status quo, even though Egypt had just days prior been calling for the overthrow 
of King Hussein. Note that all of these actions occurred, not because of changes to the 
balance of military power, but because arms transfers signaled shifting political power. 
Placing Jordanian troops under Egyptian command, and forming a military alliance 
with Egypt was not a quick solution to Jordan’s border vulnerabilities. First, Nasser’s 
primarily Soviet-equipped forces and Jordan’s primarily US/Western-equipped forces 
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were not compatible, something the King himself recognized.393 The military alliance thus 
would have needed time for effective cooperation to be established between the two 
militaries and between different weapons systems, and would not have significantly altered 
the military balance for some time.394 Second, King Hussein was convinced that Nasser 
wanted to avoid a military engagement with Israel. In an interview after the war, he said “I 
even suspected that he [Nasser] didn’t really believe war would break out.”395 Hussein 
retained this impression even after meeting Nasser to sign the defense pact, noting “At the 
time of the Cairo meeting, I was convinced that Nasser did not want war.”396 
The Egyptian-Jordanian defense pact is therefore puzzling for two reasons. It was a 
stark reversal of prior Jordanian policy, and it would not have brought immediate, or even 
quick, relief to Jordan’s military situation in the West Bank. Viewed as the result of signals, 
however, this policy begins to make sense. Egypt could provide what the US could not: a 
clear signal of support, and confidence that it would defend Jordan against Israeli actions. 
As a result of the downgrade signal from the US, Jordan took its only remaining option: 
re-alignment with its former adversary. The bilateral defense pact, a further signal of new 
unity in the Arab world, further pushed Jordan, Egypt, and Israel down a path to war.  
 
WAR 
 
The processes that ended in war in June 1967 were set in motion by signals. Nasser’s 
escalation, including closing the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba on May 22, were 
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calculated steps to signal Egypt’s resolve.397 The Jordanian-Egypt defense pact signaled a 
newly united Arab front, which was a more credible military threat to Israel. As Nasser 
explained in an interview with Lebanese newspaper Al-Hawadith in March 1966, “We 
could annihilate Israel in twelve days were the Arab states to form a united front. Any 
attack on Israel from the south is not possible from a military viewpoint. Israel can be 
attacked only from the territory of Jordan and Syria.”398  
The US and France, meanwhile, were sending mixed signals to Israel, fueling its 
anxiety about political abandonment against an increasingly unified and seemingly 
militaristic Arab coalition. To Israel, the closure of the Straits of Tiran in May 1967 closely 
paralleled the closing of the Suez Canal in 1956. But unlike 1956, France was unwilling to 
assist Israel. Rather than act as a close friend – something Israel had come to expect because 
of its long history receiving arms from France – de Gaulle continually warned Israel not 
fire the first shot. Abba Eban noted that throughout the month of May, official France was 
covered in “thunderous silence.”399 Brecher and Geist recount a particularly troubling 
meeting between Eban and de Gaulle: “Finally, Eban – in an obvious reference to arms 
supplies – thanked France for her “reinforcement of Israel’s strength and spirit.” De 
Gaulle’s reply contained the first hint of the reversal of France’s position in this matter as 
well: “Israel was not sufficiently established to solve all her problems herself.””400 De 
Gaulle even imposed a temporary arms embargo on 2 June, before fighting started.401 It 
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was therefore with deep disappointment that Eban reflected, “I had been an eye-witness to 
the death of solemn commitments.”402 Israel was left convinced that France would not, as 
it had in 1956, honor on its political friendship with Israel.  
Israel’s growing sense of isolation was stoked by its unclear relationship with the US. 
The US denied arms requests in April and May 1967. One of the denials was of armored 
personnel carriers (APCs) – backbone weapons that should not have been the subject of 
debate. The US also refused to make a decision about whether or not to transfer the F-4 
Phantom jet, a clear boom weapon. While Israel thought that the progression of US 
transfers beginning in 1962 meant there should be question about the APCs and Phantom 
jet, the US continued to believe that it was not a major supplier to the region. As a result, 
the US turned down the request for APCs in April 1967. Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara was annoyed that Israel came to the US with another arms request so soon after 
agreeing “to continue to look to Europe for the bulk of its military requirements and not to 
regard the US as a major arms supplier.”403 The US thought agreeing to the APC request 
would reward Israel for breaking the rules. Though McNamara also believed “the Israelis 
will treat a ‘no’ as a broken promise,” his recommendation ultimately won the day and 
Israel did not receive the APCs.404 A similar logic led the US to refuse to make a decision 
about the F-4 Phantom. This boom weapons would have “change[d] dramatically” the US 
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relationship with Israel, and so the decision was delayed.405 These denials signaled, in 
Israel’s mind, a downgrade in its relationship with the US. This downgrade was seemingly 
confirmed by correspondence from President Johnson, urging Israel to “abstain from every 
step that would increase the tension and violence in the area.”406 Rather than demonstrating 
support or even sympathy, the US encouraged Israel not to act in the face of escalatory 
moves from Egypt.   
In search of a clarity about US intentions, Levi Eskhol dispatched Meir Amit, the head 
of Israel’s intelligence service, to Washington on 30 May. Amit reported: “The American 
intentions were not clear; better stated, there was not sufficient light… it became clear that 
here, in Israel, there existed certain misperceptions [about the US]. It became totally clear 
that they [the US] were not planning to do a thing.”407 Eban succinctly described Israel’s 
political position: “we were isolated; none of the powers would come to our assistance.”408 
This isolation was unexpected, and quite different from the relationships Israel had in 1956. 
As Defense Forces Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin explained, “[in 1956] Israel had been 
flanked by two supporting major powers, Britain and France, and Egypt was the only 
enemy. This time, Israel would be alone while Egypt might have Syria, Jordan and 
contingents from other Arab countries at its side and the Soviet Union in full political 
support.”409 As the month of May wore on, Israel was faced with increasing numbers of 
mobilized troops along its borders; 100,000 Egyptian troops were mobilized in the Sinai 
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and Gaza, and 60,000 Syrian troops were mobilized in the Golan Heights.410 On 22 May 
Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran, further encircling Israel. 
Unlike Jordan, Israel did not have a feasible re-alignment partner. By accepting 
increasing numbers of prestigious and capable weapons from the US, it foreclosed the 
possibility of aligning with Russia or with China, nor did it have a regional ally it could 
turn to, as Jordan did with Egypt. As expected by my theory, Israel pursued a preventative 
strategy against its chief adversary, in the form of military action that destroyed Egypt’s 
air force on 5 June 1967. The Six Day War, a resounding Israeli victory, fundamentally 
changed relations in the Middle East.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The signals sent by weapons transfers help explain how war occurred in June 1967, even 
though none of the actors were particularly interested in fighting. Doubts about its 
relationship with the US led Jordan to seek support from Egypt, which in turn raised the 
level of military threat to Israel. The US miscalculated in its response to an anxious Israel, 
and fueled its fears of political abandonment, increasing the attractiveness of a preventive 
option.  
The ambiguous signals before the 1967 war starkly contrast with the clear signals sent 
by the US to Israel prior to the 1973 war. The transfer of key boom weapons, including the 
F-4 Phantom jet, were an upgrade signal. My theory expects Israel to coordinate more 
closely with the US, which explains Israeli restraint at the outset of the 1973 war. Unlike 
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in 1967, Israel did not feel the need to take preventive action, because its relationship with 
the US had not been downgraded. Quite the opposite, the upgrade signal made Israel more 
likely to listen to, and act in line with, US desires. In an airgram from Tel Aviv, US 
diplomat Joseph Zurhellen summarized the mood in Israel upon the arrival of the first F-4 
in late 1969: “No single event in many months raised Israeli spirits as much as the arrival 
of the first Phantoms. Despite frequent reassurances, a dread lurked in the hearts of many 
Israelis that something might go wrong. The sight of a single Phantom, bearing Israeli 
markings, flying low over Israel’s cities September 13 set these fears at rest and set the 
stage most appropriately, in the Israeli view, for [Prime Minster Golda] Meir’s visit to 
Washington.”411 This signal was boosted as more F-4s arrived over the next three years. 
Finally, US and Israeli interpretations of the signal sent by this transfer were aligned. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke said that selling the Phantoms would “change 
markedly” the US relationship with Israel.412 This sentiment was echoed by a memorandum 
for the president, stating “the F-4 sale will in fact finally end our long-standing policy of 
not being the principal supplier of Israel’s military needs.”413 
There were no longer ambiguities about the US-Israeli relationship, which allowed 
Israel to act with more restraint. It did not initiate the conflict that began on 6 October 1973. 
Though it had received similar intelligence about troop movements and aggressive 
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intentions as it had in 1967, Israel did not strike first. To be sure, part of this is due to the 
confidence and continued military superiority Israel maintained after the 1967 war. Abba 
Eban said, “We could not ensure that the Arabs would not make war, but we could ensure 
that they would lose it heavily. The memories of 1967 were still vivid in our minds. 
Everything that had occurred since then confirmed the impression of Israeli superiority.”414 
Nonetheless, Israel refrained from a preemptive strike, even though such a strike would 
have been advantageous.415  
This case provides two key lessons for explanations of international politics. First, the 
bipolar structure of the system does not always translate into mutually exclusive spheres 
of interest at the regional level. Though Jordan was aligned with the United States, it was 
able to re-align with Egypt, a Soviet partner, in May 1967. This re-alignment shares 
similarities to Pakistan’s re-alignment with China in 1965, and suggests that in general, 
alignments and possibilities for alignment are more flexible than suggested by the bipolar 
Cold War structure. Regional relationships can provide flexibility and a greater menu of 
options than a systemic-level analysis would indicate. More generally, alliances are more 
nuanced than policy and popular discourse lets on: allies are not always “friends” and their 
interests do not have to largely coincide.416 As historian Paul Schroeder observes, “allies 
often clash with each other more than they unite in common cause,” and he thus 
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characterizes alliances as “associative-antagonistic relationships.”417 While the existence 
of an alliance tie is a useful heuristic for determining shared interests, alliance ties vary in 
strength, and do not inherently exclude the formation of seemingly contradictory 
relationships. 
Second, signaling in international politics is deeply contextual, but also extremely hard 
to manipulate. The symbols and shared understandings of weapons in the Middle East 
meant that there were often differences of opinion between regional actors (Israel, Egypt, 
Jordan), and their great power patrons. US arms transfers to Israel had signaling 
implications, despite attempts from the US to deny, downplay, or manipulate those signals. 
Similarly, the US was unable to imbue the backbone and blip weapons it sent to Jordan 
with greater meaning. Weapons transfers share many similarities with Jervis’ discussion 
of “indices”, which have meanings regardless of whether the actors are trying to convey a 
message.418 Importantly, however, the meanings attached to weapons, which enables their 
transfer to act as a signaling device, are not universal across time or place. As this chapter 
has highlighted, symbols are socially contextual and contingent. Tanks mattered in the case 
of India and Pakistan as well, but in the Middle East the tank was the symbolic weapon, 
which is why the US tried to transfer tanks to Israel using West Germany as a broker.  
The strange behavior of the US – it’s unwillingness to accept that its transfers to Israel 
were essential in building a political relationship – can be partially explained by returning 
to Jervis. I have argued here that weapons transfers are what Jervis calls indices, behavior 
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or action that sends a signal because it in inextricably linked to capabilities and/or 
intentions.419 If weapons transfers are indices, then their meaning can’t be manipulated. It 
seems likely that the US was treating indices as Jervis-type signals, which he describes as 
“promissory notes” that do not contain any inherent credibility, and can be manipulated.420 
Divergences between the US and Israel, then, are most likely due to their different 
treatment of arms transfers. Israel – and indeed, most actors in the Middle East – saw arms 
transfers as inextricably linked to intentions. When the US began transferring capable and 
prestigious weapons to Israel, this necessarily signaled intentions about a political 
relationship. The US, on the other hand, thought that it could alter the meaning of arms 
signals, and tried to moderate any suggestions of a growing political relationship with 
Israel. Why the US treated weapons transfers this way, particularly after seeing Israeli and 
Egyptian reaction to its previous transfers, remains a puzzle. Future research can attempt 
to determine why the US proved unwilling or unable to learn, but returning to Jervis’ initial 
outline of signals and indices provides a useful description of the different views on 
weapons transfers.  
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Chapter 5. Certain Uncertainty: Strategic Ambiguity in the Taiwan 
Strait 
 
In January 2010, the United States agreed to sell Taiwan $6.4 billion worth of US military 
equipment, including Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot and Harpoon missile systems, and 
mine-hunting ships. The sale also included communications upgrades for Taiwan’s 
squadrons of F-16 fighter jets. Though the US has provided arms to Taiwan since the 
1950s, the 2010 sale provoked a strong Chinese reaction. China’s Defense Ministry lodged 
a “solemn protest” with the United States, and further said, “Considering the severe harm 
and odious effect of US arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese side has decided to suspend 
planned mutual military visits…We strongly demand that the US respect the Chinese side’s 
interests.” It then called for the sale to be stopped.421 China’s Vice Foreign Minister 
similarly stated that the arms sale “will harm China-US relations and bring about a serious 
and active impact on bilateral communication and cooperation.”422 His office released a 
message saying that “It will be unavoidable that cooperation between China and the United 
States over important international and regional issues will also be affected.” Experts noted 
that this Chinese reaction was the most forceful seen in recent years.  
Across the Strait, the reaction in Taiwan was positive, though muted. Taiwan’s 
president welcomed the sale by noting that it would make Taiwan “more confident and 
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secure.”423 But the deal did not include additional F-16 jets, or plans for a diesel submarine; 
the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait remains fundamentally unchanged. Taiwan’s 
military, at 130,000 active troops, is dwarfed by China’s force of 800,000.424 Without new 
submarines, Taiwan remains woefully unmatched. Two of its submarines (half of the fleet) 
are old World War II-era US submarines that the Defense Minister said “belong in a 
museum.” The submarines can no longer fire torpedoes. Taiwan’s other two submarines 
were built by the Netherlands in the 1980s. By contrast, China has 59 attack submarines, 
including five nuclear-powered ones.425 The disparity in quality and quantity of military 
forces caused the Pentagon to warn, in May 2017, that Taiwan’s historical defensive 
advantages have been eroded or negated, and that it was losing the ability to deter a 
potential attack.426 
Given the disparity in military power, China’s outrage at the 2010 US sale seems 
misplaced. Seen in historical perspective, China’s reaction makes more sense. The United 
States policy of strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait is premised on uncertainty. The 
US uses a combination of different types of signals, including weapons transfers, to stoke 
uncertainty about whether or not, and how, the US might intervene should China attack 
Taiwan, or if Taiwan declares independence.427 Arms transfers were a key tool in the 
                                                 
423 “China hits back at US over Taiwan weapons sale,” BBC News, 30 January 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8488765.stm. 
424
 Helene Cooper, “US approval of Taiwan arms sales angers China,” The New York Times, 29 January 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30arms.html. 
425
 Steven Lee Myers and Chris Horton, “Once formidable, Taiwan’s military now overshadowed by 
China,” The New York Times, 4 November 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/world/asia/china-
taiwan-military.html. 
426 Ibid. 
427
 Nathan 2000, 102; Zhongqi 2003, 396. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   185 
development of this policy – first formulated in the 1972 Shanghai Communique – and 
remain an essential piece in the production and restructuring of great power political and 
military relationships in East Asia.428  
This chapter traces the development of relations between the United States, China, and 
Taiwan from the late 1960s through the completion of normalization in 1979. It shows how 
the US was able to maintain its relationship with Taiwan while pursuing closer relations 
with China.  Even as the US was upgrading its relationship with China – which involved 
switching diplomatic recognition to the mainland and abrogating the 1954 US-Taiwan 
defense treaty – the US used arms transfers to signal continuity in its relationship with 
Taiwan. The hostilities between China and Taiwan, and their mutually exclusive views 
about leadership and rule over China/Taiwan, meant that the US should have had to pick 
sides, supporting either Taiwan or China. And yet, the signals sent by arms transfers were 
a key factor in holding on to a set of relationships that would otherwise have been 
impossible. Arms transfers enabled the US to walk the delicate balancing act of deterring 
China from attacking Taiwan, while reassuring Taiwan (though not too much) of continued 
US support.  
This chapter shows that arms transfer signals are both strong and flexible compared to 
other common and clear signals, including diplomatic visits, military exchanges, and public 
statements, uniquely positioning them as key foreign policy tools. To explain how arms 
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transfers facilitated strategic ambiguity, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide 
background information on the US relationship with Taiwan and mainland China. I then 
discuss the creation and maintenance of the policy of strategic ambiguity through three key 
periods: 1) the reduction in US arms aid to Taiwan in the late 1960s and early 1970s; 2) 
the formulation and consequences of the 1972 Shanghai Communique; and 3) policy made 
in response to the 1974 National Security Study Memorandum 212, which outlined US 
arms transfer policies to Taiwan. I conclude with brief reference to the 1979 Taiwan 
Relations Act and the 1982 Joint Communique between the US and China, the two 
contradictory documents that complete the “sacred texts” of the US-Taiwan-China 
strategic triangle, and which carried the policy of strategic ambiguity into the present 
period.  
 
BACKGROUND: (MOSTLY) ALLIED AGAINST COMMUNISM 
 
Mirroring its relationship with Pakistan, the United States and Taiwan signed a Mutual 
Defense Treaty in 1954. Article V of this treaty stated that an attack in the West Pacific, 
against either US or Taiwanese territories, was considered dangerous and required each 
party to “act to meet the common defense in accordance with its constitutional 
processes.”429 The defense relationship established in this treaty was strengthened by the 
1955 Formosa Resolution, which made it the responsibility of the United States to 
determine if an attack on the islands of Quemoy or Matsu were related to the defense of 
Taiwan, and to act accordingly.430  
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The US aligned with Taiwan in part because of Cold War logics: Taiwan was an 
attractive political partner in the fight against Communism, and provided a strategic 
location near both the Soviet Union and China. Taiwanese leaders were aware of the US 
preoccupation with fighting Communism, and continually portrayed Taiwan as the last 
bastion of the free world in East Asia. This narrative continued even as the US was turning 
toward mainland China. Taiwanese Premier Chiang Ching-kuo wrote to Gerald Ford that 
the US-Taiwan relationship needed to continue because it “also serves to sustain a vital 
bulwark of the free world against any force of aggression which seeks to disturb the peace 
and stability of the Western Pacific.”431 By painting Taiwan as essential to the Cold War 
logic of dominoes, Chiang was again mirroring moves made by Pakistan. This view of 
Taiwan as a linchpin in the fight against Communism continued through the 1970s.432  
Taiwan’s expectations were largely met. As befitted an anti-Communist ally, Taiwan 
received prestigious and capable arms, including Hawk surface-to-air missiles, F-5A 
Freedom Fighter jets, advanced radar systems, and Benson-class destroyers. Until 1968, 
the majority of these arms were transferred through grant aid. Thereafter, the US 
instituted a military sales program for Taiwan.433 This allowed for the continued transfer 
of arms, as well as joint production. For example, the US allowed Taiwan to construct 
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100 F-5E Tiger jets on the island.434 More than with its other allies, the US seemed 
interested in creating a self-sufficient Taiwan.435 In addition to providing Taiwan 
weapons through grant aid, the US also provided significant economic aid, averaging 
$121.5 million annually between 1951 and 1965.436 The alliance and economic ties, 
combined with similar anti-communist strategic narratives, led Taiwan to expect boom 
and backbone weapons from the United States. Compared to Pakistan, Taiwan should 
have expected more sophisticated and larger numbers of weapons because of its 
proximity to China and US agreement that China posed a threat.  
The US-Taiwan relationship began to change in the 1970s when Richard Nixon pushed 
to establish relations with China. The US decreased its defense and economic aid to Taiwan 
at this time. Military assistance aid was cut to below $15 million in 1970, a sharp decrease 
from its high of $90. 6 million in 1967.437 US leaders began engaging with China, and 
seemed to start overlooking Taiwan. In July 1971, Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to 
China, followed quickly by a public visit in October of that year. Although President Nixon 
sent California Governor Ronald Reagan to Taiwan in October 1971, this was widely 
acknowledged as a “symbolic gesture,” meant to assuage hurt feelings in Taiwan.438  
Taiwan’s international position was also deteriorating. In October 1971, Taiwan was 
expelled from the United Nations, and was replaced by a representative from mainland 
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China. Taiwan’s treatment at the UN mirrored changes to its international diplomatic 
position. In 1970, 71 countries recognized Taiwan, and 48 mainland China, as the seat of 
government. By the end of 1973, only 39 countries recognized Taiwan, whereas China was 
recognized as the diplomatic seat by 85 countries.439 Setbacks continued for Taiwan: in 
February 1972 the US and China issued the Shanghai Communique, which pledged the US 
to withdraw its military forces and installations from Taiwan and indicated a long-term 
decrease and end to weapons sales; US military personnel stationed on Taiwan were 
reduced by half between 1972 and 1974; in October 1974 the US repealed the Formosa 
Resolution; and in December 1978 the US switched its diplomatic recognition to mainland 
China.440  
Sprinkled in among this downgrade in US-Taiwan relations were nuggets of hope. In 
December 1972, Taiwan signed a deal to co-produce the F-5E fighter jet, a capable boom 
weapon.441 In 1973 and 1974, Taiwan opened new consulates in Atlanta and Kansas City, 
and reactivated a Consulate in Portland, seeming to indicate continuity in US-Taiwan 
relations.442 In May 1975, the US decided to continue to allow Taiwan to access new US 
weapons;443 and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act committed the US to continue providing 
Taiwan “with such weapons as may be necessary for its security.”444 Thus the 1970s were 
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a period of contradictions and uncertainty in the relationships between the US, China, and 
Taiwan. The deliberate introduction of uncertainty into these relations complicates the 
expectations derived from my theory. The downgrade signals sent by the US should lead 
Taiwan to seek an alternate partner. Failing that, Taiwan should pursue preventive action 
against China. At the same time, weapons transfers during the 1970s, F-5 co-production, 
and the opening of embassies indicated continuity of US-Taiwan relations. The 
contradictory signals (downgrade vs. reinforcement) stopped Taiwan from pursuing 
prevention against China. Instead, the US was able to hold Taiwan in a state of suspended 
animation, keeping it from declaring independence or pursuing other action against China, 
even as Taiwan unhappily watched the creation of new US-China ties.  
I show how the US used arms transfers to send contradictory signals at three key 
moments: the reduction in US arms aid to Taiwan in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the 
1972 Shanghai Communique; and policies that grew from the 1974 National Security 
Study Memorandum (NSSM) 212, which established guidelines for future US arms 
transfers to Taiwan. These were foundational moments in the creation of strategic 
ambiguity.  
Though this case is similar to the previous chapters, it differs in three key ways. First, 
there exists a real and significant arms imbalance between China and Taiwan. Though 
Taiwan had the support of the US, it was outnumbered by Chinese forces. Additionally, 
many of the more advanced weapons that Taiwan counted on were operated by and/or 
loaned to Taiwan, including F-4 Phantom jet squadrons. Unlike the other cases, Taiwan 
didn’t have full control over its weapons. Second, the signals sent by all actors were 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   191 
deliberately ambiguous. The US though ambiguity was required to restrain Taiwan and to 
not embolden China. Many within the US government also believed that commitments to 
Taiwan were interdependent with other commitments. As the State Department remarked, 
“we don’t intend to normalize in such a manner that we downgrade the integrity of our 
commitments in the eyes of such important allies as Japan or the Western European 
countries.”445 Kissinger also believed that China saw US commitments as linked, writing, 
“The Chinese are well aware that our setbacks in Indochina have increased the 
Administration’s domestic and international political vulnerabilities, creating a context 
where any major change in our relationship with Taiwan which implied abandonment of 
yet another ally would be unacceptable at this time.”446 Creating an ambiguous set of 
relationships would help the US guard against charges that it had abandoned an ally. This 
had two consequences: the sensitivity to (un)related commitments gave Taiwan and China 
more leverage in negotiating with the US, since the US was loath to be seen as abandoning 
its allies. The second consequence is that the US was more sensitive to the substitutability 
of signals, both military and non-military, including diplomatic visits, co-production 
arrangements, and embassy status. Finally, the third major difference in this case is that 
arms transfers were both leading and lagging indicators of political relationships. 
Sometimes policy was formulated, announced, and then supported or contradicted by arms 
transfers. Other times, arms transfers foreshadowed policy changes. This inconsistency 
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contributed to ambiguity in US policy: just looking at policy pronouncements would give 
one impression, whereas examining arms transfers would give a different impression. 
This is therefore the most complex, but, I suspect, the most interesting case in which to 
examine arms transfer signals, the substitutability of signals, and the interdependence of 
commitments.  
 
ARMS REDUCTIONS AND WORRY FOR THE FUTURE 
 
Even before the US took steps to establish diplomatic relations with China, Taiwan had 
cause to worry about its future relationship with the United States. In the early 1970s, 
decreasing outlays for military aid constrained US ability to provide arms that Taiwan 
sought. Ambassador Walter McConaughy – who had experienced a similar situation during 
his tenure as Ambassador to Pakistan – knew that Taiwan would interpret a slowdown in 
arms as a downgrade signal. In a 1967 telegram, he warned that Taiwan, “would view such 
a drastic and unforeseen reduction in [Military Assistance Program arms] as evidence of a 
distinct shift in [US Government] policy in the direction of dilution of US concern with 
China issues and an attempt at partial disengagement.”447 When additional funding was not 
allocated, he re-emphasized that “Many in [Taiwan] tended to interpret US decisions on 
strictly military matters in terms of larger policy considerations, particularly the US posture 
toward the Chinese Communist regime.”448 And indeed, Taiwanese Defense Minister 
Chiang Ching-kuo asked McConaughy, in 1968, if upcoming cuts in US transfers to 
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Taiwan represented any change in US policy.449 When more arms aid was not forthcoming, 
Chiang told McConaughy “confidence in US consistency and dependability had been 
seriously diluted in all sectors of his government.” He felt that the reduced arms aid could 
not “be reconciled with the requirements of alliance and friendship.”450 
As expected by my theory, the mere fact of arms reduction was enough to cause concern 
in the upper levels of Taiwan’s government, many of whom worried it signaled a shift in 
US policy. Echoing concerns expressed by Chiang, Foreign Minister James Shen said in 
1970 that a reduction in arms aid “would have serious and adverse political and 
psychological effects, would be interpreted as the ‘beginning of the end’ of military 
assistance for [Taiwan] and as part of an overall US withdrawal from Asia.” He added: 
“There is reason to suspect that the reduction involves a significant policy change by the 
US.”451 Though Taiwanese leaders were perhaps more sensitive to reductions in arms 
transfers than the other cases, they did, as expected by my theory, understand reduced arms 
transfers as a downgrade to US-Taiwan ties.  
In recognition of Taiwan’s concerns, the US tried to paint the reductions to Taiwan as 
part of an overall change in US military aid programs, and not specific to the health of US-
Taiwan relations. This was, in fact, part of the cause for reduced transfers to Taiwan. 
Worldwide, US arms aid in 1970 was $400 million, which was 16 times less than the 
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amount of aid given in 1952. At the same time, the number of aid recipients was reduced 
from 69 to 25.452 In a speech to Taiwan’s military commanders, US General Richard 
Ciccolella noted that “[Taiwan’s] importance and recognition by the United States is 
underscored by the fact that it is one of only five nations which together account for three 
quarters of the total United States investment in Foreign Military Assistance this year.”453 
Though the US tried to point to the silver lining, Taiwan saw only storm clouds ahead, 
fearing that the US was embarking on a new strategy in East Asia.   
Taiwan’s fears of abandonment were further fueled by US denials of its requests for F-
4 Phantom aircraft, M-48 Patton tanks, and a submarine. President Chiang Kai-shek wrote 
to Nixon asking for F-4s in 1969, noting that Vietnam, South Korea, and Israel had already 
received the plane.454 By explicitly referencing other US allies who had the F-4, President 
Chiang made clear his interest in learning where Taiwan stood in the US alliance hierarchy. 
McConaughy noted that the F-4 request was “a test case on US willingness to extend 
necessary defense assistance to an ally.”455 Dean Rusk agreed that Taiwan’s desire for the 
F-4 “may be motivated more by reasons of prestige and desire to obtain some reaffirmation 
of US defense commitment, than by anticipated military needs.”456 Nonetheless, the 
request was denied: the US was wary of committing too strongly to Taiwan. After denying 
                                                 
452
 Speech by General Ciccolella to Taiwan military commanders, 16 September 1969, p. 2, Entry 
A1(5412), Container 6, Folder DEF 19 1969, USNA. 
453
 Ibid. 
454
 Letter Chiang Kai-shek to Nixon, 19 November 1969, Entry A1(5412), Container 8, Folder DEF 19-8 
F4 proposal 1969, USNA. 
455 Telegram Taipei (McConaughy) to State, 18 December 1969, p. 1, RG 59, Box 1688, Folder DEF 19-8 
US-Chinat 1/1/68, USNA.  
456
 Telegram State (Rusk) to Taipei, 1 November 1968, p. 1, RG 59, Box 1688, Folder DEF 19-8 US-
Chinat 1/1/68, USNA. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   195 
the aircraft transfer, the State Department noted that Taiwan “was deeply disappointed by 
the unwillingness of the US administration to throw its support behind the [request].”457  
Feeling spurned by the F-4 denial, Taiwan requested M-48 Patton tanks. These too 
were boom weapons and would have been a marker of continued closeness with the US. 
Taiwan tried to make the transfer even easier for the US by requesting tanks that were 
excess from the war in Vietnam. These tanks would have been logistically easy and 
inexpensive for the US to transfer to Taiwan. Taiwan’s request was for signaling, rather 
than military reasons. The Patton tanks were too heavy to traverse bridges on Taiwan, and 
would have been “very constrained by the terrain.”458 This request was also turned down, 
and the entire stock of excess Patton tanks was transferred to Greece and Turkey, instead.459 
As a consolation prize, the US stationed its own F-4 Phantoms on Taiwan. Though 
stationing F-4s on Taiwan gave it important air capabilities, it did nothing to help Taiwan 
figure out its relationship with the United States. Taiwan’s strategy to determine future US-
Taiwan relations was to request a submarine, a boom weapon with a very significant 
prestige factor.  
Submarines are particularly useful in the Taiwan Strait. As important boom weapons, 
the US was wary of what signal the transfer would send, particularly as the new Nixon 
administration was preparing overtures to China. Evidence that the submarine was an 
important symbol of the US-Taiwan relationship can be seen in the various versions of a 
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submarine that were at one point under consideration. The US was torn between reassuring 
an ally of US support, and not wanting to oversell US-Taiwan ties. The Department of 
Defense wanted to sell Taiwan a former research submarine to use as a target vessel for 
anti-submarine warfare. It specified that the submarine “would be configured so as to have 
almost no combat capability.”460 This was elaborated on in a 1971 memo: “In discussing 
the question of the submarine for [Taiwan], we have been talking in terms of a boat which 
has been ‘defanged;’ i.e., had its torpedo tubes sealed or removed so that it could not be 
used for any offensive purposes.”461 That is, the Department of Defense was willing to give 
Taiwan a submarine that had little to no military use. This recommendation was calibrated 
to provide the prestige of a submarine transfer – thus reassuring Taiwan – without the 
giving the military capabilities that might have emboldened it.  
The State Department, however, opposed the sale of even a “defanged” submarine. 
Secretary of State William Rogers wrote, in August 1971, “We have again reviewed the 
matter of submarines for [Taiwan] and have concluded that the provision of even the 
research vessel described to us would give a very misleading signal to Peking in the delicate 
period prior to the President’s visit.”462 In a longer memorandum, Rogers elaborated that 
his main concern was political: the “provision of submarines probably would be interpreted 
by Peking as a hostile gesture and could jeopardize our efforts to improve relations” 463 
Taiwan was so determined to get a submarine from the United States that in September 
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1971 it leaked information that it was to receive a submarine from West Germany to try to 
convince the US to sell or loan a submarine instead.464 The US ultimately denied the request 
for the submarine. All signals seemed to indicate an impending change in US-Taiwan 
relations. 
Simultaneous to the reduction in overall aid, and the denial of the submarine and F-4 
transfers, the US stopped the patrols of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan 
was expelled from the United Nations. The Seventh Fleet had been stationed in the Taiwan 
Strait since 1950, and the reversal of this long-term trend was as concerning to Taiwanese 
leaders as the denials of arms transfers.465 Taiwan was expelled from the UN in October 
1971, even though just two years prior the US announced that it “opposes the admission of 
the Peking regime into the UN at the expense of the Republic of China.”466 The dramatic 
turn in Taiwan’s international diplomatic status in a short, two-year period, surely 
contributed to Taiwan’s interpretation of the arms aid reduction and arms transfer denials. 
Instead of isolated or one-time incidents, the arms issues seemed to portent a coming doom 
in Taiwan’s relations with the US.  
US denials of the F-4, M-48, and submarine are clear downgrade signals. Taiwan was 
still allied with the US and had proven a loyal Cold Warrior. My theory thus expects 
Taiwan to pursue realignment, and, failing that, to pursue prevention against China. 
However, Taiwan was so dependent on the United States that its policy responses to these 
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disappointments was muted compared to other cases. Unlike Pakistan, Taiwan didn’t have 
an alternate partner. Unlike Israel, Taiwan did not have the balance of capabilities to make 
prevention possible. However, Ambassador McConaughy noted that Taiwanese 
displeasure was reflected in a cooler and less forthcoming attitude.467 He also observed 
more editorial criticism of US policy, and occasional criticism by political leaders.468 The 
editorial criticism is particularly notable because the government generally exercised 
control over newspapers, and because Taiwan had been a steadfast supporter of the US, 
even as other allies began to criticize it.469 The loyalty of Taiwan is seen most clearly in 
the case of Vietnam. Where other allies were criticizing US involvement, a July 1968 
editorial in the China Post praised US involvement in Vietnam by declaring: “Almighty 
God should be given credit for having brought into being a nation with such a high sense 
of justice and prosperity.”470 Feeling stuck and confused about its relationship with the US, 
Taiwan’s policy response was to double-down on loyalty. McConaughy assessed that 
overall Taiwan was exercising restraint in its criticism because its leaders were aware that 
“friendship and cooperation with the US are essential to its existence and that vital 
American trade and investment could be jeopardized by deteriorating relations between the 
two nations.”471 He did warn, however, that without the transfer of modern equipment to 
replace Taiwan’s aging arsenal, Taiwan might launch a counter attack, ally itself with 
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Peking, or turn toward other nations (possibly even the Soviet Union) for support.472 It is 
interesting to note that Soviet journalist Victor Louis visited Taiwan in October 1968, 
accompanied by rumors that he met with Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo.473 In the 
face of this muted, though still surprising, change in Taiwan’s tenor toward the US, 
McConaughy recommended that the US transfer modern military equipment – including 
the F-4 and perhaps submarines – which would “constitute visible evidence of our live and 
practical interest in the security of [Taiwan] at a time of some concern here on that 
score.”474 
There is a second reason for Taiwan’s muted response to the downgrade signals. In 
August 1971, Taiwan received a reinforcement signal in the form of F-5E jet production. 
Northrop, the manufacturer of the F-5, approached the State Department about producing 
the jets in Taiwan. The State Department was hesitant to endorse this, and sought advice 
from McConaughy on how to discourage Northrop’s proposal before it gained momentum. 
Secretary Rogers wrote, “For obvious reasons this does not appear a propitious time for us 
to give appearance of helping [Taiwan] add a new dimension to [Taiwan’s] capacity for 
arms production.”475 Though no decisions were made by the end of 1971, the proposal was 
an indication that not all was lost for future US-Taiwan relations. The Northrop co-
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production proposal would become a key part of ambiguous US signals following the 
release of the Shanghai Communique in February 1972.  
 
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND SIGNALS OF CHANGE 
 
In February 1972 President Nixon visited China, after which the US and China released 
the Shanghai Communique. This document was more of a statement of each side’s policy 
positions, rather than an agreement.476 The Shanghai Communique was ambiguous about 
Taiwan’s legal status, and was “full of equivocal, opaque language.”477 The Communique 
seemed to reverse US policy by announcing that Taiwan was part of China, and by stating 
that the US would remove its forces and military installations from Taiwan. It is worth 
quoting at length from the paragraph that drew (and continues to draw) the most scrutiny:  
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait 
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States 
Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect 
in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and 
military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce 
its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension diminishes.478 
 
While the US and China agreed that the US should remove its forces and military 
installations from Taiwan, this document also created ambiguity about the future 
relationship between the US and Taiwan. The paragraph above states US interest in a 
“peaceful settlement.” But it also says that any issues between China and Taiwan are an 
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internal affair, perhaps indicating the US has no place in helping to resolve them.479 
Importantly, there was no mention in this paragraph, or elsewhere in the Shanghai 
Communique, of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. As Nancy Tucker summarized, 
after the Shanghai Communique, “the United States remained tied to the formalities of a 
decaying alliance with the Republic of China that seemed as awkward to Washington as it 
was indispensable to Taipei.”480 In the words of Chiao Chiao Hsieh, “The impact of the 
Nixon Doctrine was tremendous. It created uncertainties in the international environment 
probably unprecedented in post-war Far Eastern politics.”481 This uncertainty was because 
the US was committed to a peaceful solution, but made no mention of its ties to Taiwan. 
Casting issues in the Strait as “internal” might have been stage-setting for US 
disengagement from Taiwan. 
The uncertainty created by the Shanghai Communique makes theorizing its effects 
more complex. The Communique was a downgrade signal, sort of. It could also be read as 
a weak reinforcement signal. Given this ambiguity, I expect Taiwan to cautiously seek 
realignment. I expect this to take the form of explorations to find a more committed partner. 
At the same Time, Taiwan should be wary of undertaking any actions that would push the 
US to break ties with Taiwan.  
The period following the Shanghai Communique was one of confused foreign policy 
in both Taiwan and United States. The US approved Northrop’s proposal to produce fighter 
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jets in Taiwan, and sent other signals that indicated it was committed to remaining an ally 
of Taiwan. In December 1972, Secretary of State Rogers explained his reversal on the F-5 
production proposal. He wrote, “An important consideration in providing a weapon system 
to [Taiwan] is its effect on our evolving relationship with the People’s Republic of China. 
While steps to improve relations with the PRC continue, it is also our policy to assist 
[Taiwan] in maintaining its defensive capability…The F-5E is primarily a defensive 
weapon system and in Taiwan will be used to replace obsolescent aircraft.”482 This was a 
risky stance, but also an important signal, because “every country that initially bought the 
F-5E fighter went on to acquire more advanced fighter aircraft, and the Taiwanese wanted 
to be part of this trend.”483 The co-production agreement can be seen, then, as a signal 
indicating a long-term and positive relationship between the US and Taiwan. Not only 
would there be a long-term relationship for practical reasons – Northrop would have to 
establish the production infrastructure, which would take a number of years – but it seemed 
likely that Taiwan was now “in line” for more advanced fighter jets, boom weapons that 
were clear signals of a solid political relationship. Poetically, the first F-5E produced in 
Taiwan came off the assembly line on 30 October 1974, the late Chiang Kai-shek’s 
birthday.484 
Feeling that co-production was a positive signal for long-term US-Taiwan relations, 
Taiwan took efforts to prove itself a loyal and special ally. Unlike other US allies, Taiwan 
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stepped up its contributions to the war effort in Vietnam. Taiwan provided some of its F-
5A aircraft to South Vietnam, and in return the US stationed two F-4 squadrons in Taiwan. 
One diplomat described that Taiwan was “going way out of their way in their eagerness to 
provide services, accommodations, and favorable publicity to US personnel involved” in 
the F-4 operations. After demonstrating its loyalty in Vietnam and displaying positive 
treatment of US personnel, Taiwan requested its own F-4 squadron.485  
Though US air forces were stationed on Taiwan, and the F-5 co-production agreement 
was given the green light, Taiwan was still uncertain about its relationship with the US. An 
editorial in the China Times in February 1973 summarized this:  
There remain tremendous contradictions between America’s intention to 
normalize relations with the Asian communists and her constant pledge to honor 
treaty commitments and promises to her Asian allies… If President Nixon’s pledge 
that ‘new friends would not be made at the expense of old allies’ and if the pledges 
of continued US intention to honor her commitments to and friendship with the 
Republic of China and other allies are credible, then the United States should by 
no means hastily proceed with the normalization of her relations with the Maoists. 
The US steps in this direction should not be too quick or too big.486 
 
The F-4 transfer would have been a clear signal of US support. While the US did not 
give Taiwan the F-4s it desired, it did take other actions that were supposed to substitute 
for a clear arms transfer signal, which ultimately contributed to uncertainty about future 
US-Taiwan relations. First, US trade with Taiwan continued to rise, from $1.6 billion in 
1971 to $4.8 billion in 1976.487 Between 1973 and 1974, Taiwan opened consulates in 
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Atlanta, Kansas City, and Portland.488 And in 1974, the US appointed Leonard Unger 
Ambassador to Taipei. Many had expected the post go unfilled as the US began pursuing 
relations with China, but Unger’s appointment signaled continuity in US-Taiwan relations. 
Chiang Ching-kuo, now Premier, said in October 1974, “We shall do our utmost to 
maintain bilateral relations with friendly countries and especially to strengthen our alliance 
with the US.”489 While in the economic register the US-Taiwan relationship seemed to be 
strong, signals in the diplomatic realm remained uncertain. In October 1974, the United 
States repealed the Formosa Resolution, making it unclear how it would respond to military 
action near, but not on, Taiwan. 
As a result of these ambiguous signals, Taiwan designed a hedging foreign policy. 
While trying to strengthen its existing ties with the US, Taiwan also pursued economic 
relationships with communist countries, and floated rumors about developing a 
relationship with the Soviet Union. The creation of new economic ties to communist 
countries, and the strengthening of ties to Europe were the manifestation of Taiwan’s 
strategy to support its international status through economic power. As Economic Affairs 
Minister Sun Yun-suan said, Taiwan’s international position is “gradually being replaced 
by economic power, trade and technology.”490 In March 1972, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-
kai announced that Taiwan was willing to develop economic and other relations with 
communist countries, as long as they were not “puppets of Communist China.”491 One year 
                                                 
488
 Bellows 1976, 9. 
489
 Bellows 1976, 9. 
490
 Quoted in Hsieh 1985, 249. 
491
 Quoted in Hsieh 1985, 240. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   205 
later, a close advisor to Chiang Ching-kuo said, “Why shouldn’t we trade with countries 
like Bulgaria and Hungary? Trade will be our weapon to make friends.”492 In November 
1975, Taiwan established the Euro-Asia Trade Organization to facilitate trade with Europe. 
This resulted in many European countries establishing trade offices in Taiwan, including 
Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, and the UK.493 Economic ties were one way for Taiwan 
to maintain its international position without breaking with or turning against the US.  
The second prong of Taiwan’s hedging strategy was to drop hints that it was pursuing 
relations with the Soviet Union. As described by John Copper, “Taipei wants the Soviet 
Union as a friend and ally in reserve, and it seeks to convey the message to Peking that if 
the United States evacuates its forces, Taipei has alternatives.”494 It seems highly 
implausible that Taiwan could or would align with the Soviet Union. But seen as a matter 
of rhetorical coercion, this part of Taiwan’s strategy makes more sense.495 Taiwan’s 
willingness to even consider pursuing relations with the Soviet Union and eastern bloc was 
a stark reversal of previous red lines. In 1957, Chiang Kai-shek published a 300,000-word 
tome titled Soviet Russia in China, outlining the long struggle against the Soviet Union, 
and describing a strategy of anti-Communist warfare.496 This view was foundational in 
Taiwan’s development and conceptualization of its role in the international system. A 
reversal of this stance, even solely in terms of developing trading relations with Communist 
states, is therefore a significant policy change in Taiwan. The rhetoric of Soviet alignment 
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gained support when, in May 1973, two Soviet warships passed through the Taiwan Strait 
and circumnavigated the island. This naval maneuver, which was the first time since 1949 
that Soviet warships made this trip, came just one month after rumors that the Soviet Union 
and Taiwan were pursuing a military relationship.497 Notably, it occurred two days before 
US diplomat David Bruce was to arrive in Peking to set up the new US Liaison Office.498 
A February article in the South China Morning Post reported that Taiwan would allow the 
Soviet Union to lease a naval base in the Pescadores if the US recognized China.499 
Taiwan’s dalliances with the Soviet Union never amounted to more than talk. As one 
contemporary scholar observed, “Taiwan obviously hopes to use such a belief to deter the 
US from extending full recognition to the PRC, or at least to ensure that normalization is 
carried out on terms which the ROC can live with. Taipei hopes that the belief in 
Washington in Taiwan’s ‘Russia option’ will keep the US from abandoning Taiwan to 
attack or pressure from the mainland.”500 A close relationship with the Soviet Union risked 
provoking tensions in the Taiwan Strait, between the Soviet Union, and China and the US. 
It also risked pushing China toward a more militant stance toward Taiwan.501 Similarly, 
heightened tensions could scare off investors, undermining Taiwan’s new economic ties. 
The US was unwilling to believe Taiwan’s pursuit of relations with the Soviet Union was 
sincere. Henry Kissinger drew parallels between this attempted “re-alignment” and 
Pakistan’s overtures to China in the 1960s, writing that “[the US] made some symbolic 
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military moves in support of Pakistan while China did nothing.” He also reminded Taiwan 
that the US “had been taking concrete actions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.”502 Taiwan’s past 
anti-communist rhetoric, as well as its alliance and relationship with the US, meant that the 
Soviet Union was not a feasible partner. Nor could Taiwan find a replacement for – or 
hedge against – the US in Europe, since states the world over were pulling their recognition 
of Taiwan in favor of establishing relations with the mainland.  
Given Taiwan’s inability to find an alternate partner, my theory expects Taiwan to 
pursue prevention. Despite the military imbalance, this was seen as possible. Notes made 
in the margins of one State Department telegram list “launch a counter-attack” as an action 
Taiwan might take if it felt abandoned by the US.503 Taiwan did not, however, pursue 
military action against China, which I attribute to successful calibration of signals that kept 
Taiwan in foreign policy suspension. Yes, the F-4 denial and the Shanghai Communique 
were worrisome signals. But the F-5 co-production agreement, the stationing of F-4s on 
Taiwan, and continued trade all signaled US interest in maintaining relations with Taiwan. 
The lack of a clear and obvious signal to the contrary made pursuing military action just 
too risky. Taiwan did not want to be the party to sound the death knell for US-Taiwan 
relations.  
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The United States doubled down on its ambiguous signals through the responses to 
National Security Study Memorandum 212. Issued in 1974, this memorandum brought 
different US policymaking bodies together to develop a plan for future arms transfers to 
Taiwan. The resulting policy only served to introduce further ambiguities. Contrary to the 
statements made in the Shanghai Communique, the US actually increased arms transfers 
to Taiwan after 1975. 
AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS IN NSSM 212 
 
In National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 212, President Gerald Ford directed the 
Executive agencies to develop a policy for future US arms sales to Taiwan. The resulting 
policy was signal-sensitive, and recognized the political, rather than military, significance 
of arms transfers. US policy had to thread the needle between reassuring Taiwan and not 
angering China, and because of ambiguous previous policy in the Shanghai Communique, 
had no precedent on which to draw. Two primary concerns affected the resulting US policy: 
(1) heightened attention to the signals sent by arms transfers, and (2) the interdependence 
of commitments and the anticipated effects a change in US policy would have for its other 
allies.  
The guiding assumption of NSSM 212 was the political significance of arms transfers. 
It said, “Over the next three to five years, the political and psychological importance of the 
US supply of weapons to the ROC will be greater than the objective military importance 
of the weapons themselves.”504 The document has an entire section titled “A Political 
Approach to Arms Supply,” which clearly outlined the US signaling dilemma:  
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“Current circumstances necessitate an even more political approach to decisions 
on supply of arms to Taiwan. The nature and level of our arms supply will 
obviously affect normalization of our relations with the PRC [People’s Republic 
of China], but it will also have a major impact on [Taiwan]’s tolerance of a 
changing political and security environment. To date the pattern of our arms 
supply, while posing no major problems with Peking, has contributed significantly 
to the flexibility with which [Taiwan] has adjusted to rather drastic changes in its 
status. As our relations with the PRC evolve, however, [Taiwan] may as for more 
weapons to help compensate for the weakening of its political and security 
situation…. 
“Peking keeps careful track of [Taiwan] military capabilities, but it does not appear 
to conduct this assessment in isolation from other political factors…our military 
involvement with [Taiwan] will be monitored by a PRC suspicious about our 
ultimate intentions on Taiwan. Insensitivity in our handling of this issue could 
undermine the position of those within the PRC who advocate normalization or 
lead them to a change in attitude.”505 
 
As a result of this dilemma, NSSM 212 determined that the US needed to avoid actions 
which China would interpret as “inconsistent with normalization” or which Taiwan would 
interpret as “a weakening of our commitment in the Shanghai Communique to normalize 
relations” with China. At the same time, the new US policy needed to “Maintain confidence 
on the part of [Taiwan’s] leaders and public that Taiwan is sufficiently secure to minimize 
the dangers of domestic instability or desperate acts that would hinder US-PRC 
normalization, including a possible ROC attempt to involve other parties in its fate,” while 
also signaling to China that the US still had “an important interest in the security of 
Taiwan.”506  
In addition to the delicate signaling to China and Taiwan, the US was also concerned 
with the reactions of relevant third parties. The State Department was well aware that “our 
other Asian allies, particularly Japan and the Philippines, have an interest in the US defense 
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commitment to [Taiwan] and, in the long term, in the nature of any settlement that might 
be reached between Taipei and Peking.”507 Kissinger stated this more bluntly: “The US 
does not need Taiwan. The problem we have is the impact internationally of a sudden total 
reversal of an American position on other friendly countries, and even perhaps on countries 
that are not friendly to the US.”508 With no clear way to satisfy the concerns of Taiwan, 
China, and other allies, the response to NSSM 212 presented four options for Ford’s 
consideration. The State Department, Defense Department, and CIA did not recommend 
the same policy, and the internal debates show the difficulties of calibrating arms transfers 
to send just the right signal. 
The most restrictive policy option was to completely cut Taiwan off from US weapons, 
either immediately or over a three- to five-year period. None of the departments endorsed 
this option, concluding that it would undermine the US commitment to Taiwan, and could 
push Taiwan toward drastic measures. Option 2 was to freeze Taiwan’s access to US arms 
at current (1976) levels. This would mean the US would only provide spare parts and 
replacement for items already in Taiwan’s inventory. Option 2 would have prohibited the 
supply of new weapons. Option 3 had two variants. Option 3a would give Taiwan access 
to new weapons at a “lower range,” while option 3b would use an “upper range.” The lower 
range would give Taiwan access to weapons “which would not be likely to provoke the 
PRC.” The US defined provocative weapons as “those which the PRC might believe would 
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give Taiwan a clear technological superiority or would alter the current relative military 
balance.” Weapons such as F-5E aircraft, air-to-air missiles, and patrol boats were 
considered provocative.509 However, Option 3a would allow a limited supply of Harpoon 
Missiles. The upper range would expand the menu of options for Taiwan to include the 
“provocative weapons” as well as laser-guided bombs, C-130H transport planes, and an 
unlimited supply of Harpoon Missiles. It is important to note here that the weapons 
included in each category were not consistent, nor was the rationale for placing weapons 
in each category. Sometimes the F-5 was included in the lower range, sometimes in the 
upper. This reflects internal disagreement over how China would interpret arms transfers 
– whether it would be concerned primarily with the balance of power or with political 
signaling.  
The State Department and the National Security Council preferred Option 3a, the lower 
range, whereas the Defense Department preferred Option 3b, the upper range. The CIA 
had “no formal view,” but preferred Options 2 or 3 (without specifying upper or lower 
range). None of the agencies had particularly strong preferences. This was partly due to the 
difficulties of calibrating the proper signal and of knowing which weapons fit into which 
category. As the State Department explained in its January 1975 comments:  
It is difficult to provide precise guidelines to govern arms supply, because of a 
two-fold problem of (1) resolving contradictory objectives toward Taiwan with the 
PRC and (2) the difficulty in predicting with precision how either Chinese party 
will react to our decisions on specific weapons systems. Some extreme cases are 
obvious, e.g., the provision of offensive aircraft or long-range missiles to [Taiwan] 
would provoke the PRC to the point of seriously endangering normalization, but 
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there are a number of cases where our judgment cannot be confident. An example 
of this discussed below is the Harpoon missiles.”510 
 
The State Department preferred the lower bound because it feared adding to Taiwan’s 
offensive capabilities, and “it is clear that arms supply to [Taiwan] cannot be an open-
ended process.”511 The upper range option could have signaled a longer-term commitment 
to Taiwan, which State was hesitant to endorse during the normalization process. In 
explaining its choice of Option 3a, State determined, “We regard the lower range as 
providing the best balance between accommodating PRC sensitivities and fulfilling 
[Taiwan’s] psychological needs and deterrent requirements.”512 It is important to note that 
this recommendation was partially based on Taiwan’s psychological need for a reassurance 
signal. That is, State explicitly weighed the political consequences of arms transfers 
alongside potential deterrent consequences. 
The National Security Council was more concrete in its recommendation, and noted 
that arms were part of a balancing process. The NSC supported Option 3a because it would 
“cushion further political blows to Taipei, maintain a credibly though gradually 
deteriorating [Taiwan] military deterrent, and help inhibit PRC military actions against 
Taiwan.” But the NSC recognized this policy option “could raise doubts in Peking about 
US intentions toward normalization (particularly at the upper range of this option), would 
risk misunderstandings with the PRC upon weapons deliveries two or three years hence, 
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and could, at the upper range, strain [Taiwan’s] economy.” 513 The NSC therefore opted 
out of making a decision, and instead recommended the transfer of specific weapons, 
including F-5E fighter jets, AIM-9J missiles (an upgrade from Taiwan’s existing AIM-9B 
missiles), anti-submarine warfare aircraft, and two minesweepers to replace some of 
Taiwan’s older inventory. So far, these recommendations are all in line with the more 
conservative Option 3a. But the NSC also recommending giving Taiwan 960 TOW 
missiles, commenting “These would be new weapons in [Taiwan’s] inventory, but are not 
generally regarded as highly sophisticated weapons.” 514 The missiles would bolster 
Taiwan’s deterrent posture (psychologically, if not materially), but would not be a strong 
signal because they are backbone, rather than boom, weapons. The NSC also cautioned 
“both [Taiwan] and the PRC will view our handling of this issue as an indicator of the 
relative importance the US attaches to each.”515 This last quote is evidence of the political 
importance of arms transfers, and also shows the inconsistencies within the US. The NSC 
had previously written about arms transfers and the importance of the military balance, but 
was now justifying its decision based on political signals. 
With characteristic bluntness, Kissinger quipped, “It is absurd to maintain a defense 
relationship with part of a country.”516 And yet, the US did, and continues to, maintain a 
defense relationship with Taiwan. US military sales to Taiwan actually increased from $45 
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million in 1973 to $800 million in 1974-75.517 Taiwan did not get all of the weapons it 
wanted, and the ambiguous US policy that followed NSSM 212 only added confusion and 
uncertainty. The debate over Harpoon Missiles, and Taiwan’s resulting policy changes, 
show how the US navigated tense and uncertain relations to accomplish its goal of 
normalizing relations with China while restraining – through reassurance – actions by 
Taiwan. 
 
Transfers in the wake of NSSM 212 
 
Though the responses to NSSM did not result in a clear or coherent US policy, there was a 
distinct upward trend in arms transfers to Taiwan. US sales increased from $139.4 million 
in 1977 to $209 million in 1980.518 Though most of this increase was in outright purchases, 
rather than military aid, the US did continue to extend lines of credit to Taiwan. Credit 
purchases increased from $45 million in 1973 to $80 million the following year.519 
However, the Carter administration denied the transfer of numerous weapons, including 
the TOW, Maverick missiles, infrared scanners, and sonar equipment – arms that would 
have given Taiwan a visible military capability. Carter did not want to give China any 
reason to delay the normalization process.520 Confusion about US arms policy came to a 
head in discussions about whether or not to transfer Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.  
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Harpoon missiles were in an ambiguous category in NSSM 212. Option 3a allowed for 
a limited number of Harpoons, while 3b allowed unlimited missile transfers. Taiwan 
renewed its request for Harpoon in November 1976. It justified the transfer as a necessary 
military response to growing Chinese naval power (evidenced by missile boats and naval 
ships) in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan was considering buying the Gabriel missile from Israel, 
or the Otomat from a French-Italian company. Though the missiles were roughly 
comparable, Taiwan preferred the Harpoon.521 The request for Harpoons in November 
1976 was problematic, because the Harpoon was not scheduled to enter service with the 
US Navy until the spring of 1978. Therefore, even if the US approved the transfer of 
Harpoons, they would not have been deliverable for at least two years. If China-US ties 
grew in the ensuing years, the transfer of Harpoons could have been a setback for 
normalization, even if the sale had been approved in 1976. 
Recognizing these concerns, one State Department official proposed a modified, less 
sophisticated, version of the Harpoon for sale to Taiwan. “The baseline export version 
proposed for [Taiwan] would lack sophisticated electronic counter-measures equipment, 
would possess only a surface-to-surface capability, and could not be used for delivery of 
nuclear weapons.” Part of the justification for even considering the missile was that it had 
been “approved for sale to Korea, Israel, and a number of Middle East and European 
countries.”522 A denial, the logic went, would send a clear downgrade signal to Taiwan, 
something the US wanted to avoid. 
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In internal documents, the State Department presented arguments both for and against 
the transfer of the Harpoon, noting that it was a borderline transfer under Option 3a. 
Though State did recognize a military argument for providing the missiles, it also 
recognized that “Taiwan would view our handling of this issue as an important indication 
of our intentions toward Taiwan. Failure to meet the request will be additionally 
complicated by our already expressed willingness to supply Harpoon to a number of other 
nations, including South Korea.”523 The State Department was wary of worrying other US 
allies, particularly in the wake of the removal of US troops from Vietnam. Transferring the 
Harpoon would signal US support for its allies—assuaging broader concerns about US 
alliance relationships—and would also prevent Taiwan from taking drastic action. 
No arguments, on the other hand, revolved around the growing US-China relationship. 
State explained that there was significant risk that China would “react strongly to the 
provision to [Taiwan] of such a highly visible and technologically advanced weapon.” The 
Harpoon missile transfer would likely cause Peking to “view the move as casting doubt on 
our willingness to proceed toward normalization on mutually acceptable terms.”524 State 
further expressed concerns that the transfer would be viewed “as a sign of US insensitivity 
toward normalization considerations,” that might indicate the US was “backtracking on 
China policy.”525 Of particular concern was the time gap between a possible approval of 
the sale and when the Harpoon would be delivered. Because of needs of the US Navy, the 
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State Department determined the Harpoon could not be delivered until the 1980-81 fiscal 
year. Since China had already expressed concern about US intentions, the delivery of 
Harpoon missiles in 1980 would have been a problematic signal.  
US fears of fallout from a possible Harpoon transfer increased after October 1976. A 
State Department briefing memo noted that China was hardening its stance on Taiwan 
because of evidence that the US was “moving toward a policy of indefinite US support for 
[Taiwan].” Importantly, China’s “evidence” included the sale of new weapons, US 
statements about guaranteeing Taiwan’s security, and support for Taiwan’s participation 
in the Olympics.526 In addition to the Harpoon issue, China was always concerned about 
the US potentially giving Taiwan advanced fighter jets, and regularly threatened to 
downgrade its relations with the US if Carter allowed the sale of FX planes to Taiwan.527  
The approach taken with both the Harpoon missiles and fighter jets was to delay giving 
Taiwan an answer. Procrastination supported the US policy of ambiguity: The US did not 
outright deny the transfer, thus leaving the door open to Taiwan eventually receiving the 
arms in the future.528  But the US also did not approve the transfers, and thus could honestly 
tell China it was not giving Taiwan the Harpoon or fighter jets. US procrastination on the 
fighter jet issue was so successful that it was not resolved until 1992, when George H.W. 
Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan.529 
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Though Taiwan did not receive the Harpoon or fighter jets, the US did support 
continued production of F-5s in Taiwan. As in the case of Pakistan, co-production was less 
of an issue to Taiwan’s rival, but was enough of a signal to inject some hope into Taiwanese 
leaders. In September 1978, Taiwan requested permission to produce the F-5G, a more 
advanced version of the F-5E it was already making. The Departments of State and Defense 
agreed that production of the F-5G (which would become the F-20 Tigershark) should be 
approved. The plane would be acceptable to Taiwan, and “least likely to produce a negative 
[Chinese] reaction.” Secretary of Defense Harold Brown hoped that Taiwan’s production 
of the plane would also demonstrate “that key defense links to Taiwan would continue after 
normalization even in the absence of a formal defense treaty.”530 On the one hand, Taiwan 
was increasing its capabilities to produce sophisticated weapons on its own, a step that 
would have decreased its dependence on the US and given it more freedom of action. On 
the other hand, Taiwanese leaders were disappointed that the US was not willing to send a 
clear signal of support through weapons transfers. The ambiguous signals meant that 
Taiwan remained stuck between two pathways of my theory. It received ambiguous 
downgrade signals, and only made feeble attempts at re-alignment. Though re-alignment 
failed, Taiwan did not (in contrast to Israel) progress to prevention. 
 
 
 
Taiwan’s policy response: Turning the other cheek 
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Taiwan’s outlook in the mid- to late-1970s was not rosy. It was potentially losing the 
support of its great power patron, but did not have any serious alternate partner. States the 
world over were de-recognizing Taiwan in favor of China. Whereas Pakistan was able to 
re-align with China, and Israel pursued prevention, Taiwan had to express its 
dissatisfaction with the US, without giving the US justification for removing all ties with 
Taiwan. Taiwan’s policy was to deemphasize its dependence on the US while at the same 
time reminding the US of the threat Taiwan faced from global communism. This resulted 
in a rather confused strategy of trying to credibly seek support from the Soviet Union while 
also increasing its statements about the danger of aligning with Communist countries.  
Chiang Ching-kuo, who became Premier in 1972, began to take steps to lessen 
Taiwan’s dependence on the United States. If the US and other European countries were 
pulling diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, perhaps Taiwan could find sources of 
international support in many of the newly-independent African countries. Taiwan thus 
extended its policy of developing economic ties to other countries by giving foreign aid to 
both developing and developed countries. Taiwan’s goal was to create interdependence, 
and to incentivize other states to maintain or establish official ties with Taiwan.531 This 
“dollar diplomacy,” combined with deliberate overtures to African states, was designed to 
give Taiwan some level of international recognition.532 This policy has served Taiwan well: 
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in 2000 its foreign trade was larger than 171 other countries, and its foreign exchange 
reserve was, in 1998, the third-highest in the world.533 
Taiwan continued to make overtures to the Soviet Union, as well. In addition to the 
previous actions taken – including the visit by Soviet warships – the possibility that Taiwan 
would seek support from the Soviet Union entered the public sphere. A July 1977 article 
in the China Times, titled, “Exceptional Changes and Exceptional Diplomacy,” argued that 
US-China relations were so significant that they would have an effect on all relations in 
the international system. Therefore, no one should be surprised if Taiwan turned to the 
Soviet Union.534 Historian Michael Share described the increasing contacts between 
Taiwan and the Soviet Union, on matters including economic, intelligence, and defense 
issues.535 Despite the potential for growing ties, Taiwan and the Soviet Union did not 
embark on a new partnership. Such a relationship would have risked the chances of conflict 
in the Taiwan Strait, involving either China or China and the United States.536 
Taiwan’s approach to the Soviet Union was likely intended to scare the United States 
into recognizing the ramifications of US-China relations. Simultaneous to its policy of 
deemphasizing dependence on the US, Chiang Ching-kuo reminded the US of the 
importance of standing up to Communism. After NSSM 212, Chiang wrote to Ford, noting 
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that Taiwan had been a “loyal friend and ally,” and expressing the opinion that “Any 
change in the status quo, especially in respect of United States relations with the Chinese 
Communist regime, will inevitably result in upsetting the desired equilibrium and turning 
the scale in favor of communist expansion.”537 Recognizing Taiwan’s anxieties, Ford 
dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib to Taiwan, to remind Chiang that the 
US had “shown a prudent regard for the vital interests of your people.”538  
Taiwan’s policy response to the changes to arms transfers after NSSM seems, at first 
glance, confused and incoherent. On the one hand, it feebly tried to align with the Soviet 
Union, a communist state. On the other, Taiwan communicated its continued opposition to 
and wariness of communist countries to various US officials. Taiwan did not realign with 
the Soviet Union, nor did it pursue diplomatic or military action against China. Taiwan was 
suspended between policy options because of ambiguous US policy: arms transfers 
reassured Taiwan that the US would continue to remain involved in the defense of the 
island, even as the postponement of decisions on other arms made Taiwan question the 
strength of this US commitment. 
The US policy of strategic ambiguity was cemented with two final documents, the 
Taiwan Relations Act and a 1982 US-China communique about arms transfers to Taiwan. 
As the concluding section discusses, these documents, combined with NSSM 212 and the 
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Shanghai Communique, form the foundation of the policy of strategic ambiguity, which 
continues to inform US actions, and shapes Taiwanese policy, today. 
 
CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZED AMBIGUITY  
 
Questions about US policy were not answered when the US officially recognized mainland 
China in December 1978. The US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, 
which was supposed to clarify the US position with respect to Taiwan. This document 
contained a “substantive ambiguity” about Taiwan, particularly concerning weapons 
transfers. Section 3 of the Act states: “the United States will make available to Taiwan such 
defensive articles and defensive services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”539 Since the Act does not define 
“defensive weapons,” it is unclear what Taiwan could, or should, expect to receive from 
the US. As one scholar noted, “there is a case to be made that if the island were attacked 
the most effective defense would be attacks on air, missile, and naval based on the Chinese 
mainland, which would require weapons of a tactical offensive capability.”540 The Taiwan 
Relations Act leaves the determination of the “quality and quantity” of these weapons up 
to the US President and Congress, in consultation with military authorities.541 Nonetheless, 
the Act signals continued US involvement in the defense and political survival of Taiwan, 
even as it raises questions about just what shape that involvement would take. 
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Were the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act the last word of US-China-Taiwan relations, the 
policy of strategic ambiguity would likely not have persisted for so long. However, the Act 
was contradicted less than three years later in a 1982 US-China communique. This 
communique would seem to pledge the US to stopping arms transfers to Taiwan. In the 
August 1982 communique, the US pledged “that it does not seek to carry out a long term 
policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales will not exceed, either in qualitative or 
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce 
gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.”542 
It is unclear what “final resolution” means. It could mean a peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan-China issue, or it could mean the formulation of new US policy toward Taiwan, or 
anything in between. Adding further confusion, the Reagan administration “clarified” that 
the communique would not supersede the clause about arms transfers in the Taiwan 
Relations Act.543 In response to press questions, Reagan said “we’re doing all the things 
we have always done. The shipments are regularly going on…our Taiwan friends are going 
to continue to get everything they need for their own self-defense.”544 More confusingly, 
just two days after the 1982 communique, the US increased its arms sales to Taiwan, 
beginning with the sale of 30 F-5E and 30 F-5G jets. Three months later, in November 
1982, the US sold Taiwan $79 million worth of armored vehicles.545 Though the US was 
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willing to sell Taiwan weapons that it already had (or produced), the US dragged its feet 
on modern fighter jets, because this would have been “such a visible transaction.”546 If 
arms sales were indeed a “barometer of US behavior,” the barometer gave inconsistent 
readings.547 Like the previous documents concerning US Taiwan policy, neither the Taiwan 
Relations Act or the 1982 Communique defined what arms could be transferred. Arms 
transfers – and postponements and denials – help maintain ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait. 
The longstanding policy of ambiguity means that Taiwan and China are both sensitive 
to signals in other domains which might indicate a change in US policy. In the 
contemporary period, this was seen in speculation that Donald Trump’s phone call with 
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen signaled a new direction in US policy. Described as 
“protocol-breaking” and “historic,” some analysts said the phone call “appeared calculated 
to signal a new, robust approach to relations with China.”548  
Anything remotely involving weapons is the target of overreaction on all sides. In April 
2015 two US fighter jets landed in Taiwan after experiencing mechanical problems. A 
spokeswoman for the Pentagon said, “While this landing was unplanned and occurred 
exclusively out of mechanical necessity, it reflects well on Taiwan that they permitted 
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pilots in distress to land safely.”549 While the US expressed gratitude for Taiwan’s help in 
an emergency, China’s Foreign Ministry made “solemn representation to the US,” and 
demanded “that the United States strictly abide by the ‘one-China policy.’”550 The 
emergency landing was the target of outrage because it was the first time US jets had landed 
on Taiwan in 30 years, and because the F-18 is a flashy boom weapon.551 The rise in 
tensions was certainly not helped by speculation within Taiwanese media that the landing 
was a subtle signal in response to Chinese air force exercises east of Taiwan.552 One US 
analyst agreed with this interpretation, saying that the landing appeared to send “a political 
message to China,” since the F-18s could have landed at a Japanese airfield, instead.553 
The United States appears willing to allow, if not encourage, speculation about its 
motivations. Uncertainty continues to breathe life into the policy of strategic ambiguity, 
and has, for nearly forty years, prevented the outbreak of war between China and Taiwan. 
Because signals sent by weapons transfers have been such an integral part of this policy, 
for such a long period of time, China and Taiwan have also developed sensitivity to 
signaling in other domains. This suggests that as states learn to understand and interpret 
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signals over longer periods of time, signals in one area can bleed into other ways of 
communicating.  
The history of US signaling in East Asia further suggests that uncertainty can be, at 
times, a goal of signaling. Compared to the other two cases, signaling designed to 
communicate uncertainty was more successful than signals designed to send specific 
messages about an upgrade or downgrade in relations. Whether this is a lesson that future 
policymakers should take heed of is less clear. Though intended signals are often 
misperceived – that is, the receiver often reads a stronger signal than the sender often 
wishes to send – it might be the case that some signal is better than no signal. Further, I’m 
skeptical that the deliberate use of uncertainty could be as effectively used in many other 
situations. The structural environment and the political context seem unique: where else 
will the US – or another state – have the option to abandon one ally in favor of establishing 
relations with a newly internationally-focused former adversary? What this case does say 
for policy should come from the simultaneous reassurance signal (to Taiwan) and 
deterrence signal (to China) that the US sent through arms transfers. This type of multi-
register/multi-audience signaling is frequently desired by states, and could be of use in 
other areas, including NATO’s eastern border with Russia. However, the high stakes of the 
Taiwan case – the potential abandonment of a loyal anti-communist Cold Warrior – 
increased actor’s sensitivity to and interest in signals. It is unclear if a similar sensitivity 
yet exists in Eastern Europe, or if current political leaders would be able to display the 
nuance needed for this type of delicate signaling.  
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Chapter 6. Receivers Turned Suppliers 
 
Most of the top-tier weapons manufacturing companies are located within the major 
powers. Arms manufacturers in the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, 
Italy, and Germany, as well as trans-European countries accounted for 88.1 percent of all 
arms sales in 2016.554 Even if they aren’t home to major manufacturing companies, many 
smaller states are interested in developing the capacity to produce weapons domestically. 
This can take the form of co-production agreements, like the US offer to help India produce 
an aircraft engine, or assembly and license agreements, like Taiwan’s production of the F-
5E fighter jet. Most theories would expect states to prefer co-production agreements over 
the transfer of a completed weapon: the ability to make/assemble a weapon domestically 
reduces a state’s vulnerability to embargoes, and should give it more political freedom to 
use its weapons. While the receivers in the historical case studies had the option to produce 
(part of) weapons, this was usually not an appreciated offer. States were more interested in 
the transfer of a completed, off-the-shelf weapon, than in developing their own production 
capacity. Part of this is likely because states like the US and UK, which have the top 
weapons suppliers, are reluctant to allow other states access to their most sensitive weapons 
technology. Therefore, co-production agreements are rarely allowed for the newest, or 
most sophisticated weapons systems. From a purely military power perspective, then, states 
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are often better off buying weapons, rather than investing the time and money to build 
factories that will produce older, less advanced weapons.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the number of states that produce and export weapons 
has increased. This raises a complicating question for the theory of arms transfers as 
signals: what happens when a receiver becomes a sender? Are these new senders still 
interested in receiving signals from arms transfers? Do the signals decrease in power or 
meaning? This chapter analyzes the rise of production capacity in India and Israel to shows 
that becoming a weapons sender does not change a state’s interest in receiving signals from 
arms transfers.555 That is, indigenous production capacity is not a substitute for the upgrade 
or reinforcement signals states get when they receive arms. This chapter begins by 
discussing the implications of indigenous production capacity for the theory of arms as 
signals. It then examines domestic weapons production in India and Israel, and addresses 
whether and how those states remain interested in receiving signals.  
 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND ARMS SIGNALS 
 
Arms transfers send signals about political alignment. The previous case studies showed 
that these signals were more powerful than other signals, and that they often provided clear 
lines through otherwise complex diplomatic situations. If this is generally the case, then 
domestic production capacity shouldn’t change a state’s interest in signals. States should 
still want to receive arms because of their political signaling function. However, as states 
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develop their capabilities to produce weapons, they are likely to buy fewer weapons from 
other states, for reasons of economic prudence. If states buy fewer foreign weapons, then 
the range of signals they are able to receive shrinks. For example, if a state builds its own 
boom weapons, then it is hard for that state to receive an upgrade signal. A state that can 
build backbone weapons removes a key source of reinforcement signals. Domestic 
production capability should shrink the range of signals states are interested in: they’ll want 
to maintain existing relationships, but because they won’t be purchasing boom weapons 
might have to find other ways to upgrade and sustain relationships. 
However, in practice, few states produce all types of weapons. Even when states have 
the industrial and technological capabilities to produce weapons, they often find it easier 
to buy abroad rather than produce at home. The Deputy Director of Singapore’s Defense 
Science and Technology Agency explained, for example, “we acquire whatever is available 
on the market, and if what we require is not available, only then do we develop.”556 
Singapore most frequently buys weapons from other states, and adjusts the technology or 
firepower at home. It did this with French AMX-13 tanks, and German Cold War-era 
Leopard tanks, as well as US C-130 transport planes. Singapore even upgraded Gulfstream 
jets with surveillance technologies. Singapore’s acquisition strategy suggests that many, if 
not most, states will not develop a robust domestic arms industry, even if they have the 
capabilities to do so.557 
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The few states that do have the capacity to produce a full range of weapons usually got 
there by sharing technology and research with other states. This type of exchange generally 
happens only between close states. France and Italy, for example, frequently co-develop 
and produce weapons, and the US shares more of its technology with the UK and other 
NATO allies than it does with other states. This means that in practice, states will still buy 
some boom weapons, but these boom weapons are expected weapons transfers, and thus 
function as reinforcement signals. When states are at this level of closeness, the most 
important signals are downgrade signals – sent through the interruption of transfers.  
The situation is different for states who are in the process of developing domestic 
production capacity. It is extremely difficult to develop the ability to design and 
manufacture weapons without external support, so these transitional states are frequently 
interested in joint production and technology transfers.  This changes the way states make 
decision about arms transfers: they have incentives to choose weapons suppliers based on 
who is most willing to help them develop their production capabilities, either by locating 
production facilities in the purchasing state, or by sharing technology. States in transition 
thus might follow an economic, rather than a political signaling, logic. I examine this in 
the following section by discussing arms sales to Israel when it was not fully self-sufficient, 
as well as through an analysis of India, a state that is currently going through the receiver-
supplier transition.  
 
 
 
                                                 
goods, states are more constrained in who they can sell to – which makes developing and sustaining a 
domestic arms industry a risky endeavor.  
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ISRAEL: MAJOR WEAPONS PRODUCER 
 
Israel is an ideal case to examine how, if at all, states with advanced domestic production 
capabilities consider the signals they receive from arms transfers. Israel is one of the top 
ten weapons exporters in the world; in 2015 its exports totaled $5.7 billion.558 Israel has 
distinguished itself as a weapons producer of drones, and it accounts for nearly 60 percent 
of the global market. By comparison, US drones account for only 24 percent.559 Israeli 
arms companies also produce main battle tanks, missiles, jets, and small arms, making it is 
nearly self-sufficient for military hardware production.  
Israel’s domestic production began in earnest after the 1967 war and the resulting 
French arms embargo. Today, it exports weapons to nearly all parts of the globe. The 
majority of Israeli arms go to Asia and the Pacific ($2.3 billion), followed by Europe ($1.6 
billion), the US and Canada ($1 billion), Latin America ($577 million) and Africa ($163 
million).560 Though African states receive the least amount of arms from Israel, Israel has 
made a concerted push to sell its arms to African states including Morocco, Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa. Israel’s 2014 exports to African states were up 40% 
compared to the previous year.561 This section outlines the development of Israel’s 
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domestic arms industry before turning to the signals Israel sends through its own arms 
transfers, and the signals it still looks for when receiving arms. 
 
Development of Israel’s arms industry 
 
Though today Israel is perhaps best known for its drones and the Iron Dome missile defense 
system, Israel has a long history of developing its own conventional weapons systems. 
Many of these systems were developed in response to Israel’s security situation, or as the 
result of embargoes or transfer denials. Referencing Israel’s security environment, former 
Defense Minister Moshe Arens said, “Living in the Middle East is difficult. Having to stay 
on your guard all the time is also difficult…Building up a defense industry in a small 
country is difficult and one can only maintain it if you export.”562 In other words, part of 
the reason Israel needed to become a weapons exporter was to support and sustain its own 
defense production – a particularly important industry because of the frequent arms 
embargoes placed on Israel. 
Israel’s first tank, the Merkava, was developed in 1974, in direct response to the United 
Kingdom’s unwillingness to sell Israel the Chieftain tank.563 The Merkava was the first 
major conventional weapon platform made entirely within Israel, without relying on 
engines or other parts from other states.564 Israel was also an early mover on drones, first 
using domestically-produced drones in 1979. By December 1983, the United States asked 
Israel for assistance with its own drone program, and the US Navy ordered 175 drones 
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from Israel in 1986. The US used these drones in the 1991 Gulf War.565 Israel’s weapons 
production capabilities stem part from its collaborations with other major weapons 
producers. Israel had manufactured jets under French license, and some of its programs 
received research and development program from the US Pentagon.566 For example, during 
the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration invited Israel to participate in the development 
of the Star Wars missile defense program. Israel’s innovations during those meetings 
resulted in Pentagon financing for the Arrow system, Israel’s first anti-missile battery.567 
The Arrow was the precursor to the Iron Dome, which also received funding from the 
US.568  
As a matter of policy, Israel’s defense ministry has to approve weapons exports. 
However, recent reports suggest that 99.8% of all sales were permitted.569 Many states seek 
Israeli weapons because Israel has gained a reputation for producing effective weapons 
systems. Because Israel frequently uses its own weapons, it has become a proving ground 
of sorts.570 Israel has used this reputation to build its own military assistance program. Like 
the US, Israel provides arms to states it hopes to develop a political relationship with. As 
Aaron Klieman noted, “Arms have been useful, for example, in creating narrow openings 
for political contacts and in cultivating commercial ties. This even pertains to several 
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countries which are reluctant for a variety of reasons to conduct normalized relations with 
Jerusalem and yet are more than willing to do business with it because they respect the 
value of defense support from Israel”571 Overall, then, Israel’s development over time has 
seen it move from the position of primary importer to primary exporter. But does Israel 
still seek signals from arms transfers. 
 
Transfer Signals 
 
As a sender of weapons, Israel generally operates as my theory expects. This is face validity 
for applying the theory to all weapons exporters, regardless of their power standing in the 
international system. Israel uses arms transfers as a way of “showing the flag” for symbolic 
support.572 Some analysts have called Israeli arms transfers “Uzi diplomacy.” First 
described by a journalist from Haaretz, Uzi diplomacy is a way of cultivating “diplomatic 
and strategic alliances” from its arms exports.573 Transferring arms became a central pillar 
of Israel’s diplomatic strategy after the 1973 war.574 
Sometimes, however, Israel’s use of arms transfer signals seems to have a more 
coercive logic. Israel will give arms with the expectation of a quid pro quo of recognition 
or international support, what Klieman calls “the close interplay between the logic of 
necessity and of opportunity.”575 Israel is sometimes coerced from the other end, too. It is 
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both wary of causing friction with the US based on who it sells arms to, but is also willing 
to act as an “alternate supplier” in instances when the US is unwilling or unable to directly 
transfers weapons to other states. During the Cold War, this meant that many Israeli 
transfers to states in Latin and South America were actually at US bidding.576 
The short answer to the question of Israeli interest in signals from arms transfers is yes, 
Israel still seeks reassurance and continuity through arms transfers. It has, over time, shown 
sensitivity to the signals its own transfers will send. The longer answer, however, is that 
even though Israel can produce most of the weapons it needs for its own purposes, Israel 
remains sensitive to the signals that the US, in particular, sends to Israel—through denials 
or slowdowns—and to upgrade signals The US sends to other states in the region. This 
interest in signals has been relatively constant over time, as demonstrated through the 1986 
transfer of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, Israel’s purchase of Hellfire missiles in the mid-
2000s, and the September 2016 US military aid package for Israel.  
AWACS sale 
The US sold Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia 
during the Reagan administration. At the time, this was the largest foreign arms sale in US 
history: it included five E-3 Sentry AWACS and eight KE-3 refueling aircraft, to be 
delivered between June 1986 and September 1987. Leaders within the US tried to 
downplay the significance of the sale, because they feared Israel’s reactions. West Virginia 
Senator Robert Byrd, then the Senate minority leader, opposed the sale and stressed that 
the vote on the sale “is not a test of the US-Saudi relationship or a test of the US-Israel 
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relationship.”577 One day after the announcement of the sale, the Reagan administration 
issued a statement that said it was “firmly committed” to Israel’s security.578 In Israel, 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin read an official protest to the US Ambassador, and 
expressed “profound regret and unreserved opposition.”579 Israeli Ambassador Ephraim 
Evron met with State Department officials in Washington to ask them to reconsider the 
AWACS sale.580  
Interviews conducted with Prime Minister Begin show that he opposed the AWACS 
sale in part because of the capabilities it would give Saudi Arabia. Begin said he was 
concerned about Saudi Arabia’s capabilities to surveil Israel.581 But he also thought that 
the US was not acting as a true friend. When asked about US-Israeli relations, Begin said, 
“We’re friends and allies. I will always quote that expression by the Secretary of State, we 
are in a permanent alliance.” But “relations are not as they used to be.”582 Begin’s objection 
to the sale doesn’t make much sense on military capabilities grounds. Though the planes 
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were useful for surveillance purposes, the deal included a provision that would have had 
US experts monitoring the intelligence gathering, in a direct attempt to limit Saudi abilities 
to surveil Israel. The AWACS also would not have been equipped with the same advanced 
computers as the ones used by the US. As a 1981 article from Newsweek put it: “[The 
AWACS] are ponderous, ungainly, and wholly unarmed – hardly the sort of modern 
warplanes that, to a layman, seem likely to alter the military balance throughout the Middle 
East.”583 And yet, Israel’s strenuous objection to the AWACS sale shows that it was still 
quite sensitive to the signals sent by arms transfers, even after it had developed its own 
weapons production capabilities. 
The perspective that the AWACS sale would inaugurate a new US-Saudi relationship 
was not unique to Israeli leaders. An opinion piece by William Safire in the New York 
Times said that the sale represented a diplomatic shift that indicated the Reagan 
administration wanted to make Saudi Arabia “America’s Arab linchpin.”584 The Christian 
Science Monitor similarly reported that the sale demonstrated Reagan’s intent to “include 
Saudi Arabia now as the third favored nation on which the US bases its strategic 
planning…”585  
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Although Israel was concerned about Saudi Arabia’s new surveillance capabilities, it 
was also concerned about what the transfer signaled about future US-Saudi relations. Israel 
wanted to stop the sale, thus preventing a strengthened US alignment with Saudi Arabia.  
Hellfire Missile Stoppage 
Israel ordered Hellfire missiles from the United States in 2005, and again in 2014. The 
Hellfire is an air-to-surface missile used against armored targets, like tanks or reinforced 
structures, and it can be launched from the Predator drones. After learning that Israel used 
Hellfires in Gaza and against civilian infrastructure, the Obama administration stopped 
shipment of the missiles to Israel in August 2014. 
Israel’s reaction shows that importance it places on reinforcement signals: even though 
Israel is capable of making its own, similar missiles, it was concerned that the interruption 
to the missiles’ delivery signaled a downgrade in its relations with the US. The Wall Street 
Journal reported that the Obama administration stopped the transfers to show “Israel that 
military assistance once taken for granted is now under closer scrutiny.”586 In response to 
the cessation of arms shipments, Israeli Finance Minister Yair Lapid said, “This is a 
worrying trend and we cannot allow it to continue. Our relations with the United States are 
a strategic asset that must be maintained.”587 The interruption of transfers that were 
otherwise expected was, at one point, unthinkable. Former Israeli Ambassador Michael 
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Oren said that the US would never halt or reduce weapons supplies to Israel: “It would 
never happen. It can’t happen. Israel does not want to change the relationship, and it’s not 
in the US interest for it to change either.”588  
The Hellfire saga likely evoked memories of US actions in the wake of the 1973 war. 
Gerald Ford refused to sell F-15 fighter jets and Lance missiles to Israel. Yitzhak Rabin 
feared would lead Arab states to “conclude that the US was singling out Israel.”589 Perhaps 
recognizing that the stoppage would send a downgrade signal, US officials tried to blame 
“the bureaucracy” and said that it was not a “signal of disapproval.”590 Nonetheless, Israeli 
officials read a signal in the temporary pause of transfers from the US.  
Arms Aid Negotiations 
Finally, in September 2016 President Obama announced a $38 billion military aid 
package for Israel, to be disbursed over the next ten years.591 Israel had hoped for as much 
as $45 billion, and many within Israel saw the deal as a signal of a downgrade, or at least 
a cooling, of relations between the US and Israel. The arms aid, however, did include 
squadrons of the F-35 – the modern-day equivalent of the F-104 Starfighter, the ultimate 
bling weapon. Nonetheless, Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak called the deal “a failure 
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and a sign of the withering relationship between the US and Israel.”592 As he explained in 
a Washington Post editorial, Barak felt that already poor relations between Israel and the 
US were reflected in this less than satisfactory deal. He said that if US-Israel relations had 
been stronger, the aid package would have been better.593 For Barak, arms transfers still 
reflect the strength of US-Israel ties.  
One of the provisions that made the deal under Obama different than previous deals is 
that it prohibits Israel from asking Congress for additional aid. An opinion piece in Haaretz 
said that this provision was “humiliation,” and that it means the aid package is in actuality 
a decrease from prior years as a result.594 One contrary view came from Ilan Goldenberg, 
director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, 
who said, “The most important thing about this is the strategic message. The fact that 
Obama and Netanyahu are able to get this done even when they don’t agree on a lot of 
things and they don’t have a very good personal relationship is a very strong signal that 
this is a vital alliance and each side recognizes it transcends politics and personalities.”595 
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Regardless of interpretation, the debate over the arms aid shows that US and Israeli leaders 
still treat transfers as signals of political alignment.  
The case of Israel shows that even when states are largely self-sufficient, they still care 
about the signals sent by arms transfers. For Israel, that manifested in special attention to 
downgrade signals and to interruptions to reinforcement signals, as well as attention to the 
signals its neighbors received.  
 
INDIA: A STATE IN TRANSITION 
 
Unlike Israel, India is a more typical case of a state transitioning from receiver to supplier. 
India has the capabilities to produce small arms, ammunition, and larger ordnance, but has 
not yet achieved the ability to design and manufacture the larger conventional weapons. 
Most of what it transfers are second-hand weapons, like Soviet-era T-55 tanks, or light 
helicopters that have been produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in India. Overall, 
its defense exports, at about $150 million per year, are less than that of Israel, South Korea, 
and even Singapore.596 India has struggled to transfer weapons it has produced at home. In 
2016 India sold light helicopters to Ecuador, but after a number of these helicopters 
crashed, Ecuador pulled them from use and said it had received poor support and training 
from India.597 India remains undeterred in its quest to become a producer of major weapons 
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systems, and since the 2010s has embarked on a concerted effort to develop its indigenous 
production capabilities beyond small arms and ordnance.598 An analysis of India’s recent 
arms transfer decisions thus affords the opportunity to see how, if at all, India considers 
the signals sent by arms transfers. This section overviews the Indian government’s efforts 
to become a major arms supplier, before turning to two specific arms transfers: India’s 
search for a medium multi-role combat aircraft, and its purchase of Sea Guardian drones 
from the United States. 
 
Indigenous Weapons Development  
 
At the Defense & Security Equipment International Weapons Exhibition in London, the 
Indian government had a large pavilion to display its capabilities as a weapons producer. 
The weapons exhibition coincided with the release of the “Make in India” campaign, which 
is the government’s policy for weapons procurement. Make in India requires the 
government to first look at domestic producers before purchasing from abroad. If a foreign 
producer is necessary, the Indian government requires the manufacturer to produce 60 
percent of the weapon components within India.599 This policy is an attempt to coerce 
manufacturers into sharing their technology with Indian firms, which the government 
believes will help India become a major arms producer. Indian Defense Production 
Secretary A.K. Gupta said that this policy, “Will not only take us toward the goal of self-
reliance in defense production, but will also create tremendous employment 
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opportunities.”600 This seems to be evidence, then, that India is primarily concerned with 
economic and technological logistics, rather than the political signals it would receive (or 
send) through arms transfers. 
The economic logic of arms transfers is also evidence in India’s Defense Production 
Policy. This policy, developed in August 2012, doubles down on the economic logic by 
prioritizing defense offsets. Offsets are agreements that require the selling state to 
undertake some activity to offset the purchase value of the weapon.601 The Indian 
government prioritizes offsets in the form of technology transfer and locating production 
within India.602 The policy states that “The key objective of the Defense Offset Policy is to 
leverage capital acquisitions to develop Indian defense industry by (i) fostering 
development of internationally competitive enterprises (ii) augmenting capacity for 
Research, Design, and Development related to defense products and services and (iii) 
encouraging development of synergistic sectors like civil aerospace and internal 
engineering.”603 Rather than choosing a supplier based on the lowest cost or the political 
alignments that would result, the Indian government makes its decisions based on a 
combination of lowest cost and superior technology, what is known as the L1T1 method.604 
Even though there is an economic underpinning to India’s procurement policies, the 
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government believes self-sufficiency in arms production is just good international politics. 
A 2015 amendment to the Defense Production Policy opened with a quote from 
Machiavelli’s The Prince: “Now the main foundation of all States, whether new, old or 
mixed, are good laws and good arms.”605 Official Indian policy is therefore to use arms 
transfers as a means to an end. By requiring weapons components to be produced in India, 
it hopes to establish the manufacturing infrastructure to produce major conventional 
weapon transfers. By seeking the transfer of technology, India hopes to turn single weapons 
deals into the technological knowhow that will allow it to produce multiple types of 
weapons. 
Despite this coordinated effort, India has not come close to achieving its goals. The 
Indian army rejected an Indian-made rifle (twice!) because the rifle failed quality tests. The 
Arjun tank and the Tejas light combat aircraft, both of which were locally produced, can’t 
be deployed to India’s border with China or to Kashmir, because of performance issues.606 
India had slightly better luck with co-production and development. The Brahmos cruise 
missile, jointly produced with Russia, is a capable military weapon that India is seeking to 
export. It hopes to build on its experience with Brahmos by seeking similar joint-
production arrangements with other states.607 Because India’s domestic production 
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capabilities are lower than Israel’s, India continues to seek weapons from other states. Two 
deals in particular illustrate the competing pressures of economics and political signals.  
 
Transfer Signals 
 
India remains interested in using arms transfers to signal political alignment, but often for 
instrumental reasons. India’s desire for technology transfer has made it interested in 
developing closer relations with the United States, because it knows that only close allies 
get access to US weapons technology. For reference, even the United Kingdom did not get 
full access to the technology suite inside the F-35 fighter jet. The US designated India a 
Major Defense Partner in December 2016, indicating that a closer relationship was on the 
horizon.608 Vivek Kapur, an analyst with India’s Institute for Defense and Security 
Analyses wrote, “While India is not an ally of the US, the current US offer of technology 
transfer places India at a level of high trust and strategic importance with the US.”609 The 
Indian government does display an interest in using arms for signaling purposes, though 
its desire for those signals might be motivated by economics rather than more general 
political alignment.  
Sea Guardian Sale  
The Sea Guardian is a maritime unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). It is the non-lethal 
version of the MQ-9 Reaper drone. In 2017, the Trump administration authorized the sale 
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of 22 Sea Guardians to India, a sale worth more than $2 billion.610 This was the first arms 
transfer to India since it was designated a major defense partner. According to my theory, 
the Sea Guardian transfer should play the role of a first transfer, cementing the new ties 
that came with the Major Defense Partner designation. 
The Sea Guardian transfer was, in fact, seen as inaugurating a new relationship between 
the US and India. The two states released a joint statement noting that “The US and India 
look forward to working together on advanced defense equipment and technology at a level 
commensurate with that of America’s closest allies and partners.”611 Expert observers 
agreed that this was a significant step in US-Indian relations. A report by the Atlantic 
Council noted that the transfer is a “seminal event” because it is the first time the UAV 
was sold to a non-NATO/non-coalition partner. The report determined: “This should be 
viewed as a significant step in cementing the US-India bilateral defense relationship.”612 
Similarly, the Times of India also called the deal “a significant step” for US-India ties.613 
An opinion article in the Hindustan Times emphasized that this was the first Sea Guardian 
sale to a non-ally, and noted “in announcing this offer to India, Trump effectively signaled 
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that the US has staked out a new policy position in India’s favor…”614 It continued: “in 
offering India Sea Guardians, the US recognizes that India is a maritime partner and the 
interests of both nations are aligning.”615 US Senator John Cornyn, co-chair of the Senate 
India Caucus tweeted (yes, tweeted), “Drone sale would cement US-India ties.”616  
These interpretations fit with other signs that US-Indian relations are warming. US 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis traveled to India in 2017 to discuss US-Indian 
cooperation and said that the US was looking forward to sharing advanced defense 
technology. Reports noted that the visit “underscored the growing salience of defense ties 
in shaping the trajectory of Indo-US relations.”617 One analyst observed that “As India and 
the US expand military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, new alignments are emerging 
which have the potential to reshape the regional security architecture.”618 India’s pursuit of 
military technology is thus a cause of its search for closer ties with the US.  
The Sea Guardian transfer seems to indicate that India is aware of the signals sent by 
arms transfers, and that it remains interested in upgrade signals, even as – or perhaps 
because of – its attempts to build its own defense industrial base. Should India receive 
advanced technology from the US, and if it is able to translate this into the ability to produce 
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and repair US/Western weapons, India will find itself in a unique position. Most of India’s 
weapons are of Soviet/Russian origin, and it is capable of maintaining and repairing these 
weapons. If India can develop the same capabilities for Western weapon systems, it will 
be the only state with the expertise and infrastructure to integrate and upgrade Russian, US, 
and European weapons systems.619 This would be an extremely powerful position, because 
India would be a link in the supply chain for nearly all weapons sales. But to get there, 
India first needs to cultivate a strong and close political relationship with the US and 
European states, in order to receive technology commensurate with its status as a close 
ally.  
Mother of All Defense Deals 
India’s interest in the signals sent by the Sea Guardian transfer sharply contrast to the 
way India handled its search for a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). The 
MMRCA tender, known as the “mother of all defense deals,” was purported to be a US$13-
15 billion deal for 200-300 jets.620 As of April 2018, the MMRCA tender was effectively 
canceled, but the way India approached negotiating with potential sellers followed an 
economic, rather than a political or strategic, logic.  
India was prioritizing manufacturers who would transfer it the technology so that more 
than half of the planes could be produced and assembled within India.621 India needed 
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foreign support for this because for more than thirty years India has tried to build its own 
single-engine fighter jet, without success.622 India tried, in the early 1980s, to produce its 
own successor the Russian-produced MiG-21, which was a staple of India’s inventory.623 
In 2011, India issued requests for information to manufacturers in France, the US, Russia 
and Sweden, and stressed its desire to have most of the planes built in India.624 As Vipin 
Narang noted, the purchase of jets from the US would “mark a watershed moment in India’s 
strategic outlook as it would be the first major shift away from Russian platforms, 
embedding India in a deeper commercial and military relationship with the United States 
for parts, weapons, maintenance, and operational training, generating an integrated client-
side relationship.”625 Ashely Tellis, a senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment, 
similarly wrote that a purchase from the US would be unparalleled because of the gains 
accruing to New Delhi from a stronger partnership with the United States. Such a 
development would be cheered in Washington and would send important signals to all 
India’s neighbors – especially its adversaries, China and Pakistan.”626 However, India 
                                                 
622
 Sandeep Unnithan, “MMRCA redux,” India Today, 3 February 2017, 
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/defence/story/20170213-aero-india-exhibition-mmrca-contract-
fighter-aircraft-985686-2017-02-03; Dinakar Peri, “Why has India struggled to buy fighter aircraft?” The 
Hindu, 25 November 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/why-has-india-struggled-to-buy-
fighter-aircraft/article20915834.ece. 
623 Dinakar Peri, “Why has India struggled to buy fighter aircraft?” The Hindu, 25 November 2017, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/why-has-india-struggled-to-buy-fighter-
aircraft/article20915834.ece. 
624 Vasabjit Banerjee and Prashant Hosur, “The Rafale acquisition scandal: A potential threat to France-
India defense relations,” The Diplomat, 12 December 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/the-rafale-
acquisition-scandal-a-potential-threat-to-france-india-defense-relations. 
625 Vipin Narang, “India’s MMRCA deal: Muddled rationale, costly adventure?” University of 
Pennsylvania Center for the Advanced Study of India, 26 October 2009, 
https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/narang. 
626 Ashley Tellis, “Dogfight! India’s medium multi-role combat aircraft decision,” Carnegie Endowment 
for international Peace, 2011, p. 102 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   250 
ultimately chose France’s Dassault, and began the process to purchase and produce the 
Rafale fighter jet. India’s decision was based on France’s willingness to transfer technology 
to India and because Dassault came in as the lowest bidder.627 One analyst, quoted in The 
Hindu said that India had “settled for a plane, not a relationship.”628 Ultimately, the deal 
with Dassault failed because of disagreements over how much of the plane would be 
produced within India, and because of Dassault’s lack of confidence with the ability of 
firms in India to produce the plane.629  
Nonetheless, the India’s focus on technology transfer and lowest costs shows 
contradictions within India about the role and purpose of arms transfers. The MMRCA 
saga suggests that India’s interest in becoming a self-sufficient arms producer negated its 
interest in the political signals sent through arms transfers. And yet, India’s response to the 
2017 Sea Guardian deal suggests that India remains quite interested in using arms transfers 
to signal, and produce, closer political ties. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Even when states are able to produce their own weapons, they remain interested in the 
signals sent by arms transfers. In the case of Israel, the signals sent by arms transfers remain 
important indicators of political relationships in the Middle East. For India, the signals sent 
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by arms transfers can lead to closer political relationships, which should ultimately help 
India increase its domestic production capacity. Regardless of the interests of the states in 
the transfer dyad, observing states continue to interpret arms transfers as signals of political 
alignment. Importantly, even India, where there are hints of an economic logic to arms 
transfers, the signals sent by arms transfers are significant. This suggests that arms transfers 
will continue to play a signaling function, even if the global arms trade shifts to operate 
under a more strictly economic logic. As seen in the historical case studies, arms transfers 
send signals about political alignments, regardless of the intent of the sender or receiver. 
This brief investigation into the choices receivers make has provided further face validity 
for the applicability and generalizability for the theory of arms transfers as signals. 
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Conclusion 
 
As credible signals of the strength and depth of international alignments, weapons transfers 
have proved an essential tool in states’ diplomatic toolkits. Weapons transfers expand the 
foreign policy options available to states by allowing them to hold on to otherwise 
contradictory relationships. For the United States, at least, weapons transfers built intra-
group hierarchies and established nuanced relationships with friends and allies – formally 
or informally defined. Israeli diplomat Abba Eban, describing US foreign policy said: “It 
is characteristic of American diplomacy that it seeks to accommodate a bewildering 
pluralism of objectives within every definition of its interests. It recoils from sharp, 
exclusive alignments and thus ends up by distributing displeasure across a broad field. 
Other nations complain that the United States is not a [one hundred] percent friend; but 
they also acknowledge that its adversarial postures are not intense and immutable. 
America’s allies always have something to fear and its foes have something for which to 
hope.”630 This vast, and often contradictory, US foreign policy would not have been 
possible without the signals sent through US weapons transfers. Weapons transfers can 
represent a ray of sunshine in an otherwise bleak situation, or they can be a looming storm 
in an otherwise friendly relationship. This final chapter summarizes the findings of the 
dissertation, assesses its applicability in other settings, and outlines implications for both 
scholars and policymakers.  
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SUMMARY OF THE CASES 
 
This project developed a theory to explain the foreign policy effects of conventional 
weapons transfers. It showed how arms transfers are signals of political alignment, and 
how different signals lead to different foreign policy outcomes.  The chapter on US arms 
transfers to India and Pakistan, which was the least complex of all the cases, helped explain 
why India and Pakistan went to war in the spring of 1965, and why Pakistan turned away 
from its chief ally, the US, and toward China in the early 1960s. Pakistan’s foreign policy 
shift was the result of a downgrade signal, in the form of denied F-104 Starfighter transfers. 
Lacking confidence in its ties with the US, Pakistan pursued new relations with China. 
Simultaneous to Pakistan’s shift, India was disappointed by the lack of boom and bling 
weapons transfers from the United States. Even though the US rushed aid to India during 
its 1962 border war with China, the lack of subsequent transfers of prestigious weapons 
ultimately prevented the rise of a US-India coalition. The signals sent by arms transfers 
explain fluctuations in US relations with both India and Pakistan, and the ebbs and flows 
in tensions on the subcontinent.  
The chapter on arms transfers to the Middle East begins to add complexity to the 
explanation of arms transfers as signals. It offers an amended explanation of the June 1967 
war, centered on the missteps the US made in its relationships with Jordan and Israel. 
Crucially, this chapter shows how arms transfers send signals regardless of the intentions 
of the sender. Though the US tried to couch all of its transfers to Israel – beginning with 
the 1962 transfer of Hawk missiles – as one-time, uneventful transfers, Israeli leaders 
believed the transfers foretold growing strategic alignment with the US. Israeli leaders were 
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therefore surprised, in April 1967, to learn that US leaders did not share their view of a 
close Israeli-US partnership. With respect to Jordan, the US thought that the transfer of 
backbone and blip weapons in the spring of 1967 would reinforce US-Jordan ties. But the 
US severely miscalculated: Jordan had hoped for bling weapons in the form of supersonic 
jets. This disappointment led King Hussein question the US commitment. Unsure of true 
US intentions, Hussein realigned with Egypt, a shift in Middle East power coalitions which 
ultimately led to the 1967 war. Despite US intentions, the signals it sent through arms 
transfers contributed to uncertainty and to anxieties – creating an environment ripe for war. 
The case of US arms transfers to Taiwan in advance of the opening to China presents 
the most complex, and hardest, case for the use of arms transfers as signals of political 
alignment. This chapter highlights the key role arms transfers played in producing and 
sustaining US policy of strategic ambiguity. Even as the US was normalizing relations with 
China, it used arms transfers to Taiwan to simultaneously deter China and reassure Taiwan. 
This was arguably the most successful use of arms transfers as signals, as the policy of 
strategic ambiguity has persisted through the present period, and has worked to prevent the 
outbreak of armed conflict between China and Taiwan. This case also showed just how 
much effort goes in to maintaining the status quo. Contrary to the belief that change is 
harder than maintaining the status quo, the United States and Taiwan had to put significant 
time, resources, and effort into continuing their relationship over time. 
Overall, then, the theory performs well in explaining otherwise puzzling foreign policy 
shifts, and should continue to offer insights into contemporary or future cases that share 
the context of an enduring rivalry or high tensions. Contemporary parallels might include 
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tensions between Russia and the Baltic region,631 Russia and the Ukraine,632 as well as 
rising tensions between Turkey, Syria, and the European Union states.633 The final 
empirical chapter addresses arms signals once states are able to produce their own 
weapons. This chapter shows that arms remain important and sought-after signals even 
once states have domestic production capabilities. That is, the ability to produce one’s own 
weapons does not remove the function or effect of arms transfers as signals. India, which 
has, over the previous fifteen years, embarked on an extraordinary program to develop its 
production capabilities, still seeks signals through its arms purchases abroad. Even Israel, 
which develops its own, highly sophisticated weapons, still cares about the signals it 
receives from the US, as well as the signals other states in the region receive from the US. 
Though the economics of arms transfers have becoming increasingly important in 21st 
century, arms continue to be credible signals of international alignment.  
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This final chapter suggests that arms transfers will continue to remain relevant tools in 
international politics, and begs the question of how they might operate outside of an 
enduring rivalry or high-tension context. Overall, not much should change, though states’ 
attention to the signals sent by arms will likely shift. In contexts where states significantly 
share interests and arms are part of a standard operating procedure of relations, an 
interruption to arms transfers will send a signal. The regular transfer of arms matters, but 
more as a background feature of the existing relations – it is only when this background 
stream is interrupted that states are reminded of the critical role arms play in reinforcing 
ties. For example, the US and many European countries regularly send arms to Saudi 
Arabia, but beginning in 2016 these states faced calls to suspend their arms transfers as a 
result of Saudi human rights violations in Yemen.634 Until then, the transfers had been part 
of regular interactions between these states, making the interruption – even if temporary – 
a notable signal.  
Outside of an enduring rivalry context, the transfer of prestige weapons will be the most 
potent signal. Boom or bling weapons are still powerful symbols, and thus should still have 
a signaling effect. Low prestige weapons, on the other hand, have lower signaling value 
outside of rivalry/conflict contexts. In the contemporary period, China has transferred 
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prestigious weapons to many African states in support of China’s One Belt One Road 
initiative. In the words of one analyst, Chinese transfers of drones, main battle tanks, and 
aircraft serve “Beijing’s end-game [of] longer-term geopolitical and strategic influence.”635 
Two-thirds of all African states now receive Chinese arms, even though most states are not 
in an enduring rivalry or high-conflict environment. This suggests that even as the 
incidence of major conventional war decreases, arms transfers will retain their signaling 
function.  
Because the primary empirical analysis in this project focuses on the Cold War period, 
there are remaining questions about arms transfers in the 21st century, particularly as new 
suppliers enter the market. It might be the case that economic pressures constrain or 
otherwise modify the applicability of the arms-as-signals theory. This dynamic was 
partially seen in the case of contemporary India: the government’s procurement process 
now emphasizes technology transfer alongside capabilities and lowest cost. States that have 
little to no domestic production capacity, or that are seeking to significantly grow their 
economic power, might find value in weapons transfers as a means to economic ends. 
Brazil, for example, concluded a US$5.4 billion deal with Saab of Sweden for Gripen 
aircraft. Sweden’s Minister for Economic Development said of the deal: “It paves the way 
for a long-term strategic partnership with Brazil in a whole range of areas ranging from 
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defense to civilian industry-related projects.”636 Similarly, Malaysia has used recent 
weapons purchases to fund domestic infrastructure development, and to fund green and 
cyber technology companies, healthcare, and post-secondary educational programs.637 The 
Malaysian government explains its weapons procurement strategy as giving priority to 
“activities that provide active platform for local industry participation in selected sectors 
contributing to the national aspiration towards achieving developed country status.”638 If 
states are interested in the economic side benefits – or offsets – they can get from arms 
transfers, do such transfers still send political signals? Do political signals enter into these 
states’ calculations? More research is needed to understand the long-term effects of using 
arms transfers in this way. 
 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
This dissertation has identified a number of avenues for future research, four of which I 
discuss here. First, how do arms become symbols? The approach in this project has been 
to determine prestigious weapons inductively, by searching for instances where leaders 
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discussed the prestige of the weapon without reference to, or in spite of, its capabilities. 
But it would be useful to know if some weapons are more likely to be symbols than others. 
I have suggested that there is a baseline of technology and/or firepower that weapons need 
to reach in order to be candidates for prestige, since the notable prestige weapons were the 
F-104 fighter jet (high technology), submarines (technology and potentially firepower), 
and main battle tanks (firepower). Technology is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of 
prestige. While there is some work in the feminist literature about the symbols of weapons 
– that, for example, the missile is phallic, that the names of arms evoke gender stereotypes, 
or that the military and weapons are masculinized spaces639 – this literature doesn’t speak 
to the same type of symbolic meaning that is at the heart of this project. And alternate 
pathway might connect with sociological and anthropological work on the rituals of gift-
giving, and seek to find the weapons-equivalent of the conch shell that was an integral part 
of gift-giving rituals and the creation of alliances between different tribes.640 The conch 
shell itself wasn’t particularly useful, but it was an important signifier of status and 
standing. 
It remains, though, an open question whether prestige is something that can be pre-
determined, or if it must always be determined inductively. We also know, however, that 
weapons with identical characteristic will be treated differently. The F-104 fighter jet was 
the symbol of the NATO alliance, but the F-5 and F-4, equally capable jets, did not take 
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on this same shared meeting, even though all three planes had similar capabilities. 
Understanding how weapons become symbols, and the link between prestige and symbol, 
will add more insight into the ways in which different actors understand weapons, and how 
those weapons affect, and are affected by, international politics.     
Second, future research should examine the extent to which signals are substitutable. 
The chapter on China and Taiwan showed the interplay between arms transfer signals and 
diplomatic signals – including diplomatic recognition, high-level visits, and the 
opening/closing of embassies. Are signals directly substitutable for one another? Can a lot 
of diplomatic signals overwhelm an arms-based signal? Are there certain points in a 
relationship where a signal in one domain is more impactful than a signal in a different 
one? The evidence in the preceding chapters would seem to suggest that arms are unique 
in their ability to expand states’ foreign policy options, but a more systematic analysis is 
needed to address this issue. Similarly, can arms send signals through different uses, such 
as the forward positioning of arms? This might be a weaker signal, since the “receiving” 
state doesn’t actually take ownership of the weapon, but there might be signaling dynamics 
in play here. Alternately, the forward positioning of weapons would provide the 
opportunity to examine signaling in a more narrowly confined deterrence and compellence 
context.641 It might be the case that forward positioning shares more in common with the 
military moves states use to signal will and capability, than it does to the more general 
signaling of political alignment through arms transfers. Finally, there is a remaining 
question about substitutability where nuclear weapons are concerned. As was only briefly 
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alluded to in the case studies, nuclear weapons have implications for both the sender and 
receiver of conventional arms. As with the case of US arms transfers to Israel, the sender 
might be willing to give a state more conventional weapons to forestall the receiver’s 
nuclear development. This means that the receiver can threaten and take steps toward 
nuclear development to gain independence within the alliance, or to extract more 
conventional weapons, as Taiwan did in the late 1970s.642 
Future research should also more deeply investigate non-US transfers. This would 
require access to archival evidence from other states, such as France, Russia, China, 
Germany, or the United Kingdom. The theory described here draws primarily on US 
transfers, but scholars and policymakers will both want to know if there are scope 
conditions on who can use arms transfers to send signals. Is the US in a relatively unique 
position, since it is the largest exporter and sends arms to most regions of the globe? Can 
medium-sized powers also engage in this type of signaling? Future research should add 
nuance and depth to this dimension of the theory. 
Though the dissertation explains how the receiver’s foreign policy changes after 
receiving – or being denied – a weapons transfers, the sender was treated as the primary 
decision-maker. The largest task for future research, then, is to determine how receivers 
make their choices when they have multiple options, and how the receiver’s choices affect 
foreign policy in the sender. Some of the cases touched on this: the chapter on the Middle 
East discussed Israel’s choices between the US and UK, and Taiwan had a choice of missile 
                                                 
642
 On Taiwan’s nuclear development, see Hersman and Peters 2006; Albright and Gay 1998. On Israel see 
Cohen and Burr 2006. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   262 
supplier between the US, Israel, and France. But particularly in the post-Cold War period, 
where there is a larger number of suppliers and thus greater flexibility for receiving states, 
we need more research in to how receivers choose between possible suppliers. It would be 
especially useful to determine how receivers decide between supplier from the same 
political group. Does it matter, for example, if a state chooses France over Germany, if its 
ultimate goal is to get a NATO weapon? Since second-tier suppliers depend on arms sales, 
they often offer additional incentives such as technology transfer or co-production. This 
might shift the decision-making calculus made by receivers. It is an open question whether 
or not these economic incentives shape or overwhelm the political signaling dynamics. 
Future work would find value in studying arms transfer decisions in India, Brazil, and 
East Asia, either the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, or Singapore. Each state varies in its 
hostility environment, its level of domestic production capacity, and its geographic 
location, but hold the overall level of development relatively constant. Tensions are highest 
in East Asia and the South China Sea, followed by India and then Brazil, whereas India has 
the greatest capacity for producing its own weapons, followed by Brazil, and then the East 
Asian states. Additionally, India and Brazil are likely to be among the top purchases of 
arms over the next five years,643 so understanding how they make their decisions, and the 
relative weight of political alignment compared to other factors will be of use to scholars 
and policymakers. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS 
 
Finally, this project offers implications for scholars of international politics. First, signaling 
is simultaneously less and more complex than acknowledged by existing scholarship. 
International communication is less complex because it doesn’t require the verbal 
gymnastics of audience costs.644 Though leaders’ statements can still matter, 
communication can be credible without invoking the audience cost or hands-tying 
mechanisms. This, of course, also means that international communication is more 
complex because it is political, social, and contingent. Arms transfers send signals because 
there are symbolic meanings and shared understandings about particular weapons. Scholars 
need to be aware of history, meaning, and the perception of stakeholders in order to explain 
why, for example, the F-104 sent a different signal than did planes with similar capabilities. 
Scholars interested in how states make credible commitments, or how they signal 
alignments and friendships should pay attention to the circulation of things like weapons. 
Though this project holds that arms are unique in their symbolic signaling role, it is possible 
that there are other things – whether goods, services, or ideas – that states use to make and 
unmake relations. One potential area is disaster relief and reconstruction aid. Egypt and 
Jordan offered aid to help reconstruct cities within Syria, and Israel, and many other states 
flooded Mexico with aid following the earthquake in Mexico City in September 2017. In 
each instance, the states offering aid seemed to be signaling something – whether about 
their desire for a closer relationship or about their role as “good” states in the international 
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system. As with arms transfers, the signal comes from the symbol of the transfer/aid, rather 
than its material effects.645 
Second, this project has implications for scholars interested in hierarchy and order in 
international relations, and encourages scholars to think more broadly to the ways in which 
structure can constrain and enable action.646 One of the key insights is that the structure of 
the international system writ large can have variable manifestations at the regional level. 
During the Cold War, Pakistan had more flexibility in its alignment than did Israel – and 
Pakistan, in fact, did align with China in the mid-1960s. The chapter on the Middle East 
shows changes in regional alignment, and the power of the non-aligned movement as an 
alternate to the bipolarity of superpower relations. Understanding flexibilities in the 
structure of the international system is essential for understanding each state’s menu of 
policy options.  
One lesson from this project is that maintaining relationships is hard work. States 
cannot transfer a weapon, sit back, and expect their relationships to stay the same. As is 
the case in individual social relationships, continuity of relations takes investment of time, 
energy, and resources. Receiver’s appetites can grow insatiable, and the sender can feel 
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compelled to feed the constantly ravenous beast. This raises larger questions about the 
effects of aid: if the sender is the one feeling compelled, the idea that military aid confers 
leverage to sender is foolhardy. It is in fact the sender—who is often the more powerful 
state—who feels the pressure to continually act. This is even more so the case for military 
aid, as there is always another suitor. Dependence, it would seem, is experienced more by 
the giver than the receiver. The implication, then, is that states get very little in return for 
the weapons and military aid they give to others.  
Finally, this project has significant methodological implications for how we conduct 
research in and draw inferences about international politics. The theory developed in this 
project sits at the intersection of materialist and constructivist approaches to international 
security, and does not hue to a single method of inquiry. It takes advantage of standard 
statistical analysis, network analysis, and process tracing through case analysis. It draws 
from participant observation at weapons shows and extensive archival work. Most 
importantly it emphasizes relationalism: that states act in and are acted upon by a social 
structure, and that states are not separable from their relations. I have fused heuristics from 
political psychology, the balance of power from traditionally rationalist schools of thought, 
and work on signaling and communication from across the spectrum with new insights 
about the inner workings of the global arms trade. I join the growing ranks of those calling 
for epistemological pluralism, and the importance of a historical sensibility in our 
theories.647 The stakes of this kind of work concern the inferences we are able to make 
                                                 
647
 See, among others, Hadden 2015; Krebs 2015. for examples of this type of mixed-method work. On 
cultivating a historical sensibility, see Gavin 2007, 166-176; Cohen 2005, 575,585. 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   266 
about why actors behave the way they do, and the expected effects of their behavior. A 
historical sensibility and a pluralistic epistemology equip scholars to deal with, and even 
appreciate, surprise, unintended consequences, and uncertainty in international events.648  
Any one of the methods used on their own would have left us with an incomplete 
explanation of the causes and consequences of weapons transfers. For example, the 
statistical analysis highlighted past arms transfers type as a significant variable, but gave 
no guidance about why or how this affected state behavior. The network analysis got us 
closer to an explanation, suggesting there were network effects leading to the development 
of reciprocal ties and the creation of strategic triangles. But we are still in search of the 
mechanism that tells us why and how. The process tracing without the guidance of the 
previous methods would have been more of a wild goose chase than the tracing of a 
process. This is not to say that all inquiries must adopt a mixed methods approach. But for 
areas of research like state behavior – where there is rarely a single, readily identifiable 
cause of action – we need to use more tools at our disposal in order to increase the chance 
that our inferences are based on accurate information. The final implication of this 
approach, then, is that it demonstrates one of the ways in which scholars can adopt an 
epistemologically pluralist approach in order to develop more robust theories.  
This project has two primary implications for policymakers interested in foreign policy 
and grand strategy. First, policymakers should think more deliberately about the 
connections between military/defense and diplomatic actions. If anything, the cases 
demonstrate the power of arms transfers to override other common signals, such as 
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diplomatic visits, (costly) public statements, and development/economic aid. Foreign 
policy, therefore, should be approached holistically, with the different pieces of a state’s 
policy apparatus supporting, rather than contradicting, one another. Though advocating for 
more coordination in bureaucratic processes might seem like a fool’s errand, the costs of 
discoordination are high. Lastly, a consistent theme throughout the empirical analysis was 
the unintended consequences of states’ actions. Arms transfers are signals that are 
extremely difficult to manipulate, so policymakers need to be careful and cautious in 
developing arms transfer policies, and need to consider the multiple audiences that will 
draw inferences from each transfer. States will often find themselves in a signaling bind: 
the signal that it desires to send to one state might be counterproductive to relations with a 
third state. Recall in the case study of Pakistan, arms transfers that the US and India thought 
had little signaling value were taken by Pakistan as harbingers of future doom. In general, 
policymakers should continue to be aware of the interconnectedness of actions, and be 
wary of assuming too much control over the consequences of their actions.  
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Appendix A. New Dataset and Models 
 
This appendix describes the dataset creation and analyses that are discussed in broad 
outlines in Chapter 1. The dependent variable in the dataset I created is the number of arms 
from the United States to the recipient country. Though the master dataset includes all 
transfers 1950-2015, I only analyzed transfers from the US in the following models. The 
variables are described below. 
 
Military and Defense Variables 
 
From the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, I used a 
variety of indicators concerning conflict.649 Fatality is a 0-6 scale of overall fatalities in the 
dispute. The cut points for the variable are: 1-25 deaths; 26-100 deaths; 101-250; 251-500; 
501-999; and more than 1,000 deaths. Hostility Level is the highest level of hostility 
reached in the dispute. It is coded on a scale ranging from 1 (no militarized action) to 5 
(war). The intermediate stops are threat to use force (2), display of force (3), and use of 
force (4). The variable Highest Action records the highest action by an individual side in 
the dispute; it is correlated with hostility level, and I used it only in the robustness models. 
In the models that follow, I lagged the MID variables by one year. From the COW National 
Material Capabilities dataset (v5.0), I used variables concerning military spending.650 
Military Expenditure is thousands of US dollars spent on the military in a given year, and 
Military personnel is thousands of military personnel each year. In the following analyses, 
                                                 
649
 Palmer et al. 2015. Because of ambiguities surrounding the coding of “revisionism,” I excluded this 
variable from my analyses. See MID dyadic-level codebook, v3.10, 2 andPalmer et al. 2015, 222. 
650
 Singer 1988. 
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I logged both of these variables. Finally, I included information from COW’s alliance 
dataset on whether or not the state had a defense pact with the United States, with 1 
representing a defense pact.  
 
Economic Variables 
 
I included variables designed to capture the recipient state’s purchasing power, its level of 
development, and its trade networks. First, from the COW Trade dataset, Flow 1 represents 
imports of the supplier from the recipient, in millions of US dollar and Flow 2 is imports 
of the recipient from the supplier, also in millions of US dollars.651 I logged both of these 
variables. From Kristian Gleditsch’s expanded GDP data, I used data on real GDP in 2005 
US dollars, as well as per capita GDP, and again logged each variable.652  
 
Political Variables 
 
Finally, I included political variables designed to capture latent political alignment between 
the sender and receiver. From Erik Voeten’s dataset, I included two variables on voting 
similarity and affinity. UN voting is the voting similarity index using three-category vote 
data (yes/approval, abstain, and no/disapproval), Affinity Index is the sum of metric 
distances between voted by dyad members in a given year. More concretely, this term uses 
three category vote data to calculate an indicator of closeness, based on the formula 1-
2*(d)/dmax, where d is the sum of the distance between votes, and dmax is the largest 
                                                 
651
 Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008. 
652
 Gleditsch 2002. I used version 4.1, available from 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html 
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possible distance for these votes.653 I also included data on regime type, as coded by the 
Polity project.654 The revised Polity Score variable captures, on a -10 to 10 scale, whether 
the state is more autocratic or democratic. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Before describing the models I used, I first present some descriptive analysis of the new 
dataset. Figure 11, below, shows the average amount of arms received by each state, for 
the period 1950-2010. The graph shows significant variation between countries; many 
receive little to no arms, while some countries receive significant amounts of weaponry. 
The x-axis in this graph is each state’s COW country code (the, US, for example, is coded 
2). States are coded based on their region, as indicated by the vertical lines in the figure. 
                                                 
653
 Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey 2017. 
654
 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html 
Figure 11: Transfers by Receiver 
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States in the Western Hemisphere (numbers through 200) have much lower levels of arms 
imports than states in Europe or the Middle East.  
Within Europe, the 200s represent Western Europe, whereas the 300s represent Eastern 
Europe. There is a difference between these groups, too, with Western Europe importing 
more arms than the east. In the middle of the figure, African states have significantly lower 
levels of arms transfers than most other regions. Transfers to the Middle East (600s) are 
among the highest, while most of the Asian states have a lower level of imports.  As this 
graph clearly shows, there is significant variation in transfers by region. 
Narrowing in on weapons transfers sent from the United States, there is again 
variation over time. Figure 12 represents the number of arms transferred on the Y-axis, and 
the year on the X-axis. The figure shows a spike in arms transfers in the mid-1950s, with 
much less variation in the post-Cold War period. To analyze the variables associated with 
these arms transfers, I estimated both fixed- and random-effects models.  
Figure 12: Total US transfers over time 
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The dependent variable – number of arms transferred – is continuous, so I use standard 
OLS models. I estimated the first set of fixed-effects models using the entire dataset, 1950-
2015. Table 5, below, shows the results from a full model that included all the independent 
variables, as well as two models drawn from existing literature. The second model, the 
“conflict model” uses all of the conflict or military-related variables as independent 
variables. The last model in this table is the “economic and diplomatic” model, which 
narrows in on the economic and political independent variables. Across all three models, 
the only independent variable with statistical significance is the previous years’ transfers. 
Many of the variables run in the opposite direction than expected. For example, the Polity 
Score has a negative coefficient, which means states that are less democratic are more 
likely to receive arms from the United States. Similarly, the hostility variable is negative, 
suggesting that conflict in the previous year does not lead to an increase in arms transfers. 
While the full model is the best fit of the three in this table, the conflict model is not much 
worse, though the economic and diplomatic model underperforms.  
Though fixed effects models allow one to examine the effects of factors within the 
same county over time, these models don’t directly allow one to examine the potential for 
temporal breakpoints in these effects. I therefore split the data into Cold War and post-Cold 
War periods, under the assumption that the international system was different before 1990 
than it was afterwards. These differences are reflected in the network graphs in Chapter 1: 
the Cold War-era networks showed sharper clusters than did the post-war networks. Table 
6 reports the results from the economic and conflict model in both periods. Notably, none 
of the independent variables are statistically significant in either split sample period. 
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Though none of the variables are significant, it is notable that some of the independent 
variables’ relationship to arms transfers changes in direction from one period to the next. 
For example, UN voting, having an alliance with the US, and the Polity Score variable all 
have positive coefficients during the Cold War period, but negative coefficients during the 
post-war period. This could suggest that there were different logics to US arms transfers 
during the Cold War as compared to the post-Cold War period. It might be the case, for 
example, that political alignment was a primary determinant of arms transfers during the 
Cold War, whereas arms transfers accord to a more free-market logic, and are less 
constrained by superpower bipolarity in the post-Cold War era. However, since none of the 
variables are statistically significant, we should not draw strong inferences from these 
models.  
To check the robustness of the fixed-effects models, I substituted in other affinity and 
military variables. I estimated one model using the Affinity Index rather than voting 
similarity index, and included military personnel, the highest action level, and fatality level. 
There was one change to the results: using the logged military personnel variable turned 
the US imports variable significant. However, the coefficients are negative, and the 
substantive effects of the variable remain minimal, and the model fit remains the same. The 
previous years’ arm transfers are far and away the strongest explanatory variable. As a final 
check on the quantitative models, I estimated a random-effects variable. The results, as 
reported in Table 8, are very similar. The only difference between the fixed- and random-
effects models, is that in the latter the receiver’s GDP is statistically significant. A higher 
GDP is correlated with receiving more arms from the United States. Overall, though, these 
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results show the difficulty of estimating arms transfers using quantitative models. Further, 
the minor differences in variable significance shows that results are sensitive to model 
choice, which means that it is risky to draw inferences about the relationships between the 
independent variables and arms transfers. 
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Table 5: Modeling Arms Transfers 
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Table 6: Cold and Post-Cold War Comparison 
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  Table 7: Robustness checks 
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Table 8: Random Effects Model 
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Appendix B. Weapons Exhibitions as Field Sites 
 
Over the course of a year I participated in two international weapons exhibitions: Defense 
& Security Equipment International (DSEI) in London in September 2015, and the 
Eurosatory Land and Air Exhibition in Paris, France in June 2016. Each of these sites 
informed my knowledge of the logistics of the global weapons network, and allowed me 
to examine how manufacturers and buyers each talk about weapons. This appendix 
describes the exhibitions as field sites and explains what I learned through participant 
observation.  
I spent the five days of each show walking the conventional halls, collecting brochures 
from weapons manufacturers as well as “swag” – things like a pin in the shape of the 
Eurofighter jet, earphones from Leidos, and canvas bags from the Indian Ordnance 
Manufacturing Board. Where allowed, I took pictures of both weapons on display and the 
layout of the convention hall.  
Each show used a color-coding system to classify guests as either industry, military, 
government, or exhibitor. I was classified as industry personnel, though my name badge, 
which had to be visible at all times, clearly stated that I was from the University of 
Minnesota. Other than that they both displayed major conventional weapons systems, the 
shows were radically different sites. This appendix first describes DSEI, paying particular 
attention to the hierarchy of exhibitors, before explaining some of the key insights from 
the show. It then describes Eurosatory, paying particular attention to the ways in which a 
music soundtrack was used during the demonstration of weapons, before also explaining 
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the ways in which Eurosatory informed this project. The appendix concludes with a 
reflection on how my positionality affected my experiences at the field sites. 
 
DEFENSE & SECURITY EQUIPMENT INTERNATIONAL 
 
This show was held at the Excel Center in London, UK in September 2015. There were 
1,683 exhibitors representing 54 countries, and 34,038 unique attendees representing 108 
countries. After paying for and passing a background check, I was allowed to attend this 
show as a member of the industry. My name badge, which included a QR code that the 
exhibition hall staff scanned each day, clearly stated that I was from the University of 
Minnesota. 
In addition to providing space for manufacturers to display their weapons, DSEI was 
also the site of mini-conferences and seminars, as well as a naval and UAV outdoor 
demonstration. The seminars addressed issues as wide ranging as the future of naval 
warfare, to recruiting a skilled military force, to teaching industry representatives how to 
sell or market their weapons in different countries. I attended a number of seminars 
throughout the week.  
DSEI was geared toward those buying and selling weapons, making it difficult to take 
pictures during the show without drawing significant attention to my participation. 
Participants were more interested in the materials describing the weapons than in taking 
pictures, so in order to observe without drawing attention to myself, I have very few images 
from the event. I did collect nearly 30 pounds of written material, and I also have sketches 
of a few different exhibitor booths.  
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Layout of the show 
 
Security to enter the Excel Center was extremely tight; visitors had to show their badges 
three times and passports twice before being allowed to queue in a line to enter the 
convention center. Most participants arrived via the DLR train, which had a dedicated stop 
for the Excel Center. Inside, exhibitors were grouped both geographically and topically. 
There was, for example, a section of the convention center where most Indian 
manufacturers were stationed, as well as sections dedicated to electronic warfare or naval 
warfare. There were 42 country-specific areas of the show. See the map at the end of this 
section for a layout. 
In addition to the inside space, there was an outside static display area where helicopters 
and a replica fighter plane were stationed. The convention center is on the river Thames, 
which was the site of moored naval vessels. Large speakers played music as you 
approached the outdoor area. When I first approached the area I thought a live band was 
playing “pump up” music: the music was vaguely patriotic and relied on a heavy brass 
section, but was marched along by a drum kit that gave it more of a peppy feel than a “stand 
and salute” feel. The ships moored outside were from Canada, Belgium, Germany, Britain, 
and India, as well as a private French company (though that ship was registered in 
Aberdeen, Scotland). The Thames was the site of the naval demonstration, where we 
watched British soldiers run through a boarding exercise, all of which was monitored by a 
UAV, whose footage was relayed to a large-screen display in front of the audience section.  
Back inside the convention hall, there was a clear hierarchy to exhibitors. Major 
weapons manufacturers, like Lockheed Martin, MBDA, and Raytheon, had two-story 
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structures. Their weapons, or videos displaying demonstrations of their weapons, were on 
the first floor, which also included a reception booth where you could pick up brochures. 
The second floor and back half of the first floor were private rooms. The first floor rooms 
had closed doors and windows only along the bottom of the wall – this is where 
negotiations took place. You could not enter this area unless you were escorted. The second 
story was essentially a reception hall. Most afternoons there would be food, drink, and 
some sort of music coming from these big structures; these were also invite-only. The 
reception booths were staffed by attractive young women wearing outfits that harkened 
back to 1960s flight attendant clothing.  
Lower down on the exhibitor hierarchy were slightly raised platforms. Platforms 
usually had weapons and weapon replicas on display in the front, and closed-door rooms 
in the back. Since the platforms did not have a second story, they could not hold parties in 
the afternoons. Finally, the lowest tier exhibitor had a table and a banner displaying their 
name – they were the lemonade stand equivalent at the weapons show. See the end of this 
document for some of my sketches of different booths and structures. 
Spaced throughout the structures and platforms were the seminar “rooms” – a 
collection of chairs, raised stage, podium, and TV screen roped off from the rest of the 
room. Anyone could attend the seminars – again, the assumption was that if you were at 
DSEI you were a “legitimate” actor in the global weapons network – but the QR code on 
your badge was scanned by the staff prior to each seminar.  
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Attendees 
 
The 34,000 attendees skewed male. Most women were either in charge of the reception 
stands on exhibitor booths or were staff from the Excel Center. Both civilian and military 
leaders attended DSEI. Official military delegations from foreign countries were assigned 
a UK military escort; the higher the importance of the foreign delegation, the higher 
ranking the UK officer. I identified delegations from Chile, the United States, Italy, Ghana, 
Egypt, China (army and navy), Australia, India, Scotland, Norway, Turkey, South Africa, 
Singapore, and Japan. This is not a complete list; I was unable to identify some delegations 
just by their uniforms. This list does, however, show the wide range of countries that 
attended DSEI. Among the civilian (or non-uniformed) people, many wore large gold rings 
on the pinky or ring finger of their right hand. The rings did not look like service academy 
rings, but were common among male participants.  
In addition to the formal meetings that took place in the exhibition hall, meetings 
between exhibitors and non-uniformed people happened in the back of armored vehicles. 
For example, the Rheinmetall medical armored vehicle called Survivor R was the site of 
many meetings, as was Nexter’s infantry fighting vehicle.  
Though the infrastructure for negotiating weapons deals was in place at the Excel 
Center, much of the real negotiations took place offsite. Waiting in line to enter one 
morning I overheard two British government officials talking about their meeting at a strip 
club the previous night. The older official was ribbing the younger one for leaving early, 
and was also bemoaning his hangover. I was able to identify the two men as British 
government officials based on the purple color of their badge and the “British” inscription. 
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Unfortunately, it was not possible for me to observe the after-hours negotiations at strip 
clubs. The gender imbalance was so great that it would have been very noticeable if I had 
followed a group to a secondary location, and my very presence likely would have changed 
the type of conversations taking place. 
I did try to have conversations with the exhibitors. However, no one was interested in 
talking to an academic, even when I framed my research in industry-friendly terms such as 
“the economics of national security.” I approached a very small booth – one that belonged 
to the bottom tier of the exhibitor hierarchy – placed on the outer perimeter of the exhibition 
hall. The colorful banner hanging from the table announced the booth as belonging to “Less 
Lethal Africa.” I thought that if anyone might be willing to talk to an academic, surely it 
would be two individuals working on reducing gun lethality. I approached the booth and 
inquired as to the array of bullets on the table. The bullets were silicone-tipped, which was 
supposed to make them less lethal than typical bullets. The American man running the 
booth reached under the table to take out pictures of someone who had been shot with one 
of these bullets – while the shot was not lethal, there was a large, dark purple bruise 
covering about one half of the circumference of the person’s lower calf. The American man 
did also admit that, at close range, the bullets remained lethal. It was at this point that he 
looked down at my badge, looked back at me, and asked, “What is someone from the 
University of Minnesota doing here?” I explained to him that I was studying the 
international economics of weapons, to which he grunted, put the picture of the bruised leg 
away, and said, “Ok.” After a few seconds of awkward silence, I thanked him for his time 
and moved on.  
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Encounter with a protestor 
 
As I left the exhibition hall Thursday afternoon—the fourth day of the show—a woman 
police officer (a rare sight to begin with) approached me before I left the first secured area 
outside the show. She told me to take off my name badge, which was very strange because 
we had been instructed to keep our identification visible at all times. I asked her why, and 
she glanced over her shoulder before telling me to remove my badge. To my knowledge, 
neither this officer nor other officers asked anyone else to remove their badge before 
leaving the secured area; a number of people on the train platform—the only destination 
from this particular exit—were still wearing their identification. 
I followed the officer’s instructions, and as I passed through the next security area 
(toward where the police officer had glanced) I learned why: a single, middle-aged woman, 
dressed in pink was wearing a cardboard sign that said “war is hell” and “arms deals are 
unethical.” She was also carrying a smaller sign condemning participants at DSEI. There 
were numerous police officers in the vicinity, so I kept walking toward the train platform. 
I don’t know how this woman was able to enter into the secured area, or why the police 
just observed her; we had been told earlier in the week that protests were kept contained 
off-site. 
Even though I did not make eye contact with the protestor, she decided to yell at me. It 
was clear her words were directed at me, as she let multiple people pass in front of me 
without words, and I did not hear any of her protests prior to or after this. She yelled “Arms 
deals make war and suffering! How can you be a part of this?” I don’t know why she chose 
to yell at me. Maybe because I am a young woman and don’t fit the usual DSEI 
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demographic. Maybe it was because I was carrying a bright red bag from an Indian arms 
manufacturer that had a target and cross hatch on it. Once I reached the train platform with 
the other DSEI participants (all still wearing their badges), a British Royal Navy and Royal 
Army solider were chuckling and rolling their eyes at the protestor.  
 
How DSEI informed the project 
 
From the seminars I attended and from observing how people looked at and talked about 
the weapons on display, I learned more about the logistics of the global weapons network 
and of the importance of weapons’ prestige. On the former, I spent most of my time in the 
Global Partnerships Theatre (GPT), which held a number of seminars about how to do 
business in different countries. For example, three former military and government officials 
from India spent 90 minutes talking about how the Indian government issues its requests 
for proposals, key words to include in your bid, and a timeline of decision-making. The 
Singapore and Malaysian governments spoke about their priorities over the next few years, 
and how they plan to use offset agreements to get more from weapons manufacturing 
companies. The primary take-away from these seminars was that the weapons market is 
not a grocery store: states rarely can go out and “shop” and come home with a weapon the 
same month, never mind in the same year. Thus, our assumptions that states can get what 
they want when they want it are deeply flawed. Even when a weapon is transferred through 
grant aid, the sending state must budget out the funding, and states craft their budgets years 
in advance. The Indian government said that it works on a five-year timeline, and that it 
recognized that this was an extremely short timeline compared to most other states.  
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I also learned that weapons “sales” are often not sales the way we usually think of 
economic transactions. Yes, actor A gives actor B a weapon (the tie is directional, has an 
intensity, and a specific content). Usually, we imagine B giving A money (the tie is 
directional, has an intensity, and a monetary content). The buzzword of DSEI, however, 
was “offsets”. Instead of B giving A money in return for the weapon, B required A to give 
additional things. For Malaysia, these things were support for green technologies, and 
investment in infrastructure and higher education. For India, these were domestic 
production capabilities and technological knowledge to build weapons systems. Thus, 
instead of simply reciprocal ties between A and B, A also transferred non-weapons items. 
We can think of this as two ties. The US, for example, sells Malaysia a missile defense 
system (the tie is directional from A to B, has an intensity of 100, and the content is 
missiles). Malaysia gives the US some money in return (the tie is directional from B to A, 
has an intensity of some millions of dollars, and the content is money). The transaction 
continues, however, as the US also gives Malaysia solar panels and their technical 
specification (the tie is directional from A to B, has an intensity of 1,000, and the content 
is both solar panels and technical knowledge). The key takeaway here is that thinking of 
the weapons market as a typical economic exchange network often overlooks the second 
tie going from A to B.  
Finally, on logistics, I learned that states treat weapons transactions as interdependent. 
Quite contrary to many social science models that treat each dyad as independent from 
other dyads, states look to one another for ideas about how to write their weapons contracts, 
for evidence of what weapons proved effective in different contexts, and to learn how 
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different weapons transfers were followed, or not, by greater political investment. A former 
official within the Malaysian government said Malaysia’s new policies on weapons imports 
were based on policies from South Korea and Turkey dating to the 1970s.  
The other important lesson from DSEI concerns weapon prestige. Unlike many other 
weapons shows, DSEI only had one weapon demonstration—the naval demonstration that 
took place on the Thames. Therefore, in trying to differentiate their weapons from available 
others, manufacturers used their brochures and sales pitches to link weapons to perceptions 
of prestige. Brochures on armored vehicles tried to link the vehicles to tanks, by showing 
how they could both transport troops and be used for firing on targets. This is an attempt 
to move a weapon out of a more support-type role and into the category of tanks, which 
are a perceptually prestigious weapon. Future work will further investigate how 
manufacturers try to manipulate perceptions of prestige through their marketing materials.  
 
EUROSATORY 
 
This land and air exhibition was held in Paris, France in June 2016. It featured many 
of the same exhibitors as DSEI, but was a radically different show. There were 1,572 
exhibitors representing 56 countries, and 57,018 unique visitors from 151 countries. To 
attend Eurosatory I did not need to pass a background check, and it was possible to register 
and attend the show on the same day. Though there were security guards around the show, 
security was not nearly as visible as at DSEI.  
The most important difference between the shows is that while DSEI took place over a 
single week, Eurosatory ran for three. Of the three weeks, civilians were allowed to attend 
one week; it was this civilian week that I was able to attend. As at DSEI, badged were color 
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coded, but keeping the badge visible was of less importance at Eurosatory. The show took 
place at the convention center just outside Paris, and had the feel of a comic-con convention 
or a festival, rather than a serious international arms market.  
 
Layout 
 
The show spanned two halls of the five-hall convention center and also used most of the 
outdoor parking space. Inside the convention center, the hierarchy of booths mirrored that 
at DSEI with one notable exception. At DSEI Israel was represented only by the weapons 
manufacturer Rafael. Their booth in London was red and white, and the reception booth 
was placed in the middle of the raised platform. The outside was covered in TV screens 
showing demonstration videos, and of missile models. In order to get to the reception area 
at DSEI, you had to walk down a hall; the layout was such that one would not walk down 
that hallway unless one had reason to do so. Israel’s participation at Eurosatory was the 
exact opposite. There was an entire Israeli pavilion in one of the halls, with an inviting 
reception booth where the staff handed out bags, Israeli flags, and information about 
Israeli-produced weapons systems. 
The outdoor area at Eurosatory was significantly larger than at DSEI. There was no 
river for ships, but Eurosatory was primarily for land and air weapon systems. Located 
outside were static displays of tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft. The outdoor area 
spanned about one and a half football fields. There were pop-up restaurants and food trucks 
parked throughout this area, again fueling the sense that this was a tourist stop and not a 
military or government site. You could also take a shuttle to the “demo area” where, twice 
a day, about ten weapons were demonstrated in a mock exercise.  
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Outdoor Demonstration 
 
About 150 seats arranged on risers and covered by an awning faced mounds of dirt and 
corrugated metal shacks. There was an announcing booth behind the audience seats – if I 
had not known better I would have thought I were attending a high school football game. 
The announcer was a young-sounding British man, who announced each weapon, its 
specifications, and its manufacturer as the weapon entered the demo area. There was a large 
display screen in front of the demo area, where video from four videographers, as well as 
pre-recorded field video from field tests, was relayed throughout the demo. 
Prior to the demonstration beginning, a cop in full body armor was roaming the 
audience area, stopping to talk to attendees. The cop spoke French, but seemed to be 
casually chatting with attendees. The cop smiled and laughed often, but he was at least 6’ 
2” tall, and was carrying what looked like a semi-automatic weapon, making him rather 
intimidating. 
Pictures of the demo area are at the end of this appendix. The area the audience faced 
was staged as a small town on a hill, with one large dirt hill to the right, a scattering of 
metal shack-type structures, and an improvised bridge spanning two hills in the middle. 
The announcer said that it was supposed to be a “typical town in Eastern Europe,” which 
seemed to me an allusion to Ukraine. The narrative of the demo was that rebel forces held 
this town, so the “good guys” were going to take it over, using a variety of different weapon 
systems. The roles of rebels and good guys were both played by British special forces. As 
the demo began, a rock soundtrack blasted over the speakers, softened just slightly when 
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the announcer talked. The music had a relatively high beats per minute, and was composed 
primarily of drums, bass, and guitar – no singer.  
The demo began with 8-wheeled ATV-type vehicles “extracting” the advance team that 
was already in the village. The vehicles sped up and down the dirt hills, and did donuts in 
front of the audience. Next, two infantry fighting vehicles entered the scene and “good 
guys” poured out of the back. They engaged in firefight with the rebels, giving the IFVs 
the opportunity to drive up and down the dirt hills to demonstrate their capabilities.  
The demonstration continued this way, until suddenly things were interrupted by the 
piercing scream of a young woman coming from my right. As I looked in the direction of 
the scream, I saw a man wearing a bandana holding a young blond woman, with what 
looked like a knife in his hand. The hulking cop ran toward them, and the man in the 
bandana ran down in front of the audience area. Thankfully, this was part of the 
demonstration, as other men in bandanas, holding rocks and bricks, emerged from the side 
of the demo area and began advancing on a line of cops that had emerged from a parked 
vehicle. The cops were dressed like the one who had been roaming the audience area prior 
to the show: complete armor and similarly large guns. Two of the cops had dogs with them. 
This was, we learned, a demonstration of the RoboCop gear and of a riot rifle that shot a 
soft projectile rather than bullets. The cops also allowed the dogs to demonstrate their 
ability to disarm a protestor. 
The diversion from military to police was not the only diversion during the 
demonstration; soon after the “protest” ended, a white Jeep Wrangler with “UN” on its 
door in what looked like black tape drove onto the pavement in front of the audience. The 
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announcer gleefully said that the UN had arrived to negotiate with the rebels, but a large 
boom and smoke near the Jeep’s front tire indicated that an IED had gone off. The white 
Jeep sped away, allowing the bomb squad to enter and for the audience to witness new 
bomb-detonation tools. I was surprised by the inclusion of the “UN” vehicle (and that it 
was white), but the audience primarily chuckled at the speedy departure of the UN vehicle. 
Even in this weapons demonstration, the UN was the source of momentary humor.  
It took attending the demonstration a few times for me to pick up on the subtle changes 
in the music that occurred throughout the demo. The type of music never changed – we 
were serenaded by rock music throughout the show. But the tempo and intensity of the 
music changed depending on the weapon on display. When the “rioters” were on stage, the 
feedback in the guitar increased, there was less silence between guitar riffs, almost as if the 
music were trying to echo the chaos and noise of a riot. Toward the end of the demo, a fire 
control vehicle sped around the dirt track, demonstrating the range of its hose. Never has a 
firetruck been so majestically or enthusiastically serenaded. It was as if the least prestigious 
weapons were given the highest tempo and the most coherent music of the demonstration. 
Guitar and bass, supported by the now-constant hits of the cymbal, propelled the fire truck 
along. As our heart rates increased with the beats per minute of the soundtrack, so did our 
adrenaline, and so did (at least in my case, and, I’d wager, for many others), our positive 
feelings toward the firetruck. The music made me happy; had I attended the show only 
once I would have associated that happiness with the firetruck. It was only after multiple 
times viewing the demo – and a misspent youth learning music theory and composition – 
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that I was cued on to the ways in which music was used to manipulate our assessments of 
weapons. 
 
Attendees 
 
While there were some attendees in uniform, they seemed to be treating the week at 
Eurosatory as a tourist event – their arms were filled with keychains, pens, and other 
handouts from the exhibitor booths. Unlike at DSEI, there were no official military escorts, 
and I primarily saw French military personnel, rather than foreign military personnel. 
Because more civilians were able to attend this show, the gender balance was slightly 
better, but attendees and exhibitors were still overwhelmingly male. The women who were 
working with the exhibitors were dressed in a way designed to appeal to men. The platform 
of a Turkish arms manufacturer was staffed by women in tight-fitting dark gray tops and 
very tight pants in a camouflage pattern. Most of the women also wore a civilian version 
of combat boots.  
I did not stand out as much at Eurosatory as at DSEI; the high number of civilian 
tourists mean that taking pictures and video was a more typical behavior of attendees.  
 
Encounter with protestors 
 
Whereas DSEI kept the protestors – for the most part – a few kilometers away from the 
show, protestors occupied the space between the metro station and the first security 
checkpoint at Eurosatory. The protestors objected to profiteering from war, and carried 
signs and banners urging people to stop supporting the war industries. Interestingly, these 
protestors were silent. To get from the Metro to the convention center, you had to go up a 
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small flight of stairs. Protestors stood at the bottom of the stairs – but in front of the railings 
so that they were not blocking anyone’s walking path – handing out small postcards to 
participants. If you refused to take one, the protestor would smile and look to the next 
person. The protestors, and their stunning silence, remained throughout the show. 
On the one hand, it seemed odd to me that there was not some chant or attempt at 
dialogue. On the other, their silence drew us all in. We did not know, that first day, who 
these people were, and as a result I think the protestors were able to get many more people 
to blindly accept their postcards than they would have if chanting had been involved. It is 
also much harder to demonize or laugh at protestors – as people did at DSEI –when they 
stand in silence. 
 
How it informed the project  
 
Eurosatory was important primarily for the ways in which it differed from my experience 
at DSEI. Eurosatory increased the confidence I have in the information I gathered and the 
inferences I drew from DSEI. Unlike Eurosatory, DSEI was the real deal.  
Eurosatory was also important for what it revealed about prestige and perceptions. The 
use of a rock soundtrack, and the demonstration of less-prestigious weapons revealed how 
manufacturers try to manipulate perceptions of their weapons. In this case, that 
manipulation was done through music. The attempt to make a firetruck seem cool was the 
best example of this, but it indicated that perceptions of prestige are subtle and not always 
visible at first glance.  
The demonstrations also made apparent the fluidity between the domain of the military 
and the domain of the police. This has two implications. The first is addressed in this 
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project: the division of weaponry into conventional vs. small arms light weapons is tenuous 
at best. Not only are police forces – especially in the US – increasingly receiving discarded 
military equipment, but they’re also using weapons that are marketed and displayed at the 
same major international events as typical military equipment. The second implication is 
not explicitly addressed in this project but will be a focus of future work. When we think 
of weapons transfers, we often look for outcomes in terms of interstate conflict, or 
rebellions against a government. Eurosatory, by merging the police and military, suggests 
that we need to pay much more attention to the linkages between weapons transfers and 
suppression of domestic dissent. The same vehicles that were used on the mock battlefield 
could also be modified for use on city streets. The same weapons that were used by the 
“rebels” were used by the police. The spread of small arms and light weapons, as well as 
the transmission of tactics and strategies, has been understudied thus far.  
 
POSITIONALITY AND FIELD EXPERIENCE 
 
As a young woman not working an exhibitor’s booth, I was in the minority at DSEI and 
Eurosatory. However, the gender imbalance had a greater effect on my experience at DSEI 
than it did at Eurosatory. Because Eurosatory was open to the general public, I fit in as a 
tourist and did not often garner a second glance from the exhibitors. When I did stop at a 
booth to either pick up materials or take a souvenir, exhibitors did not rise to greet and ask 
me questions, as they did with people who had government or military identification. The 
benefit to this treatment was that it gave me more space to observe different booths and to 
watch interactions between exhibitors and other people. However, this meant that I was 
unable to hear sales pitches or other conversations about the weapons. The metro line out 
Spindel, Beyond Military Power    
 
   308 
to the convention center in Paris terminated at Charles de Gaulle airport two stops later. 
Therefore, based on dress and gender it was difficult to tell who was attending Eurosatory 
as a tourist and who was going to the airport. It was quite easy to pick out the official 
visitors to Eurosatory, as they either displayed their identification on the train, or were 
dressed in suits or military uniforms. Because they were mixing with the general public, 
conversations between official visitors were hushed. It would have been very obvious if I 
had tried to position myself to listen to any of these conversations.  
Though gender was not the primary division between attendees at Eurosatory, it did 
play a role. I asked a male colleague to attend the show with me one day. Though we 
entered together, I asked him to explore on his own and to let me know how it went when 
we met back up for lunch. Though he had the same type of identification as I did, he said 
exhibitors were more willing to talk to him when he paused at booths and platforms. This 
could be a function both of his age and gender, but I think it shows that there is an 
assumption that the women in attendance were not experts or exhibitors. I was assumed to 
be a tourist, and my experience at Eurosatory reflected that assigned role. 
At DSEI, divisions between participants were gender- and age-based, and I stood out. 
This meant that lingering at booths attracted attention, so I spent time when I was not in 
seminars walking through the halls. It was possible to “attach” myself to small groups, and 
to shadow them from a few feet away. This allowed me to listen to sales pitches and 
conversations, without drawing much attention to myself.  
The Excel Center in London is on a DLR train line. Because the train departs from 
central London most of the DSEI attendees were able to get seats on the train; those 
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passengers boarding at stations between London center and the Excel Center had to stand. 
This meant that the rear and front of each car – which had very few standing places – were 
occupied almost entirely by DSEI attendees. Because this exhibition was business casual, 
dress was one way to narrow down likely attendees. Tank-shaped tie clips, and visitor 
badges made it quite easy to identify DSEI participants. The relative separation of DSEI-
goers from the general population made conversations on the DLR more free-flowing. I 
overheard conversations about booths visited, and observed one woman sharing images 
from inside the show with her colleague.  
While there were some women at DSEI, they were usually staff from the Excel Center 
or were working as receptionists for exhibitors. The few women who did not fit this pattern 
appeared to be ten to fifteen years older than me. My relatively young age and gender thus 
marked me in two ways as not fitting the pattern of typical attendees. While I was able to 
observe much of the day-to-day workings of the show, most of the useful information I 
obtained was by sitting in on the seminar series. Further, some important conversations 
took place off-site (at strip clubs or bars), places at which my presence would have been 
noticeable. Certain aspects of the international arms trade were thus foreclosed to me for 
factors outside of my control. I experienced DSEI as an outsider who had earned 
permission to see, but there was still a barrier between my experience and that of the typical 
attendee.  
Though my experience at both of these shows was not that of a typical attendee, my 
outsider status did carry with it some advantages. The point of attendance was less to sit 
on negotiations between manufacturers and buyers, and more to observe the logistics and 
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lay out of the weapons exhibitions. While observing negotiations would have been an 
interesting point of information, it would have been just that: a single point. By instead 
focusing on the totality of show and the regular actions between attendees, I got a better 
picture of how industry insiders use weapons exhibitions. Return trips to DSEI in 
September 2019, and perhaps expanding my participation to additional conferences in 
future years, will allow me to compare weapons exhibitions across time and space. 
